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FINAL REPORT





FOOD SYSTEM SUPPORT of the RELOCATION STRATEGY in CALIFORNIA

VOLUME I: ANALYSIS

Contract DCPA01-78-C-0220 **FEMA Work Unit 2313F**

September 1980

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FINAL REPORT

FOOD SYSTEM SUPPORT

OF THE RELOCATION STRATEGY

IN CALIFORNIA

Volume I: Analysis

by:

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Prepared For:

Federal Emergency Management Agency
Washington, D.C. 20301
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
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SUMMARY



INTRODUCTION

Background

The movement of large masses of population from threatened target areas in advance of a potential nuclear attack will severely test the flexibility of national, state, and local food distribution systems. Past research has assessed the food requirements of the relocated populations; identified promising means of reconfiguring the existing food distribution system to meet these requirements; and developed and documented guidelines for food distribution under crisis relocation and postattack conditions. This study extends previous research efforts by investigating food distribution alternatives in a state, California, where relocation distances are unusually long, and heavy population concentrations in targeted areas are expected to stretch the capabilities of host areas to the limit.

Objectives

The objectives of this research have been to (1) trace the existing patterns of food distribution in California; (2) develop and analyze alternative strategies for reconfiguring the existing food distribution system to support the relocated population; (3) investigate the transportation requirements imposed by distribution changes and recommend means for reducing stress on the transportation system; (4) draft prototype plans for reconfiguring the state food distribution network in an emergency; and (5) develop appropriate guidelines to be used by Nuclear Civil Protection (NCP) planners and local officials in organizing and implementing food distribution under crisis relocation conditions in their jurisdictions.

RELOCATION OPTIONS

California is highly urbanized, with over 80% of its population living in areas threatened by nuclear attack. Hosting accommodations are relatively scarce outside these areas, and the average host area would have to accommodate several times its normal population under crisis relocation conditions. Four different relocation options were considered in this study:

1. Regional Hosting, a plan prepared by the California Office of Emergency Services (OES), in which areas threatened only by potential fallout are permitted to host evacuees, thereby lowering the ratio of risk area residents to host area residents (to roughly 4.5 to 1) and making it possible to assign most risk area relocatees to host areas within their own geographic regions.

- 2. Uniform Hosting, in which each host area accommodates exactly seven times its normal population. Since the majority (64%) of the state's residents live in Southern California, while the majority of the available Yow-risk areas (54%) are located in the northern portion of the state, this option imposes lengthy travel distances on many evacuees. The average distance traveled from risk to host area is 200 miles, and food distribution distances are stretched accordingly.
- 3. Proximity Hosting, in which evacuees are assigned only to host areas near their departure points and areas theatened by fallout in evacuation. This option results in high risk- to host-area population ratios of 12 to 1, but travel distances are correspondingly shorter.
- 4. Proximity Hosting with Transport Constraints. In this option, only 80% of the risk-area population is relocated, and highway capacity is a deciding factor in determining the number of people assigned to each host area.

EXISTING FOOD DISTRIBUTION PATTERNS

As a major agricultural producer, California exports more than half of its home-grown foodstuffs, particularly fruits and vegetables, to other states. In turn, the state imports significant shipments of meat and cereal products. This report traces California's food supply through the channels of distribution from producer to consumer, and assesses the vulnerability of each element to nuclear attack. Approximately 85% of California's farmland is low-risk area removed from the threat of nuclear attack, as is 21% of the state's food processing capacity. Of those foodstocks most readily available for distribution under crisis relocation conditions, California wholesalers have between two and three weeks of inventory on hand, retail grocers have between one and three weeks of inventory, and seven to ten days of supplies are estimated to be in transit to wholesale warehouses at any time. Food wholesalers are the most vulnerable element of the distribution chain. Wholesale stocks tend to be held in distribution centers in such major cities as Los Angeles, San Francisco, and San Diego, with only 6% of the state's wholesale food warehouses located in host areas. Food stockpiles under federal control are quite small, except for stocks of dry milk maintained in several risk-area locations.

DISTRIBUTION OPTIONS

A number of different alternatives for distributing food under crisis relocation conditions were identified and evaluated in terms of specific criteria encompassing set-up and maintenance costs, system disruption, attack vulnerability, operating requirements, equity, transportation stress, and system effectiveness. The results of this evaluation are reflected in the guidelines of Summary Exhibit 1. It appears that the most effective basic strategy for food distribution under crisis relocation conditions is to allow agricultural output and

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Summary Exhibit I RECOMMENDED GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR PROVIDING FOOD SUPPORT FOR THE CRISIS RELOCATION STRATEGY

STATE AND REGIONAL ACTIVITIES

- * Define distribution patterns for chain and independent wholesalers.

 * Arrange for any additional drivers and equipment made necessary by revised distribution patterns through MDTA.

 * Majve vehicle highway weight restrictions.

 * Publicite valving of OOT Driver Restrictions.

	RISA ANIA ACTIVITUS	HOST ANIA ACTIVITIES
PRODUCERS	*Continue any agricultural activity of national, regional, Or local significance. (Little significance agricultural production currently occurs in risk areas.)	* Continue all agricultural activity.
PROLESSORS	* Continue only those processing activities that lead to production of commodities included in energency standards and that either are national or regional in scope or command a significant share of the local market. * Brocurage workers in discontinued processing activities to transfer their shills to similar host area processing facilities. * Ship excess "inventory of cannot goods and other dry grocentes, as ordered, to host area sterage points.	* Continue all food processing activity, expanding uperations where possible through the use of relocated workers and unused capacity.
MICHALLESS RETAILERS	"Continue to operate all chain and independent wholesale operations that command a significant (i.e., over 10%) share of the local market, following revised distribution patterns specified at state and regional level. Empty smaller werehouses as quickly as possible, transferring goods to host area commissaries and warehouses. Encourage workers in discontinued operations to seek employment in host area warehouses. Augment transportation flect and driver pool as required, following guidelines and procedures established by NDTA for obtaining personnel and equipment from other sectors. Increase wehicle and driver productivity by taking advantage of waived driver restrictions and weight instance requirements, increasing wehicle loads; loading only full-pallet quantitie; and shimping only hereasary commedities. "Unserve price controls 6 single purchase limit-	*Continue all food warehousing and distribution activities, expanding operations where possible through the use of commandered space, worker overtise, and relocated warers. Frankers between different comparies may be worsed out as necessary. *Augment transportation fleet and driver pool as required, fallowing guidelines and procedures established by NOTA for obtaining personnel and new equipment from other sectors. *Increase whicle and driver productivity by taking advantage of waived driver restrictions and weight limitations; minimizing down time; relaxing maintenence requirements; increasing vehicle loads; loading only-full pallet quantities; and shipping only necessary commodities. **Observe price controls, single purchase
	ations established nationally during pre-crisis period and evacuation period. As inventories & personnel permit, remain open during evacuation period. Then close operations for duration of crisis relocation period & report on remaining inventories. Chain stores arrange for employees to transfer to chain's host area outlets for duration of emergency. Employees of independent stores should be encouraged to seek employment in host area retail outlets.	limitations, rationing plans, & coupon redemption policies established nationally during pre-crisis period & for duration of crisis relocation period. *Continue all retail food operations, expanding as required by using added personnel relocated from rish area; extending business hours; suthorlizing overlinework; stocking at night; and identifying and using expedient nearby storage space.
Pre Parl As And Servers	Chain restaurants with host area outlets should transport inventories to these outlets & reasaign workers to host area operations. Fast food operations should prepare as many mealt as possible during evacuation period & make them available at evacuation staging area. Caterers should relocate all mobile food preparation equipment & as much of their inventories as possible to host area. Institutions & stores with equipment for large-scale food preparation should transport inventories & equipment to host area.	Restaurants & kitchen-equipped institutions should expand operations by using additional personnel relocated from risk area; enletging seating capacity; & identifying & using expedient nearby storage space (garages, etc. large-scale mass feeding operations in hitchen-equipped institutions will be supervised by disaster agencies such as Red Crost Distribute food preparation equipment & incoming inventories as needed among institutions, restaurants, congregate care facilities, & private residences with hosting capacity.
CUNSUMERS	Avoid hoarding in pre-crisis period. Transport as such non-perishable fond to host area as is permitted by home stocks and mode of transportation. A one- to two-week supply should suffice.	Avoid hearding in pre-crisis period. * Encourage heat area residents to provide shelter and food to members of relocated population.
CONTROLS	* Price regulation & liberal single-purchase limitations at relail dutlets during pre-crisis and evacuation periods.	* Price regulation & conservative hingle- purchase limitations at retail outlets during pre-crisis period. * Price regulation & coupon rationing at retail outlets, restaurants, & mans feed- ing facilities during crays relicing

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major processing plants to follow normal distribution channels, and to continue using risk-area wholesale facilities to serve the evacuated population. This strategy places stress on host-area retail outlets and on the transportation system linking risk-area wholesalers with host-area retailers and mass feeding centers. In spite of this stress, the continued operation of major risk-area wholesalers is preferable to the alternative strategies considered for staging and transporting food to host areas: pre-crisis stockpiling is too costly; extensive direct shipments from processors to the host areas would disrupt existing channels and require impossible priority judgments; and heavy use of expedient host-area warehouse space is both inefficient and difficult to accomplish within a one-week time frame.

Even though the options of stockpiling direct shipments from processors to host areas and host-area warehouses are not attractive as alternatives to the basic strategy of continuing of operation risk-area warehouses, each of these options may be used to a limited extent to augment the basic strategy. Existing stocks of dried milk held under federal control should be moved from risk areas in advance of the crisis and stockpiled in selected host-area locations. A similar strategy should be followed in the case of canned goods inventories held by California processors. These processors typically have large inventories, particularly of canned fruits and vegetables, which are laid in following the harvest and drawn down during the year by shipments to all parts of the country. Removal of the sizable inventories from risk areas would reduce their vulnerability, and help to ensure the availability of food following an attack. Under normal conditions, California processors typically use railroads for out-of-state shipments and trucks for shipments to California locations. During crisis relocation, however, canned goods should be shipped by rail to host areas, where they may be stockpiled in wholesale warehouses, secondary distribution centers, intermodal transfer points, or simply left in railcars on sidings identified for that purpose.

Direct or "drop" shipments from processors to retailers can be used to a limited extent under emergency conditions. Major chains normally try to minimize such shipments because they are expensive and strain the processors' transportation capabilities. During the 1978 truckers' strike in California, however, several food distributors increased the volume of these drop-shipments to ease the strain on limited trucking resources. Under crisis relocation conditions, drop-shipments are most appropriate when the producer or processor is located in the host area and can drop-ship to wholesale, retail, or mass feeding centers nearby. The billing should be done through the distributor so that centralized control can be maintained. Even under emergency conditions, it is unlikely that drop-shipments will exceed 10% or 15% of all distributor shipments.

In California, each retail food chain and major wholesaler has been assigned secondary host-area warehouse space to be used as an adjunct to its risk-area operations. Although risk-area warehouses will continue to carry the main distribution burden, these secondary warehouses will also be used to stage deliveries to host-area stores and mass feeding

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centers. Discussions with retail chain representatives indicate that certain types of nonperishable foodstuffs, particularly canned goods, can be efficiently distributed from secondary warehouse space. This option is particularly attractive in California, where host-area foodstocks are substantial and significant amounts of host-area warehouse space are available, much of it used by the food processing industry on a seasonal basis.

The use of secondary host-area warehouse space as an adjunct to primary risk-area space has the advantage of making some goods and personnel less vulnerable to attack; reducing transportation stress somewhat; and providing a base for postattack operations without unduly disrupting existing distribution patterns. In the event that the crisis is not resolved for some period of time, distributors may wish to channel more and more of their supplies through secondary host-area warehouses.

DELIVERY OPTIONS

A number of alternatives for preparing and serving food to the evacuated population have been identified and assessed in earlier research. These include the use of family residences, restaurants, institutions, and remote commissaries. Each of the alternatives will be employed to some extent under crisis relocation conditions in California. In general, small group sizes and low set-up costs are desirable features of any preparation and serving alternative. On the basis of these two criteria, family residences and restaurants would be preferable to mass feeding operations. In California, the high hosting ratios will strain the serving capacity of mass feeding facilities, so it is particularly important that family residences be used to the maximum extent possible. Other considerations, such as relative availability of homes, restaurants and institutional kitchens, the number of relocatees, the location of lodging accommodations, and the need for transportation will determine the relative attractiveness of each alternative in a specific host area.

TRANSPORTATION REQUIREMENTS

Food transportation requirements under crisis relocation conditions in California are significantly affected by the state's high hosting ratios and unique geography. Summary Exhibit 2 lists the transportation requirements imposed by a combination of alternative hosting and distribution options. Measuring transportation stress in terms of the ton-mile increase under crisis relocation conditions, the regional hosting option proposed by OES increases distribution mileage by a factor of approximately two to one over normal conditions. The uniform hosting option results in higher transportation stress (a ratio of 2.9 to 1 over normal conditions with direct warehouse shipments), and places a proportionately heavier load on mass feeding centers and congregate care facilities. If the uniform hosting strategy is replaced with a proximity hosting strategy (keeping the same risk/host definitions), it is possible to lower the transportation stress factor to 2.1, but the load on mass feeding centers increases, and the population of some southern California counties increases by a factor of 12.

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SUMMARY EXHIBIT 2

TRANSPORTATION STRESS FOR CALIFORNIA FOOD DISTRIBUTION

UNDER NORMAL AND CRP CONDITIONS

Direct Warehouse Direct Ware		Tonnage	Normal Conditions	OES Regional Hostin Risk/Host Ratio:	OES Regional Hosting Option Risk/Host Ratio: 4'5:1	Uniform Risk/Hos	Uniform Hosting Option Risk/Host Ratio: 7:1	Proximity Hosting Risk/Host Ratio: 7:1
Vear 1,181 2,414 2,253 3,452 2,482 Instance 1,181 2,414 2,253 3,452 2,482 Instance 12.34 9,41 11.36 8.39 10.81 Instance 12.34 9,41 11.36 8.39 10.81 Instance 1,24 2,69 2,69 2,59 2,58 Instance 1,0 2,0 1,9 2,9 2,7 Instance 1,0 2,0 1,491 3,800 Instance 1,491 3,800	·			Direct Warehouse Shipments	Ofrect Warehouse Shipments with Intercompany Diversion	Direct Warehouse Shipments	Direct Warehouse Shipments with Intercompany Diversion	Direct Warehouse Shipments
12.34 9.41 11.36 8.39 10.81 10.81 11.36 10.81		Hillions of Ton-Hiles/Year	1,181	2,414	2,253	3,452	2,482	2,482
4.12 2.69 2.69 2.59 2.58 0 4.36 2.26 5.48 3.07 1.0 2.0 1.9 2.9 2.7 1.10 2.0 1,491 3.800 1.491 3.800 1.491 3.400 1.400 3.400 1.		Millions of Tons Shipped to Stores	12.34		11.36	8.39	10.81	8.22
1.0 2.26 5.48 3.07 1.0 2.0 1.9 2.9 2.7 1.10 2.0 1.491 3.800 1.491 3.800 1.491 3.400 1.401 3.400 1.401	·	Millions of Tons Shipped to Res- taurants and Institutions	4.12		5.69	5.59	2.58	2.18
1.0 2.0 2.9 2.7 2.1 2.9 2.7 2.1 2.9 2.7 2.1		Millions of Tons Shipped to Mass Feeding Centers	o	4.36	2.26	5.48	3.07	6.07
1,491 3,800 2,815 7,400 4,239 - 9,100		Transportation Stress Factor	1.0	2.0	1.9	2.9	2.7	2.1
actors 1,491 3,800 2,815 7,400 4,239 - 9,100		Addition	al Resources Nec	pened				
		• Fra • Fra • Driver	Tractors illers 's		1,491 2,815 4,239	3,800 7,400 9,100	Pre!	ferred Planning Option

Transportation stress can be reduced somewhat by encouraging selective intercompany transfers in which wholesalers with few host-area outlets ship to the stores of wholesalers with a relatively large number of host-area outlets. In California, for example, Ralph's Los Angeles warehouse should supply some of Safeway's host-area stores, while the Lucky warehouse in Vacaville should ship to some of United Grocers' host-area outlets. The limited use of drop-shipments and secondary host-area warehouses as recommended will also reduce transportation stress. Other means for reducing transportation stress include the relaxation of such regulatory constraints as driver restrictions and weight limitations, and the improvement of equipment utilization by minimizing down time, relaxing maintenance requirements, eliminating light loads, shipping only full-pallet loads, and limiting shipments to essential commodities.

Since existing transportation equipment is not used to capacity, existing distribution systems can typically support a doubling of vehicle-miles for short periods of time without requiring additional vehicles. Thus a doubling of transportation stress does not necessarily imply the need for twice as many drivers and trucks. A tripling of the stress factor might be met by doubling the driver pools and increasing the vehicle fleet by 50%. In the case of the regional hosting option proposed by OES, a detailed redistribution plan was developed for each major warehouse in California, and individual stress factors and equipment needs were estimated for each distributor. This resulted in a requirement for 1,491 additional tractors, 2,815 additional trailers, and 4,239 additional drivers. These requirements can be met readily by diverting vehicles and drivers from less critical sectors of the economy.

IMPLICATIONS OF RESEARCH ON CRISIS RELOCATION GUIDANCE

The results of the California research have been reviewed in light of the current guidance for crisis relocation planning. As a result of this review, it appears that the basic strategy proposed for food distribution under crisis relocation conditions is sound and suitable for use in highly-urbanized areas that have problems similar to those found in California. However, analysis of the food distribution system in California has brought to light several elements which should be included in the crisis relocation guidance for areas with similar characteristics. These elements include:

- Planning for limited intercompany transfers to reduce transportation stress and balance host-area shipments;
- Assignment of secondary warehouse space in the host areas to each major risk-area distributor, to be used as necessary to augment risk-area wholesale operations;
- 3. Guidelines for limited use of drop-shipments directly from processors to host-area retailers, under the central control of major distributors; and

4. Provision for rail shipments of canned goods and other dry groceries from processors' risk-area warehouses to host-area warehouses, secondary distribution centers, intermodal transfer points, or rail sidings.

Guidelines for state and local planners have been updated to reflect these elements, as well as other factors identified in extensive interviews with planners and industry personnel. These elements have also been incorporated in the food sections of prototype crisis relocation plans for California.

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Volume I: Analysis

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. विकास स्थापन के स्थापन के किस्सा के किस स्थापन The report traces the existing patterns of food distribution in California; develops and analyzes alternative strategies for redirecting the existing food distribution system to support the relocated population; investigates the transportation requirements imposed by distribution changes; drafts prototype plans for redirecting the state food distribution network in an emergency; and develops appropriate guidelines for the use of Nuclear Civil Protection planners and local officials.

Although roughly 85% of California's f ensive agricultural lands are removed from direct threat of nuclear alock, only 21% of the state's food processing capacity is located in unthreatened areas. Food wholesalers, which carry between two and three weeks of food stocks, are the most vulnerable element of the distribution chain, with only 6% of these stocks likely to survive a nuclear attack undamaged. Retail grocers, with one to three weeks of inventory, are distributed in proportion to the population itself, with roughly 18% in areas free from blast effects.

It appears that the most effective strategy for food distribution under crisis relocation conditions is to allow agricultural output and major processing plants to follow normal distribution channels and to continue using risk-area wholesale facilities to serve the evacuated population. This strategy places stress on host-area retail outlets and on the transportation system linking risk-area wholesalers with the evacuated population. In California, this strategy can be expected to increase the mileage traveled in distributing food by a factor of two or three, depending on the evacuation pattern selected. This additional mileage can be accommodated by a number of actions, including those listed below:

- Encouraging selective intercompany food transfers designed to redress supply/demand imbalances;
- Assigning secondary host-area warehouse space to each major wholesale;
- Identifying instances in which drop-shipments directly from processors to host-area retailers are feasible;
- Relaxing such regulatory constraints as driver restrictions and weight limitations; and
- Improving equipment utilization by minimizing down time, relaxing maintenance requirements, eliminating light loads, shipping only full-pallet loads, and limiting shipments to essential commodities.

If these actions are taken, it appears that the transportation requirements associated with food distribution under crisis relocation conditions in California can be met with existing food industry resources and a nominal diversion of drivers and vehicles from less critical sectors of the economy.

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PREFACE

This report has been prepared as one of the first in a series of studies undertaken by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the California Office of Emergency Services (OES) to investigate the potential logistic problems to be encountered in implementing a strategy of crisis relocation in California. The report was prepared under Contract No. DCPA01-78-C-0220, and addresses the problems incurred in distributing food to residents evacuated from high-risk areas of the state during periods of severe international crisis. The research described in this report was accomplished over a one-year period in the Los Altos, California offices of SYSTAN, Inc. Dr. John W. Billheimer acted as project manager, while Arthur W. Simpson was principal investigator. Mr. Andrew Canfield and Ms. Gail Fondahl assisted Mr. Simpson with data processing tasks, while Ms. Carole Parker and Ms. Bracey Avery organized and edited the final report.

Technical monitors on the project were Mr. James Kerr of FEMA National Headquarters and Ms. Frances Diaz of FEMA Region VII. Mr. George Van Den Berghe of FEMA also provided technical guidance at the national level, while Jack Kearns, Loren Fields, and Orlin Orr of the California OES supplied guidance at the state level. Thanks are also extended to the many representatives of the California food industry who provided invaluable insights into the production, processing, and distribution of food throughout the state.

This report has been prepared in two volumes:

Volume I: Analysis

Volume II: Prototype Plans and Revised Guidance

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SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

Background

The movement of large masses of population from threatened target areas in advance of a potential nuclear attack will severely test the flexibility of national, state, and local food distribution systems. Past research has assessed the food requirements of the relocated populations; identified promising means of reconfiguring the existing food distribution system to meet these requirements; and developed and documented guidelines for food distribution under crisis relocation and postattack conditions. This study extends previous research efforts by investigating food distribution alternatives in a state, California, where relocation distances are unusually long, and heavy population concentrations in targeted areas are expected to stretch the capabilities of host areas to the limit.

Objectives

The objectives of this research have been to (1) trace the existing patterns of food distribution in California; (2) develop and analyze alternative strategies for reconfiguring the existing food distribution system to support the relocated population; (3) investigate the transportation requirements imposed by distribution changes and recommend means for reducing stress on the transportation system; (4) draft prototype plans for reconfiguring the state food distribution network in an emergency; and (5) develop appropriate guidelines to be used by Nuclear Civil Protection (NCP) planners and local officials in organizing and implementing food distribution under crisis relocation conditions in their jurisdictions.

RELOCATION OPTIONS

California is highly urbanized, with over 80% of its population living in areas threatened by nuclear attack. Hosting accommodations are relatively scarce outside these areas, and the average host area would have to accommodate several times its normal population under crisis relocation conditions. Four different relocation options were considered in this study:

 Regional Hosting, a plan prepared by the California Office of Emergency Services (OES), in which areas threatened only by potential fallout are permitted to host evacuees, thereby lowering the ratio of risk area residents to host area residents (to roughly 4.5 to 1) and making it possible to assign most risk area relocatees to host areas within their own geographic regions.

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- 2. Uniform Hosting, in which each host area accommodates exactly seven times its normal population. Since the majority (64%) of the state's residents live in Southern California, while the majority of the available low-risk areas (54%) are located in the northern portion of the state, this option imposes lengthy travel distances on many evacuees. The average distance traveled from risk to host area is 200 miles, and food distribution distances are stretched accordingly.
- 3. Proximity Hosting, in which evacuees are assigned only to host areas near their departure points and areas theatened by fallout in evacuation. This option results in high risk- to host-area population ratios of 12 to 1, but travel distances are correspondingly shorter.
- 4. Proximity Hosting with Transport Constraints. In this option, only 80% of the risk-area population is relocated, and highway capacity is a deciding factor in determining the number of people assigned to each host area.

EXISTING FOOD DISTRIBUTION PATTERNS

As a major agricultural producer, California exports more than half of its home-grown foodstuffs, particularly fruits and vegetables, to other states. In turn, the state imports significant shipments of meat and cereal products. This report traces California's food supply through the channels of distribution from producer to consumer, and assesses the vulnerability of each element to nuclear attack. Approximately 85% of California's farmland is low-risk area removed from the threat of nuclear attack, as is 21% of the state's food processing capacity. Of those foodstocks most readily available for distribution under crisis relocation conditions, California wholesalers have between two and three weeks of inventory on hand, retail grocers have between one and three weeks of inventory, and seven to ten days of supplies are estimated to be in transit to wholesale warehouses at any time. Food wholesalers are the most vulnerable element of the distribution chain. Wholesale stocks tend to be held in distribution centers in such major cities as Los Angeles, San Francisco, and San Diego, with only 6% of the state's wholesale food warehouses located in host areas. Food stockpiles under federal control are quite small, except for stocks of dry milk maintained in several risk-area locations.

DISTRIBUTION OPTIONS

A number of different alternatives for distributing food under crisis relocation conditions were identified and evaluated in terms of specific criteria encompassing set-up and maintenance costs, system disruption, attack vulnerability, operating requirements, equity, transportation stress, and system effectiveness. The results of this evaluation are reflected in the guidelines of Summary Exhibit 1. It appears that the most effective basic strategy for food distribution under crisis relocation conditions is to allow agricultural output and

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Summary Exhibit I RECOMMENDED GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR PROVIDING FOOD SUPPORT FOR THE CRISIS RELOCATION STRATEGY

STATE AND REGIONAL ACTIVITIES Define distribution patterns for chain and independent wholesalers. Arrange for any additional drivers and equipment made necessary by revised distribution patterns through NOTA. **Autor whole his hand additional drivers. Waive vehicle highway weight restrictions. Publicize waiving of DOT Driver Restrictions BISK AREA ACTIVITIES HOST AREA ACTIVITIES Continue any agricultural activity of national, regional, or local significance. (Little significant agricultural production currently occurs in risk areas.) PRODUCERS Continue all agricultural activity. Continue only those processing activities that lead to production of commodities included in emergency standards and that either are nation all or regional in scope or command a signifi-cant share of the local market. PROCESSORS Continue all food processing activity, ex-panding operations where possible through the use of relocated workers and unused capacity. Encourage workers in discontinued processing activities to transfer their skills to similar host irea processing finilities. Ship excess inventory of canned goods and other dry groceries, as ordered, to rost area storage points. Continue to operate all chain and independent wholesale operations that command a significant (i.e., over 10%, share of the local market, following revised distribution patterns specified at state and regional level WHOLESALERS Continue all food warehousing and distribu tion activities, expanding operations where possible through the use of commandered space, worker overtime and incommendation of the cated workers. Transfers between different commanders may be worked out as meetsforty. impty smaller warehouses as quickly as possible. transferring goods to hust area commissaries and warehouses. Encourage workers in discon-tinued operations to seek employment in host area warehouses. Augment transportation fleet and driver pool as required, following guidelines and procedures established by NDTA for obtaining personnel and new equipment from other sectors. Augment transportation fleet and driver pool as required, following guidelines and procedures established by NDTA for obtaining personnel and equipment from other sectors. Other sectors. Increase vehicle and driver productivity by taking advantage of waived driver restrictions and weight limitations; minimizing down time; relaxing maintenance requirements; increasing vehicle loads; loading only-full pailed quanticities; and shipping only necessary commodities. Increase wehicle and driver productivity by taking advantage of waived driver restrictions and weight limitations; ministing down-time; relaxing maintenance requirements; increasing whicle loads; loading only full-pallet quanti-ties; and whiteping only interesting commedities. Observe price controls, single purchase limitations, rationing plans, & coupon redemption policies established nationally during pre-crisis period & for duration of crisis relocation period. RETAILERS Observe price controls & single purchase limit established nationally period and evacuation period. As inventories & personnel permit, remain open during evacuation period. Then close operations for duration of crisis relocation period & re-Continue all retail food operations, excontinue all retail room operations, expanding as required by using added personnel relocated from risk area; extending ousiness hours, authorizing overtime work; stocking at night; and identifying and using expedient nearby storage space. port on remaining inventories. Chain stores arrange for employees to transfer to chain's host area outlets for duration of emergency. Employees of independent stores should be encouraged to seek employment in host area retail outlets. Chain restaurants with nost area outlets should Restaurants & kitchen-equipped institution should expand operations by using additional personnel relocated from risk area, enlarging seating capacity; & identifying & using expedient nearby storage space (garages, at AND SERVERS transport inventories to these outlets & reassign workers to host area operations. Fast food operations should prepare as many meals as possible during evacuation period & make them available at evacuation staging area Large-scale mass feeding operations in kitchen-equipped institutions will be super-vised by disaster agencies such as Red Cross Caterers should relocate all mobile food preparation equipment (as much of their inventories as possible to host area. Distribute food preparation equipment 4 in-coming inventories as needed among institu-tions, restaurants, congregate care facili-tics, 6 private residences with hosting Institutions & stores with equipment for largescale food preparation should transport inventor ies & equipment to host area. CONSUMERS Transport as much non-perishable food to host Encourage host area residents to provide shelter and food to members of relocated area as is permitted by home stocks and mode of transportation. A one- to two-week supply population. Price regulation 6 lineral single-purchase limitations at retail outlets during pre-crisis and evacuation periods. Price regulation 5 conservative single-purchase limitations at retail outlets during pre-crisis period. CONTROLS Price regulation 5 Jupon rationing of retail outlets, restautants, 5 mass feeding facilities during crisis religion.

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major processing plants to follow normal distribution channels, and to continue using risk-area wholesale facilities to serve the evacuated population. This strategy places stress on host-area retail outlets and on the transportation system linking risk-area wholesalers with host-area retailers and mass feeding centers. In spite of this stress, the continued operation of major risk-area wholesalers is preferable to the alternative strategies considered for staging and transporting food to host areas: pre-crisis stockpiling is too costly; extensive direct shipments from processors to the host areas would disrupt existing channels and require impossible priority judgments; and heavy use of expedient host-area warehouse space is both inefficient and difficult to accomplish within a one-week time frame.

Even though the options of stockpiling direct shipments from processors to host areas and host-area warehouses are not attractive as alternatives to the basic strategy of continuing of operation risk-area warehouses, each of these options may be used to a limited extent to augment the basic strategy. Existing stocks of dried milk held under federal control should be moved from risk areas in advance of the crisis and stockpiled in selected host-area locations. A similar strategy should be followed in the case of canned goods inventories held by California processors. These processors typically have large inventories, particularly of canned fruits and vegetables, which are laid in following the harvest and drawn down during the year by shipments to all parts of the country. Removal of the sizable inventories from risk areas would reduce their vulnerability, and help to ensure the availability of food following an attack. Under normal conditions, California processors typically use railroads for out-of-state shipments and trucks for shipments to California locations. During crisis relocation, however, canned goods should be shipped by rail to host areas, where they may be stockpiled in wholesale warehouses, secondary distribution centers, intermodal transfer points, or simply left in railcars on sidings identified for that purpose.

Direct or "drop" shipments from processors to retailers can be used to a limited extent under emergency conditions. Major chains normally try to minimize such shipments because they are expensive and strain the processors' transportation capabilities. During the 1978 truckers' strike in California, however, several food distributors increased the volume of these drop-shipments to ease the strain on limited trucking resources. Under crisis relocation conditions, drop-shipments are most appropriate when the producer or processor is located in the host area and can drop-ship to wholesale, retail, or mass feeding centers nearby. The billing should be done through the distributor so that centralized control can be maintained. Even under emergency conditions, it is unlikely that drop-shipments will exceed 10% or 15% of all distributor shipments.

In California, each retail food chain and major wholesaler has been assigned secondary host-area warehouse space to be used as an adjunct to its risk-area operations. Although risk-area warehouses will continue to carry the main distribution burden, these secondary warehouses will also be used to stage deliveries to host-area stores and mass feeding

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centers. Discussions with retail chain representatives indicate that certain types of nonperishable foodstuffs, particularly canned goods, can be efficiently distributed from secondary warehouse space. This option is particularly attractive in California, where host-area foodstocks are substantial and significant amounts of host-area warehouse space are available, much of it used by the food processing industry on a seasonal basis.

The use of secondary host-area warehouse space as an adjunct to primary risk-area space has the advantage of making some goods and personnel less vulnerable to attack; reducing transportation stress somewhat; and providing a base for postattack operations without unduly disrupting existing distribution patterns. In the event that the crisis is not resolved for some period of time, distributors may wish to channel more and more of their supplies through secondary host-area warehouses.

DELIVERY OPTIONS

A number of alternatives for preparing and serving food to the evacuated population have been identified and assessed in earlier research. These include the use of family residences, restaurants, institutions, and remote commissaries. Each of the alternatives will be employed to some extent under crisis relocation conditions in California. In general, small group sizes and low set-up costs are desirable features of any preparation and serving alternative. On the basis of these two criteria, family residences and restaurants would be preferable to mass feeding operations. In California, the high hosting ratios will strain the serving capacity of mass feeding facilities, so it is particularly important that family residences be used to the maximum extent possible. Other considerations, such as relative availability of homes, restaurants and institutional kitchens, the number of relocatees, the location of lodging accommodations, and the need for transportation will determine the relative attractiveness of each alternative in a specific host area.

TRANSPORTATION REQUIREMENTS

Food transportation requirements under crisis relocation conditions in California are significantly affected by the state's high hosting ratios and unique geography. Summary Exhibit 2 lists the transportation requirements imposed by a combination of alternative hosting and distribution options. Measuring transportation stress in terms of the ton-mile increase under crisis relocation conditions, the regional hosting option proposed by OES increases distribution mileage by a factor of approximately two to one over normal conditions. The uniform hosting option results in higher transportation stress (a ratio of 2.9 to 1 over normal conditions with direct warehouse shipments), and places a proportionately heavier load on mass feeding centers and congregate care facilities. If the uniform hosting strategy is replaced with a proximity hosting strategy (keeping the same risk/host definitions), it is possible to lower the transportation stress factor to 2.1. but the load on mass feeding centers increases, and the population of some southern California counties increases by a factor of 12.

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SUMMARY EXHIBIT 2

TRANSPORTATION STRESS FOR CALIFORNIA FOOD DISTRIBUTION

UNDER NORMAL AND CRP CONDITIONS

Тоннаде	Normal Conditions	OFS Regiona Risk/Host	OES Regional Hosting Option Risk/Host Ratio: 43:1	Uniform Risk/Hos	Uniform Hosting Option Risk/Host Ratio: 7:1	Proximity Hosting Risk/Host Ratio: 7:1
		Direct Warehouse Shipments	Ofrect Warehouse Shipments with Intercompany Ofversion	Direct Warehouse Shipments	Direct Warehouse Shipments with Intercompany Diversion	Direct Warehouse Shipments
Millions of Ion-Miles/Year	1,181	2,414	2,253	3,452	2,482	2,482
Millions of Tons Shipped to Stores	12.34	9.41	11.36	8.39	10.81	8.22
Millions of Tons Shipped to Res- taurants and Institutions	4.12	2.69	2,69	2.59	2.58	2.18
Millions of lons Shipped to Mass Feeding Centers	С	4.36	2.26	5.48	3.07	6.07
Transportation Stress factor	1.0	2.0	1.9	2.9	2.7	2.1
Additiona	Additional Resources Needed	papa				
• Tracto • Trailers • Orivers	• Tractors ailers irs		1,491 2,815 4,239	3,800	Pref	Preferred Planning Option

Transportation stress can be reduced somewhat by encouraging selective intercompany transfers in which wholesalers with few host-area outlets ship to the stores of wholesalers with a relatively large number of host-area outlets. In California, for example, Ralph's Los Angeles warehouse should supply some of Safeway's host-area stores, while the Lucky warehouse in Vacaville should ship to some of United Grocers' host-area outlets. The limited use of drop-shipments and secondary host-area warehouses as recommended will also reduce transportation stress. Other means for reducing transportation stress include the relaxation of such regulatory constraints as driver restrictions and weight limitations, and the improvement of equipment utilization by minimizing down time, relaxing maintenance requirements, eliminating light loads, shipping only full-pallet loads, and limiting shipments to essential commodities.

Since existing transportation equipment is not used to capacity, existing distribution systems can typically support a doubling of vehicle-miles for short periods of time without requiring additional vehicles. Thus a doubling of transportation stress does not necessarily imply the need for twice as many drivers and trucks. A tripling of the stress factor might be met by doubling the driver pools and increasing the vehicle fleet by 50%. In the case of the regional hosting option proposed by OES, a detailed redistribution plan was developed for each major warehouse in California, and individual stress factors and equipment needs were estimated for each distributor. This resulted in a requirement for 1,491 additional tractors, 2,815 additional trailers, and 4,239 additional drivers. These requirements can be met readily by diverting vehicles and drivers from less critical sectors of the economy.

IMPLICATIONS OF RESEARCH ON CRISIS RELOCATION GUIDANCE

The results of the California research have been reviewed in light of the current guidance for crisis relocation planning. As a result of this review, it appears that the basic strategy proposed for food distribution under crisis relocation conditions is sound and suitable for use in highly-urbanized areas that have problems similar to those found in California. However, analysis of the food distribution system in California has brought to light several elements which should be included in the crisis relocation guidance for areas with similar characteristics. These elements include:

- Planning for limited intercompany transfers to reduce transportation stress and balance host-area shipments;
- Assignment of secondary warehouse space in the host areas to each major risk-area distributor, to be used as necessary to augment risk-area wholesale operations;
- Guidelines for limited use of drop-shipments directly from processors to host-area retailers, under the central control of major distributors; and

4. Provision for rail shipments of canned goods and other dry groceries from processors' risk-area warehouses to host-area warehouses, secondary distribution centers, intermodal transfer points, or rail sidings.

Guidelines for state and local planners have been updated to reflect these elements, as well as other factors identified in extensive interviews with planners and industry personnel. These elements have also been incorporated in the food sections of prototype crisis relocation plans for California.

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND

1.1.1 Evolution of the Civil Preparedness Program

Since 1961, when the Federal Civil Defense Program was made a responsibility of the Department of Defense, the Program's basic objectives have been to assist local and state governments—financially, technically, and administratively—in protecting their residents from the dangerous radioactive fallout that would follow a nuclear attack on the United States. In pursuing this objective, federal, state and local governments have identified more than 226,000 facilities with fallout shelter space for about 225 million persons. Despite this seemingly adequate capacity, a deficit of public shelter space exists in rural and suburban areas. However, a great deal of lower-quality shelter in these areas could be upgraded during a crisis to provide fallout protection. In addition to fallout shelters, other necessary components of a nationwide civil defense system have been developed, including warning and communications networks, radiological monitoring, and state and local emergency operating centers.

As the nationwide program of defense against nuclear radiation moved forward in the 1960's and early 1970's, all state governments and most local governments expanded their emergency preparedness programs to include protection of residents from natural disasters and other peacetime catastrophes, as well as from nuclear fallout. Following this lead, the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DCPA) broadened its effort a few years ago by instituting an all-hazard, all-contingency program designed to help state and local governments develop the emergency operating capability needed for coping with peacetime disasters as well as nuclear attack. Emergency planning for both peacetime disasters and nuclear attack was further consolidated in 1978, when President Carter recommended the creation of a Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), officially combining all emergency planning functions in a single executive agency.

1.1.2 The Concept of Crisis Relocation Planning (CRP)

FEMA's current civil preparedness program involves two basic protection strategies: The first provides the best protection possible with the population essentially in place at or near their homes, schools, and places of work; the second requires people to leave threatened areas to seek refuge in safer places.

The need for crisis relocation planning to support the second strategy, that of evacuation, is supported by five primary arguments:

- It is probable that a nuclear attack upon the United States would be preceded by a crisis buildup of sufficient duration to permit population relocation from high-risk areas;
- If an adversary's cities were to be evacuated during a period of crisis, the United States cities should also be evacuated;
- Many citizens will likely leave large cities in the face of crisis in a "spontaneous evacuation" whether or not they are so advised;
- 4. Crisis evacuation has proven feasible in recent large-scale evacuations during hurricane warnings; and
- 5. Given the existing availability and location of shelter space, studies show that population relocation could save far more lives than reliance on in-place protection.

1.1.3 Current Status of Crisis Relocation Planning

CRP can be defined as a comprehensive effort by FEMA to develop plans for evacuating high-risk areas if a nuclear attack threatens, and temporarily relocating non-essential residents of those areas into small towns and rural areas where nuclear blast and fire effects are unlikely.

To improve CRP expertise, FEMA is now engaged in:

- 1. Finding solutions to the following CRP problems:
 - a) Determining how fallout protection and other life-sustaining services can best be provided to residents of high-risk areas after they are relocated;
 - b) Identifying "key workers" who should commute from host area to high-risk area to operate essential industries; and
 - c) Locating shelter space within the high-risk area for use by key workers.

- Testing and verifying the "workability" of proposed solutions to CRP problems through special studies, prototype plans, exercises, and pilot projects.
- Developing plans at the state and local level for evacuating the high-risk areas of the United States.

The movement of large population masses in advance of a threatened attack will severely test the flexibility of local and national food distribution systems. Past research undertaken by SYSTAN (References 2 and 5) has assessed the food requirements of the relocated populations, identified promising means of reconfiguring the existing food distribution system to meet these requirements, and developed and documented guidelines for food distribution under crisis relocation and postattack conditions. Current study extends the previous research by investigating food distribution alternatives in a state, California, where relocation distances are unusually long, and heavy population concentrations in targeted areas are expected to stretch the capabilities of host areas to the limit.

1.2 OBJECTIVES

The general objective of this research is "to investigate alternative strategies for distributing food to the California risk-area populace that has been relocated under Crisis Relocation Planning (CRP), develop plans for food redistribution in California, and formulate planning guidelines to enable local officials to organize and implement food distribution under crisis conditions in their jurisdictions." Specific contractual tasks are to:

- Analyze the existing food distribution system in California to support the populace;
- Develop alternative strategies for reconfiguring the existing food system to support the evacuees from the California high-risk areas that would be relocated during CRP;
- Investigate the transportation needed to reconfigure the food system and make recommendations for minimizing the transportation "stress";
- 4. Draft appropriate plans (such as a suggested Food Annex to a California Statewide Crisis Relocation Plan and possible others) for reconfiguring the food system; and
- 5. Develop appropriate guidance documents for Nuclear Civil Protection (NCP) planners and local officials on organizing and implementing food distribution under crisis conditions in their jurisdictions. Such guidance would be based on the "California" experience, but would be intended to assist those involved in developing food distribution plans in other,

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highly-urbanized areas that have problems similar to those encountered in California.

Tasks 1 through 3 are the subjects of Volume I of this report (Chapters 1 through 6). Volume II contains the products of Task 4, the prototype plans, and Task 5, the guideline revisions.

1.3 REPORT ORGANIZATION

Chapter 2 discusses three alternative evacuation patterns, and discusses the effect of each on the food distribution aspects of crisis relocation planning. Chapter 3 provides an overview of the California food distribution system, and describes normal food distribution patterns in California. The flow of individual commodities is traced through the distribution network from producer to consumer, and data describe the location and vulnerability of food stocks within that network. Chapter 4 identifies and evaluates alternative strategies for reconfiguring California's food distribution system to support the relocated population. Chapter 5 analyzes the transportation requirements imposed by the reconfigured system and makes recommendations for minimizing transportation stress. Chapter 6 summarizes alternative strategies for reconfiguring the food distribution network, and discusses the implications of these strategies on transportation and other CRP activities.

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2. EVACUATION PATTERNS AND PROBLEMS

2.1 HOST AND RISK AREAS

Risk areas in California have been defined by FEMA to include the following categories:

- Category I Strategic military forces, termed "counterforce military facilities;"
- Category II Other military forces, and supporting industrial, transportation, and logistics facilities; and
- 3. Category III Industries, governmental centers, and other facilities that contribute significantly to the maintenance of the United States economy; and other urbanized areas with centralized population greater than 50,000 that are not associated with Category I or Category II targets.

California high-priority targets are shown in Exhibit 2.1. The hazard analysis performed by FEMA for California has determined that more than four-fifths of the population reside in high-risk areas. An evacuation of the high-risk areas of California would increase the population of the remaining low-risk areas by several times, and would necessarily impose significant stresses on local resources. In addition, travel distances separating high-risk and low-risk areas are considerably longer in California than in most of the United States, imposing a disproportionately heavy burden on the State's transportation network.

2.2 POPULATION DISTRIBUTION

Approximately 17.2 million California residents, or \$1.7% of the state's population, live in areas that are threatened by significant blast effects. An additional 1.2 million, or 5.8% of the state's population, either live on the fringes of blast areas or are threatened by fallout alone. The remaining 2.6 million of the state's residents (12.6%) live in areas that are not likely to be threatened by either blast or fallout. Early relocation plans assumed that only those areas entirely free from blast and fallout effects would be used as host areas in the event of a massive relocation effort. This assumption resulted in a 7 to 1 ratio of risk area to host area population, and led to

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


EXHIBIT 2.2

POPULATION AT RISK

POPULATION THREAT	Population (1000)	Early FEMA Guidelines RISK/HOST %	Later OES Guidelines RISK/HOST %
•Blast and Fallout	17,245		81.7%
Fallout Only or Blast Fringe Area	1,212	87.4%	18.3%
Unthreatened	2,650	12.6%	
	21,107	100%	100%

Risk Area Population

average evacuation destances of as much as 200 miles. Subsequent planning by the California Office of Emergency Services (OES) redefined risk and host areas so that areas threatened only by fallout could be used to host evacuees. Although this redefinition directly affected only 5.8% of the state's population (see Exhibit 2.2), it significantly lowered the risk area/host area ratio (from 7:1 to 4.5:1), paved the way for regional hosting plans, and helped to alleviate many of the potential transportation and hosting problems associated with crisis relocation in California. A more complete description of the rationale and revised allocations associated with the OES plan may be found in Part Four, Section Two of the state of California Emergency Plan. (Reference 21, Attachment 1)

Exhibit 2.2 summarizes the distribution of the total state population between risk areas and host areas for the two assumptions used in this study. Both of these assumptions result in a disproportionate imbalance of risk and host areas between Northern and Southern California. The majority of Californians live in the southern part of the state, roughly defined as that portion south of Fresno County. (See Exhibit 2.3). Although approximately 64% of the state's residents live in Southern California, under the strictest risk-area definitions only 46% of the low-risk areas available in state are located south of Fresno County. Under the more relaxed risk-area definition adopted by the California OES, 54% of the state's host areas are located in the southern part of the state. Under both risk-area assumptions, therefore, Northern and Central California, with only 36% of the total state population, have a proportionately higher share of the identified hosting capacity for evacuees. This disproportionate balance of high- and low- risk areas has significant implications for relocation planning


2.3 ALTERNATIVE RELOCATION STRATEGIES

Four different relocation options were evaluated to determine their effects on the food distribution and delivery systems under crisis relocation conditions. These were (1) the regional hosting plan deviced by the State Office of Emergency Services; (2) uniform hosting; (3) proximity hosting; and (4) proximity hosting with transport capacity constraints. Under the first plan, areas solely at risk from potential fallout were classified as hosting areas. In the remaining three plans, these fallout-only areas were considered part of the risk area.

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EXHIBIT 2.3

NORTH - SOUTH DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION AND LOW-RISK REFUGE AREAS



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2.3.1 Regional Hosting (The California OES Plan)

In order to limit travel distances for evacuees, thereby reducing fuel and resource distribution problems, this plan attempts to assign risk area relocatees to host areas within their immediate geographic region. In broad geographic terms, Southern California residents remain in the southern half of the state. The area assigned to Southern California residents for hosting is that half of the state generally south of a line drawn west to east from Monterey County to Mono County (i.e. the dividing line in Exhibit 2.3).

On a more immediate geographic level, an attempt was made to host risk-area residents within their own counties. Exceptions were made in cases where the hosting capacity of the county was insufficient, where traffic flow would be complicated, and/or where the hosting area of a risk county could be better used by another risk county. To alleviate the extreme shortage of hosting capacity throughout California, and particularly in Southern California, areas solely at risk due to potential fallout levels were classified as hosting areas.

Additional guidelines followed in assigning risk area residents to regional host areas are cited below:

"Essential workers and their families will be assigned on an organizational basis to those host areas closest to their place of work, normally within 50 miles. This approach has the advantages of shortening their relocation travel time, minimizing the time needed to relocate, and reducing their commute, thus insuring their availability to return to work at the earliest possible time.

"Households without access to automobiles are given the next closest assignments thus reducing turnaround time for buses and/or other mass transit systems. Evacuees using air or rail transportation will be assigned as near related host area terminals as feasible." (Reference 2)

A county-by-county breakdown of the risk and host area asignments under the regional hosting plan established by the California State CES may be found in Exhibit 2.4.

2.3.2 <u>Uniform Hosting Option</u>

The uniform hosting allocation involves 100% evacuation of risk areas and equal use of all hosting areas, with a resulting hosting ratio of 7.0 to 1.0 throughout the state.

Exhibit 2.4 contains a county-by-county breakdown of the number of residents at risk and the projected hosting capacity if a uniform hosting ratio is maintained throughout the state. The average distanctraveled by relocatees under this option is 200 miles (Reference 13).

EXHIBIT 2.4: Population Data Used in Analyses of California Crisis Relocation Plans (populations in thousands)

	Crisis	, Reloca	tion Plans	(populations	111 (110031	11.3.0		
	1075	нтен	-RISK	RISK-FREE	OES REC	SIONAL	UNIFORM	
	1975 POPULATION		EAS	AREAS	RELOCATI	ON PLAN	RELOCATI	
COUNTY	(pre-crisis)	blast	fallout			post-		pest- crisis
	(pre-crisis)		only		hosted	crisis	hosted	total
						total		(Gray
				•	530	730	o	0
Alameda	1090	890	200	0	3	4	7	8
Alpine	1	0	0	15	45	60	105	120
Amador	15	0	0	120	196	316	840	960
Butte	120	0	0	16	59	75	112	128
Calaveras	16	0	0	13	14	27	91	104
Colusa	13	. 0	19	, o	77	96	0	0
Contra Costa	586	567	19	16	23	39	112	128
Del Horte	16	0	a	59	173	232	413	472
El Dorado	59	700	27	110	751	888	770	880
Fresno	445	308 0	,	19	43	62	133	152
Glenn	19	0	ŏ	105	228	333	735	840
Humboldt	105	31	4	49	395	443	343	392
Imperial	84	0	ó	17	85	102	119	136
Inyo	17	223	18	101	704	823	707	. 808
Kern	342 65	11	5	50	281	336	350	400
Kings	25	Ċ	ō	25	77	102	175	200
Lake	17	1	i	15	48	64	105	120 0
Lassen	6937	6839	48	0	356	404	. 0	368
Los Angeles	46	0037	0	46	171	217	322	360
Madera	213	209	4	G	13	17	0 56	64
Marin	8	0	0	8	30	38	406	464
Mariposa Mendocino	58	ō	Q	58	176	234	322	368
	118	56	16	46	249	311	56	64
Merced Modoc	8	a	G	8	24	32 42	49	56
Mono	7	0	0	7	35	331	406	464
Monterey	269	199	12	58	261	69	700	0
Napa	90	71	19	0	50	134	238	272
Navada	34	0	0	34	100	1122	0	0
Orange	1708	1575	133	0	989	227	301	344
Placer	91	33	15	43	169 41	55	98	112
Plumas	14	0	8	14	1813	2057	1295	1480
Riverside	526	282	59	185	46	73	7	8
Sacramento	685	658	26	1 20	74	94	140	160
San Benito	20	0	0	67	927	1052	469	536
San Bernardin	o 698	573	58	225	2033	2315	1493	1707
San Diego	1587	1305	57 0	0	0	0	Ç	0
San Francisco		670	12	80	308	400	560	640
San Joaquin	293	206 0	0	128	654	782	896	1024
Sam Luis Obis	po 128	569	2	0	8	10	G	0
San Mateo	571	160	97	23	635	755	161	184
Santa Barbara	280	1103	37	31	253	321	217	248
Santa Clara	1171 151	2	ō	149	554	703	1043	1192
Santa Cruz	89	ō	_	89	236	325	623	712 24
Shasta	3	Ŏ	_	3	9	12	21	280
Sierra	35	ō	_	35	93	128	245 0	200
Siskiyou	185	105	_	0	212	292	623	712
Solano	246	35		89	424	635	525	600
Sonoma Stanie laus	224	144	. 5	75	231	311	355	368
Stanislaus Sutter	46				16	62	224	256
Sutter Tehama	32	Q	, 0		80	112	70	80
renama Trinity	10	C			26	36 1257	1456	1664
Tulare	208	•			1049		182	203
Tuolumne	26	(97		448	510
Ventura	435	318			863		0	0
Yolo	101	38			167 35		_ 77	
Yuba	45				17045		18463	21107
TOTAL	21107	1724	5 1212	2650	1/543	2,107	, -	
• = · · •								

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2.3.3 Proximity Hosting Option

The non-uniform proximity hosting allocation uses only those nearby host areas that surround the major conglomerate high-risk areas. For this proximity allocation, the hosting ratios are different for each major area. Hosting ratios are especially high in the lower-risk areas surrounding the Los Angeles and San Diego conglomerate, where risk-to-host area population ratios of 12 to 1 are required. A county-by-county breakdown of population distribution before and after a relocation to nearby host areas appears in Appendix A. The average distance traveled by a relocatee under this option is less than that traveled under the uniform hosting option.

2.3.4 Proximity Hosting With Transport Constraints

The proximity hosting option with transport capacity constraints assumes 80% rather than 100% evacuation. In this third hosting allocation plan, which was suggested by the California Office of Emergency Services (OES), major consideration was given to highway capacity in determining the number of people assigned to each host area. OES assumed conditions of minimum highway regulation during the relocation period. A county-by-county breakdown of population redistribution under this relocation option appears in Appendix A2.

2.4 CALIFORNIA TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM VULNERABILITY

In addition to the high hosting ratios required in relocating California residents, the unique geography of the state also poses potential barriers hindering emergency transportation. Past SYSTAN research has shown that the California road network is particularly vulnerable to nuclear attack (Reference 14). In most areas of the United States, road networks are sufficiently dense that enough alternative detour routes will survive to permit travel between any set of origins and destinations. Detours may increase travel distances from 15% to 40% above normal, but travel is likely to be possible between all points surviving an attack. This is not necessarily the case in California. Assuming an attack destroys all areas identified by the FEMA report on "High Risk Areas" (Reference 16) as potential target areas, portions of California could be completely isolated by a nuclear attack. Projected target areas in California include most large urban areas. These areas are located along the major state highways, which would also be destroyed. Roads in the less population, "safe" eastern area of the state are unsuitable for long hauls due to mountaincus terrain and weather limitations during the winter; in the southcost. alternate routes simply do not exist. This combination of limited road networks with heavy damage to key intersections will limit surface travel options following an attack, particularly if the attack occurs during the winter.

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East/west rail links into and out of California are also vulnerable to attack. California has about seven points at which rail lines connect California to adjacent eastern states. These points are listed in Exhibit 2.5. They would be relatively easy to target for distribution. Should these rail junctions be destroyed, shipment of grain and other food products from eastern points would be considerably reduced. Also, a more critical aspect of this isolation would be that large quantities of fresh and processed food shipped from California to the rest of the country would be stopped.

Although the rail lines going east from California are vulnerable, the most heavily traveled sections of these lines are often double track; damage to the short sections of lines could probably be repaired in a relatively short time depending on the extent of the damage and location. Damage to bridges, of course, would be critical.

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EXHIBIT 2.5

CALIFORNIA RAIL ENTRY-EXIT POINTS TO THE EAST

Railroad	Nearby City	County	Adjoining State
Southern Pacific	Floriston (near Truckee)	Placer	Nevada
Southern Pacific	Herlong	Alpine	Nevada
Southern Pacific	Araz	Imperial	
Union Pacific	San Bernardino	San Bernardino	Nevada
Santa Fe	Needles	San Bernardino	Arizona
Santa Fe	Ripley	Riverside	Arizona
Western Pacific	Clio	Plumas	Nevada

3. EXISTING FOOD DISTRIBUTION PATTERNS IN CALIFORNIA

3.1 OVERVIEW OF THE CALIFORNIA FOOD DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM

3.1.1 Channels of Distribution


Exhibit 3.1 traces the existing volume of food flow in California from sources to destinations. California is the leading U.S. agricultural producer, providing a large part of the nation's fruits and vegetables and other commodities. Because the nation's agricultural production is concentrated in a few large areas, including California, significant production/consumption imbalances can be found at local and regional levels throughout the United States. Some major agricultural areas may produce enough food to feed five times the regions' population; others, like the Northeast Region, produce only enough food to feed two out of thirteen of their residents. Under conditions of crisis relocation, of course, California, as well as other agricultural "surplus" states, would continue to maintain pre-crisis distribution ratios to local and out-of-state customers.

Food processors in California are spread throughout the state. The majority of food processing, however, takes place in the Los Angeles and San Francisco Bay areas, and in and around the San Joaquin and Sacramento Valley cities of Fresno, Modesto, Stockton and Sacramento. California food processors serve both national and regional markets; sugar refineries and yeast manufacturing plants typically produce for a national market, while bakeries and dairies tend to concentrate on regional or even local markets. California processors ship large quantities of fresh, canned and frozen fruits and vegetables to other states. Main shipments to California from other states are careal products and meat.

Wholesale distribution warehouses serve a relatively large area and are usually located in the large population centers. In California, most of the major chains and wholesale distributors have large distribution centers in the Los Angeles and San Francisco areas, with smaller warehouses in other outlying cities such as Sacramento, Francisco and Rosa, Modesto and Riverside. Some major chains (such as Ralph's), however, have only one major warehouse location and distribute to all their stores from that one location.

California retail food outlets tend to be distributed in an ordance with the population. Retail food grocery sales in Northern and Cluthern California counties, for example, are virtually proportional to the population in those areas.

EXHIBIT 3.7 PRINCIPAL CALIFORNIA FOOD DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS



(Source: Exhibit 3.5)

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3.1.2 Available Food Inventories

Food stocks are held in inventory at each stage of the distribution pipeline shown in Exhibit 3.1. In the cases of California producers and processors, over 50% of raw product and processed foodstuffs held in inventory are destined for consumption outside the state. Most of the food on the shelves of California wholesalers and retailers is destined for consumption in California, and is stored close enough to the consuming population to be used in feeding evacuees under crisis relocation conditions. The left-hand margin of Exhibit 3.1 shows the average inventory levels in each of these stages of the distribution system, measured in terms of current consumption rates.

SYSTAN's research indicates that sufficient inventories of food at California's wholesale and retail levels exist to support populations of the host and risk areas for the anticipated duration of a crisis relocation period. Based on data obtained in interviews with representatives of chains and wholesale distributors, inventories tended to average between one and three weeks for retail and two to three weeks for wholesale, which is similar to the national average. The inventory level of perishable goods, of course, is much lower. The lower end of this range of wholesale inventory levels reflects the performance of a chain store operation serving a limited geographic areas, while the upper end is more characteristic of an independent wholesaler serving clients scattered over a wide area. In addition to stock on the shelves of wholesalers and retailers, seven to ten days of supplies are estimated to be in transit to wholesale warehouses at any time. Although no data on California home supply levels are available, according to a nationwide study (Reference 19), consumers have estimated that food stocks on hand could be made to last between one and two weeks in time of emergency.

Using the most conservative estimates of inventories on the shalves of wholesalers, retailers, and consumers, it can be estimated that a minimum of three weeks of food supplies would be available in California at any time, with an additional week of supplies in transit. Siven the length of time required to evacuate a major city and to organize and accomplish a return, the minimum duration of the relocation period would be one week. Moreover, in view of the heated state of world affairs necessary to trigger a crisis relocation, it appears unlikely that the maximum duration of the relocation posture will exceed three weeks before an attack ensues or a settlement is negotiated. A negotiated settlement would trigger an order to return to risk-area residences. Although such a return could not be accomplished overnight, sufficient food supplies would be available to support California's evacuated populations for the duration of the relocation period. One of the chief problems of providing food for the crisis relocation strategy, then, will be to identify and supply the logistic support needed to make this food accessible to the evacuated populations.

More specific data on retail grocery locations in California are presented in Section 3.7.

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3.2 EXISTING PATTERNS OF FOOD DISTRIBUTION IN CALIFORNIA

3.2.1 Three Key Questions

A necessary component of any plan for food distribution under crisis relocation conditions is information on the food sources normally supplying the affected area, typical transportation modes, and the location and amount of food supplies in the distribution network.

In SYSTAN's guidance to NCP planners and agency officials (Reference 2), this information is represented by three questions:

- 1. Where does the food come from?
- 2. How does it come?
- 3. Who has the food now?

For California, these questions will be reviewed beginning with production, and proceeding through the processing, wholesale, retail, and consumption stages. Exhibit 3.2 depicts these major elements of the California food distribution system and indicates their approximate vulnerability to nuclear attack, as measured by the relative location of each element in designated risk areas.

3.2.2 Production


The twenty leading California farm products are shown in Exhibit 3.3. These crop and livestock commodities account for about 80% of the state's gross farm income. In 1977, dairy products, cattle and calves, and eggs continued to dominate the livestock industry, while cotton, grapes, hay, processing tomatoes, and lettuce were the most important crops. California agriculture is considered one of the most diversified in the world, with no one crop dominating the state's farm economy. California leads the nation in production of fruits, nuts, and vegetables, accounting for over 40% of the nation's receipts for fruits and nuts and 33% for vegetables. Exhibit 3.4 shows the leading commodities by county by weight. The leading agricultural counties in California are Fresno, Kern, Tulare, San Joaquin, Marced, Montarey, and Riverside.

Most of the food consumed in California is produced and processed in California, especially dairy products and fruits and vegetables. Nost of the meat brought into California is processed elsewhere, although California does receive a considerable quantity of live cattle and calves from other states. A number of finished grain products are shipped in from the Midwest, but California also receives raw wheat from other states to be milled here. Overall, California produces about twice as much food as is consumed in the state. California food production, consumption, imports, exports, out-of-state shipments, and receipts by food group are summarized in Exhibit 3.5, and are shown in more detail in Appendix B.

The Total marginal designation of

EXHIBIT 3.2

PRINCIPAL ELEMENTS OF THE FOOD DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM



^{*} Assumes consumer relocation to non-risk areas under crisis relocation conditions.

EXHIBIT 3.3

RANKING AND VALUES OF 20 LEADING FARM PRODUCTS FOR CALIFORNIA, 1976-77

Farm Product	Commodit	y ranking	Valu	e <u>1</u> /	Percentage o	f State total
Turm Troudes	1976	1977	1976	1977	1976	1977
	111.	mber	<u>1,333</u>	<u>dollars</u>	<u>Per</u>	<u>cent </u>
Milk & Cream	2	1	1,089,142	1,180,840	12.0	12.7
Cattle & Calves	1	2	1,094,422	987,706	12.1	10.6
Cotton	3	3	920,870	816,228	10.2	8.8
Grapes	5	4	561,289	705,145	6.2	7.6
Hay	4	5	562,773	456,011	6.2	4.9
Tomatoes, Processing	8	6	284,734	426,184	3.1	4.6
Eggs, Chicken	6	7	384,977	353,272	4.2	3.8
Lettuce	7	8	327,685	304,952	3.6	3.3
Nursery Products	9	9	279,930	297,390	3.1	3.2
Flowers & Foliage	10	10	255,163	273,475	2.8	2.9
Almonds	13	11	188,730	267,750	2.1	2.9
Strawberries	18	12	135,809	168,362	1.5	1.8
Rice	15	13	152,137	167,666	1.7	1.8
Oranges	14	14	156,896	160,410	1.7	1.7
Tomatoes, Fresh Market	17	15	137,904	153,961	1.5	1.7
Walnuts	21	16	114,741	147,810	1.3	1.6
Peaches	20	17	116,722	139,398	1.3	1.5
Chickens	19	18	124,838	138,405	1.4	1.4
Sugar Beets	12	19	199,629	126,381	2.2	1.4
Potatoes	22	20	110,161	124,943	1.4	1.3

Based on value of quantity harvested for crops and on value of quantity marketed for livestock and poultry products.

Source: California Crop and Livestock Reporting Service, California Principal Crop and Livestock Commodities, 1977, California Department of Food and Agriculture, Sacramento, June 1978, page 14.

EXHIBIT 3.4: LEADING CALIFORNIA COUNTIES IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION (BY WEIGHT)

Most & Most Alternatives	Milk & Dairy Products	oduc ts	£ 995		Cereals and Cereal Products	al Products
**************************************	County	**	County	3€	Coinity	5-0
Stroislans 12.65 Bernet 11.73 Bernet 11.73 Bernet 12.82 Tuline 6.00 Frein 6.00 Frein 5.19 San Earniston 5.19 San Earniston 2.54 Bernet 2.19 San Earniston 1.67 San Earnist 1.67	San Bernadino Tulare Riverside Stanislaus Herced San Joaquin Kinys Fresno Ventura Sonoma Vern San Diogo Sacramento Los Angeles Madera	8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00	Riverside San Bernadino San Diego Stanishaus San Joaquin Ventura Nerced Placer Orange Los Angeles Santa Barbara Fresno Rapa Routerey Putter	21.90 18.15 16.26 11.16 9.77 2.77 2.77 2.77 2.04 1.10 1.05 0.65 0.63	Colusa Butte Yolo Sutter Imperial Glenn Sacramento Yoba Kern San Jeaquin Fresno Solano Madera Kirce Kirce Guntios	15.37 9.00 9.78 7.33 7.33 8.56 1.99 1.89
00.001	fotal	100	Total	190.09	Fotal	100.00

Calmination of Salman	•	10131003		Sugar & Sweets	
County	, >6 .	County	>* (County	**
Freence	12.3	Yern	62.63	Importal	20.00
Muster 2	1.2	Riverside	11.54	San Joseph in	=
San Jestjain	7.4	Sichiyou	9.94	Solano	=
	7 0	Madag	8, 16	Montere	œ
7010	8.8	Santa Bartara	2.91	Yolg	7.
Tulare	5.3	San Joaquin	2.83	Kern	ض
Sutter	4.9	Hurboldt	83.0	Colusa	4
Stantsings	4 .3	Madera	0.75	Morcod	~
[r.perit]		Total	100	Fresho	~
P 14" 1 14"	4.2			Glenn	~
F. 1.1.3	J. J.			Suffer	· ~
Yeniu 1	5.3			Marthera	2
Solare	2.5			los Angeles	· ~
) ings	2.3			Lularo	_
W1 'erf 1	5.3			044	-
Other Jointney	13.3			office Comption	· 00
[1,4,4]	10.0			Caramar, Lauren	

Source: Reports of California County Agricultural Commissioners (assembled by SYSTAW)

EXHIBIT 3.5

ESTIMATED CALIFORNIA FOOD PRODUCTION, DISTRIBUTION AND CONSUMPTION 1975-1976

(In Thousands of Short Tons)

	California Production	Imports	Exports	Shipments From Other States	Shipments to Other States	California Consumption	Per Capita Cor Annually	Consumption Weekly
Food Group								
Meat and Meat Alternates	787	148	15	1586	38	2471	234.0	4.5
£99s	260	0	5	0	176	379	35.9	0.69
Milk and Dairy Products 2	2919	0	0	59	29	2919	276.5	5.32
Cereals and Cereal Products	2717	0	1519	898	842	1224	116.0	2.2
Fruits and Vegetables	17593	378	2144	122	12900	3148	298.2	5.7
Food Fats and Oils	305	55	78	333	99	549	53.4	1.0
Potatues	1202	0	46	694	522	1328	125.8	2.4
Sugars and Sweeteners	1411	0	0	248	423	1236	117.1	2.3
		1	İ					
Totals	27494	581	3804	3979	14996	13254	1256.9 ³	24.11

Retail weight basis
Class | Products

 3 U.S. per capita total of all products consumed based on USDA figures (Reference 8) is 1290.8 pounds. Figure shown in table above is 97% of the USDA figure for the commodities consumed.

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Source: Appendix B

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3.2.3 Processing

The food processing industry in California is dispersed throughout the state with every county having some processing operations. The main areas of concentration are: (1) the medium-sized cities in or near the agricultural areas of Southern California, the San Joaquin and Sacramento Valleys; and (2) in or near the San Francisco/Gakland/San Jose and Los Angeles/Orange County Metropolitan Areas. The location, however, varies considerably with the specific type of processing industry. The dairy industry, for example, tends to be near the centers of consumption, primarily near major metropolitan areas. Most of the fruit and vegetable processing industry is located in the growing areas of the Sacramento and San Joaquin Valleys (much of it in or near Sacramento, Stockton, Modesto and Fresno), the Salinas Valley, and Imperial Valley. There is also a sizeable fruit and vegetable processing industry in former growing areas such as the Santa Clara Valley, Los Angeles and Orange Counties. Data on the food processing industry in the leading counties are summarized in Exhibit 3.6, and shown in more detail in Appendix B. Appendix B shows food processing industry sales by SMSA.

Approximately 21% of California's food processing industry is located in the host areas. A detailed county-by-county breakdown of risk-area/host-area distribution is shown in Appendix B.

3.2.4 Wholesale Distribution

Exhibit 3.7 shows the approximate distribution of wholesale operations, based on sales. Most of the wholesalers/distributors are located in the largest cities; The San Francisco/Oakland and Los Angeles SMSA's account for two-thirds of all wholesale sales. With the San Jose, Orange and San Diego SMSA's, these major centers account for almost 80% of all California wholesale sales (Appendix B). Roughly 85% of the food consumed in these five major areas is warehoused locally, while 15% comes from other metropolitan areas. Eight smaller cities in California are supplied primarily from the Los Angeles and San Francisco areas, as shown in Exhibit 3.8. This exhibit also shows the average distance to stores served in the metropolitan areas and to stores in outlying cities (smaller markets also served by the central warehouses in the metropolitan areas).

Center Locations

Major chains and wholesalers usually distribute to stones or customers over a large geographic area. A single distribution center may serve all the stores in a state or even parts of several states. Several chains have distribution centers in Los Angeles, for example, that serve stores in Arizona as well as in Southern California.

Most of California's major cities and those nationalds are served by distribution centers within their borders or suburbs. The San

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EXHIBIT 3.6

CALIFORNIA FOOD PROCESSING ESTABLISHMENTS RANKED BY VALUE OF SHIPMENTS

(Leading Counties)

Counties	Number of Establishments	Sales (\$ Mil)	Sales Share	Cumulative Sales Share (%)
Los Angeles	773	3697.9	31.4	31.4
Alameda	186	929.6	7.9	39.3
San Joaquin	89	647.7	5.5	44.8
San Francisco	166	635.8	5.4	50.2
Santa Clara	136	619.2	5.2	55.4
Stanislaus	27	608.2	5.2	60.6
Orange	104	536.8	4.6	65.2
Fresno	113	511.5	4.3	69.5
Sacramento	61	356.8	3.0	72.5
San Diego	94	352.7	3.0	75.5
0thers	1749	2898.4	24.5	100.0
Totals	2594	11794.6	100.0	100.0

EXHIBIT 3.7

MAJOR WHOLESALE FOOD DISTRIBUTION AREAS
AND PERCENTAGE OF CALIFORNIA POPULATION SERVED





EXHIBIT 3.8

DISTANCE TO CALIFORNIA WHOLESALE FOOD DISTRIBUTION CENTERS



Francisco metropolitan area and the Los Angeles/Orange County area each have more than 75% of their wholesale food stocks available from distribution centers within their SMSA. Two additional cities (Sacramento and Fresno) have more than half their wholesale food stocks available locally. Three other metropolitan areas, San Diego, Modesto and Riverside/San Bernardino/Ontario, have more than 25% of their wholesale food stocks available locally. The other cities in California (including Chico, Bakersfield, Santa Cruz, Salinas, Santa Barbara and Stockton) have more than 90% of their food supplies stored in wholesale warehouses outside of their local areas. The smaller cities generally receive most of their dry grocery and produce supplies from warehouses in Los Angeles, San Francisco or Sacramento. In some cases, however, a portion of fresh produce is obtained from a local produce market.

Approximately 87% of California's population resides in risk areas, mainly concentrated in the Los Angeles and San Francisco Bay areas, with only 13% in the host areas. The ratio of wholesaler/distributor concentration in the risk areas is greater than that of the population, with 94% of wholesale sales in the risk area and only 6% in the host area. This is shown in graphic form in Exhibit 3.3, and on a county-by-county basis in Appendix B.

While the ratio of wholesaler/distributor concentration in the major cities is greater than that of the population, their north/south distribution in the state is similar to that of the population. Southern California has approximately 64% of the population and accounts for about 60% of the wholesale grocery sales (Appendix 6).

3.2.5 Retail Stores

3.2.5.1 Store Location.

The U.S. Census of Retail Trade (Reference 3) indicates that in 1972 California had a total of 19,238 retail food stores with sales of \$10.64 billion. On a regional basis, retail sales of food are fairly proportional to population. There is, however, significant variation among different cities and counties. The average annual sales per store in Caifornia is \$554,000, with sales in rural areas slightly lower than urban areas. Approximately 13% of the grocery store sales in California are in host areas and 87% in risk areas. The number and sales of retail food stores by county are shown in Appendix B.

To obtain the necessary retail and wholesale data for this study, SYSTAN interviewed distribution representatives of each of the major food chains, such as Safeway, as well as wholesaler/distributors, such as United Grocers. The names of the chains and distributors contacted, the warehouse locations and approximate number of stores served by each are shown in Exhibit 3.9.

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EXHIBIT 3.9 MAJOR CALIFORNIA RETAIL GROCERY CHAINS BY LOCATION AND NUMBER OF STORES

Approximate Stores In Risk And Host Areas	sr Of Served	C 94 6 B 90 10 G 93 7 F 87 13 C 97 3 B 94 6 A 100 0	0 69 31 0 38 62	E 71 29 D 100 0 B 88 12 A 46 54 B 87 13 A 89 11 D 49 51 E 31 69	
Арр	Numbe Stores				
Location	County	Orange Santa Clara Los Angeles Alameda Orange Solano Los Angeles	Sonoma Fresno	Sacramento Shasta Los Angeles Contra Costa Sacramento Los Angeles San Diego Contra Costa Sacramento Fresno Los Angeles	000-1999 2000+
Warehouse Location	City	La Habra Milpitas Los Angeles Fremont Buena Park Vacaville Los Angeles	Santa Rosa Fresno	ramento ling blon mond ramento liego nmond ramento sno donte	F 1000 G 20
	Company Hafte	Alpha Beta Alpha Beta Certified Grocers Fleming Foods Lucky Stores Market Basket Market Wholesale Grocery	Co. Market Wholesale Grocery Co. Market Wholesale Grocery	Market Wholesale Grocery Co. Market Wholesale Grocery Co. Ralph's Grocery Company Safeway Stores, Inc. Safeway Stores, Inc. Safeway Stores, Inc. United Grocers United Grocers Vons Number of Stores Served Category Range	

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3.2.5.2 Store Volume.

The annual volume of food-per-store sold varies considerably, from a high of about 8,000 tons for a major chain with all relatively large stores, to independent wholesale distributors which serve stores averaging about 125 tons. There are, of course, many stores with even smaller annual throughput. The annual throughput for the major chains averages 4,000-5,000 tons per store. On a volume basis, most food is sold through supermarkets. National figures indicate that although supermarkets accounted for only 16.5% of the total number of stores in 1977, they accounted for 75.1% of total store sales (Reference 4). The same studies show that chain grocery stores accounted for 58% of all grocery store sales.

3.2.5.3 Store Operations.

Information obtained in the interviews indicates that major chains supply as much of their stores' requirements directly from their own warehouses as possible and keep "drop shipments" by manufacturers or their wholesalers to a minimum. Chain stores such as Safeway and Alpha Beta, which sell a full range of goods (including produce, dry grocery, delicatessen, dairy, frozen and non-food items), generally handle more than 95% of their stores' orders through their own warehouses.

Non-chain stores, or smaller chains which belong to member association distributors such as United Grocers, may receive only 65-75% of their supplies from such an organization, although the share of goods received from its primary distributor varies considerably from one organization to another. Certified Grocers in Los Angeles, for example, handles fresh produce and other perishables, while United Grocers in Sacramento does not. Goods not supplied through chain stores or primary grocery distributor warehouses may be supplied by the manufacturer; dairy products and bottled and canned beverages are often supplied in this way. Fresh produce may be supplied by an independent produce wholesaler or even purchased directly by the store itself in the nearest wholesale produce market.

A typical breakdown of types of goods handled (annual throughput on a weight basis) by a "complete line" California supermarket chain is shown below:

COMMODITY CATEGORY	PERCENT
Grocery	47
Produce	22
Meat	12
Frozen Fuods	7
Variety	7
Miscellaneous Perishables	5
Total	100

Produce constitutes a substantial share of the volume of goods delivered to a chain store from a central warehouse. In the case of independent stores, total tonnage supplied by the primary distributor would be substantially lower if produce is obtained from an outside source.

All chain stores and major grocery store wholesaler have their own delivery fleets. Almost all operate their warehouses and delivery trucks at least two shifts per day and some operate three shifts per day. Delivery schedules vary considerably with the company and the types of merchandise, but most stores get deliveries three to five days per week. A variety of truck types are used, but the predominant unit is a tractor/trailer combination with a 35,000 to 40,000 pound carrying capacity. Transportation is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6.

3.2.5.4 Peak Operating Periods.

The weekend is by far the busiest time of the week for the eight checkout counters in the average new supermarket. More than 75% of the nation's food purchases are made between Thursday and Saturday. The unbalanced distribution of supermarket sales that results from heavy weekend buying indicates that the modern supermarket rarely operates at peak capacity. In a typical supermarket, the peak sales period is 6:00 P.M. to 9:00 P.M. on Friday, when nearly 14% of the week's total volume is sold. If this sales rate were maintained uniformly for seven days, the average supermarket could handle nearly four times its usual business.

This measure of capability views the supermarket merely as an outlet, and does not consider resupply problems. The inference that business could be quadrupled also assumes, not unreasonably, that patrons would be willing to adjust their normal shopping patterns in time of emergency. Granting the oversimplification involved in using a supermarket's peak period to indicate outlet capacity, it seems clear that a substantial amount of unused capacity exists in the modern supermarket.

Due to their large share of total grocery sales and expandable capacity, supermarkets may expect to bear the brunt of any demand increases accompanying population shifts caused by crisis relocation.

3.2.6 Restaurants and Institutions

On a retail weight basis, about 16.7 million tons of groceries are delivered per year in California. Roughly 75% of this goes to grocery stores and 25% to restaurants and institutions.

According to a 1976 study by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, eating away from home has increased considerably in recent years. Exhibit 3.10 shows that approximately 25% of all food consumed in the United States in 1975-1976 was eaten away from home at either restaurants or institutions.

Existing studies indicate that the share of food by weight going to restaurants and institutions is higher in metropolitan areas than in the nation as a whole. In Detroit, for example, approximately 30% of the food by weight was distributed to restaurants and institutions (Reference 6). The share of food consumed away from home also varies considerably with family income (References 7, 8 and 9). The share of food eaten out in California on a county-by-county basis is shown in Appendix B. This exhibit shows that a greater share of food is eaten away from home in counties with larger cities having a substantial daily influx of commuting workers. In San Francisco, Los Angeles and Orange Counties, for example, a higher percentage of food is eaten away from home than for the state as a whole.

3.2.7 Consumption

The U.S. Department of Agriculture has made estimates of national weekly per-capita food consumption levels. These USDA estimates for 1975, along with the USDA's National Emergency Maximum Distribution Allowance, are shown in Exhibit 3.11.

U.S. per-capita consumption on a retail weight basis is estimated at approximately 24 pounds per person per week. Total retail sales increase to 30 pounds per person per week if shipping materials, damage, losses, and trimming of fruits and vegetables are included. In the case of some food groups, California consumption varies slightly from the national average; in this study, however, where no per-person data specific to California were available, the national average figures were used. Using a total "shipped-to-store" weight of 30 pounds per person, and a 1975 population of 21,116,000, shipments of food to California consumers total approximately 16,470 million tons per year. Total food store sales are estimated at about 75% of this total, or 12,353,000 tons. The balance was supplied by restaurants and institutions.

EXHIBIT 3.10

FOOD DISTRIBUTION BY RESTAURANTS, INSTITUTIONS AND RETAIL ESTABLISHMENTS

ESTABLISHMENT

Food served in institutions and in restaurants to ex-	1955-60	1970	1975-76
pense-account patrons	6%	7%	8%
Food eaten in restaurants by those living in households	14-15%	16%	17%
All food consumed away from home*	20-21%	23%	25%
Food consumed at home	79-80% 100%	77% 100%	75% 100%

Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, National Food Situation NFS-161, September, 1977, p.25 (Reference 9)

^{*}Figures based on cost of food to serving establishments.

COMPARISON OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY MAXIMUM FOOD DISTRIBUTION

EXHIBIT 3.11

ALLOWANCE AND 1975 WEEKLY PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION LEVELS

	Amount	Per Week
Food Groups and Food Items	MAXIMUM EMERGENCY ALLOWANCE	1975 Consumption Levels
Meat and meat alternates (red meat, poultry, fish, shellfish, cheese, dry beans, peas, and nuts)	3 lbs.	4.5 lbs.
Eggs	6 (0.78 lbs.)	5.3 (0.69 lbs.)
Milk (fluid, whole)	7 pints (7.53 lbs.)	4.6 pints (4.97 lbs.)
Cereals and cereal products (flour including mixes, fresh bakery products, corn meal, rice, hominy, macaroni, and breakfast cereals)	4 lbs.	2.4 lbs.
Fruits and vegetables (fresh and frozen)	4 1bs.	5.7 lbs.
Food fats and oils (butter, margarine, lard, shortening, and salad and cooking oils)	0.5 lbs.	1.0 lbs.
Potatoes (white and sweet)	2 1bs.	2.4 lbs.
Sugars, syrups, honey, and other sweets	0.5 lbs.	2.3 lbs.
TOTAL (Equivalent Pounds Per Week)	22.31 lbs.	23.96 lus.

3.2.8 Implications of Food Distribution Patterns for Crisis Relocation

Approximately 94% of California's food distribution centers are located in the Los Angeles and San Francisco regions or other risk areas, and most of the stores served by these centers are also located in these risk areas, with relatively few in the host areas. The implications of this food distribution pattern on crisis relocation are two-fold. One is that there is likely to be considerable stress placed on the transportation system in supplying the relocated population. Second, there will be considerable stress on host-area retail stores, restaurants, and institutions. Other factors which bear on food distribution under crisis relocation conditions are California's high-level agricultural production, host-area food processing, and the substantial quantity of host-area warehousing space. Each of these factors has been considered in identifying and evaluating alternatives for distributing food to California's residents.

4. IDENTIFICATION AND EVALUATION OF FOOD DISTRIBUTION ALTERNATIVES

In this study, five distinct alternatives are considered for providing the logistic support needed to assemble food supplies and transport them to the host areas:

- Pre-crisis stockpiling;
- Bypassing the wholesaler with direct shipments from manufacturers to the host area;
- 3. Maintaining risk-area wholesale operations;
- 4. Establishing emergency warehouses in host areas; and
- Supplementing risk-area warehouses with secondary warehouses in host areas.

Alternative 1 requires extensive pre-crisis preparation; while Alternatives 2 through 5 involve adjustments to the existing distribution system. Alternatives 1 and 2 are briefly discussed below; for further detail, see References 2, 5 and 6. The remainder of the chapter is devoted to a discussion of of Alternatives 3 and 4, and to the combinations of these two alternatives in Alternatives 5. Exhibit 4.1 briefly summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of all five alternatives.

4.1 PRE-CRISIS STOCKPILING

In the past, food for survivors of localized disasters in the United States has often been obtained from stockpiles maintained by the USDA as part of their Donated Commodities Program. Since the 1930's, the USDA has purchased surplus commodities under this program for distribution to school lunch programs, summer camps, state and federal institutions, and welfare recipients. Stockpiles of these commodities were located throughout the United States and have served as a source of immediate relief to victims of natural or manmade disasters. In recent years, however, the availability of USDA-donated foods from state warehouses has been on the decline due to the switch from donated foods to food stamps for needy people. This trend has reversed recently to the extent that the USDA Food and Nutrition Service is now purchasing more food commodities for school lunch programs than previously. The Food Stamp and the School Lunch Programs are on-going USDA projects. In 1977, there were two instances where the USDA/Food Nutrition Service authorized the use of School Lunch Program food in natural disasters.

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EXHIBIT 4.1

SUMMARY OF ALTERNATIVES FOR ASSESSING AND STAGING

FOOD SUPPLIES OF CALIFORNIA CRISIS RELOCATION

ALTERNATIVE	ADVANTAGES	DISADVANTAGES
 Pre-Crisis Stockpiling. Create and maintain food stockpiles in host areas on a contingency basis in the pre-crisis period. 	Reduces attack vulnerability and transportation requirements for food distribution. Normally undergoes minimal disruption, and can be quickly reestablished following crisis relocation.	Extremely costly to set up and maintain.
 Bypass Wholesalers With <u>Direct Shipments</u>. Ship food <u>directly from manufacturer to</u> host area, bypassing the wholesale function. 	Removal of stocks from processor inventories. Decreases attack vulnerability. Possible limited use in California in conjunction with Alternative 1, where processors are in host area.	Places strain on processors oper- ating and transportation resources Disrupts distribution system.
Maintain Risk Area Warehouses. Continue to operate risk-area warehouses to deliver propor- tionally greater supplies to host-area retail outlets.	Negligible cost. Conceptually simple and builds on the existing system without creating new operating entities. Ease of post-crisis resumption of operations.	Increased vulnerability to attack for goods and personnel.
 Establish Host-Area Warehouses Drain risk-area warehouses as possible, moving supplies to expedient host-area space. 	Decreases the vulnerability of riskarea food supplies and key workers to attack.	Operating inefficiencies, system disruption, and the occurrence of major delays in reestablishing normal food distribution operations in the post-crisis period. Requires additional host-area personnel to staff emergency warehouses and increased transportation resources to drain risk-area warehouses.
Establish Secondary Host-Area Distribution Centers as Adjunct to Alternative 1. Maintain risk-area warehouses to distribute some types of food supplies. Subsequent distribution to stores and mass feeding facilities.	Basically sound concept of distributing from major chain risk-area warehouses remains intact. Transportation stress is reduced for goods originating in the host area and distributed from host-area warehouses. Supply level of risk-area warehouses is reduced. Number of risk-area critical workers is reduced. Provides basic structure and personnel nucleus which could be expanded if crisis or attack is extended.	Expanded number of distribution points adds to chains and wholesaler task of maintaining centralized control. Requires greater post-crisis effort (e.g., shut down secondary distribution points.
Commandeered Host-Area Warehouses.	Relatively more warehouse space avail- able in California due to widespread food production and processing.	Difficulty of locating suitable warehouse space.
O Emergency Construction of warehouses.	Advances in technology allow fast (2 or 3 day), relatively low-cost construction of some types of structures (e.g., air-supported structures).	Shipment of temporary structure equipment and materials to site in time-consuming if not manufacture locally.
Use of Railcar Shipments. Use railcars to move food from risk-area processors to host-area points. Chains and wholesalers order shipments.	Large inventories of California risk- area processors normally shipped by rail could be increased. Would reduce highway congestion and decrease risk- area supplies.	Difficulty in locating suitable storage or distribution facility space. Possible difficulty in maintaining centralized control.
O Use of Railcars as Host- Area Distribution Points.	Track space available in California. Some cars available from less essential sectors.	Unloading and distribution inefficiencies. Possible difficulty in maintaining centralized control.

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Replenishment of stocks was then carried out by USDA/ASCS. It should be noted, however, that food donated to the School Lunch Program is owned by state and local school lunch agencies, and may be handled as these agencies see fit. The USDA Donated Commodities Program, which includes the School Lunch Program, maintains an average inventory of about 10,000 tons of food in its Sacramento and Los Angeles warehouses.

USDA/ASCS food stockpiles are presently quite limited in the type and quantity of commodities held. In California, dried milk is the main commodity held by USDA/ASCS. These stockpiles total about 160,000,000 pounds of dried milk (see Guidelines). This quantity of milk would last California evacuees for more than three weeks if used on the same emergency standard basis as whole milk. USDA/ASCS dried milk presently stored in the risk areas would be moved to the host areas under crisis relocation conditions.

Although food stockpiles for disaster relief are smaller than in earlier years, the creation of a system of stockpiles in prospective host areas represents one option for providing food under crisis relocation conditions. Past research projects have explored the cost of establishing and maintaining a nationwide network of stockpiles of both raw wheat and processed foodstuffs (References 11 and 12). These cost figures, prorated to reflect California's share of the total population, have been projected to a common year through the use of the Consumer Price Index and are summarized in Exhibit 4.2 for different levels of stockpiles. Because the wheat stockpiling costs cover stockpiles sufficiently large to provide postattack sustenance as well as crisis relocation relief, the costs are not directly comparable with those displayed for stockpiles of prepared food, which cover only crisis relocation relief. If stockpiles were designed to cover comparable periods, it has been estimated that the cost of acquiring stockpiles of processed foods would be six times the cost of acquiring stockpiles of rau wheat (Reference 12).

The availability of stockpiled food in host areas would reduce both attack vulnerability and transportation requirements without disrupting the existing distribution system. Since the regional and local systems have sufficient food to support the population during and after crisis relocation, it appears that a strategy of stockpiling either wheat or processed foods in host areas in advance of relocation is prohibitively costly. A moderate nationwide program of wheat stockpiling, for example, would require more than half of the present civil defense expenditures.

4.2 BYPASS WHOLESALERS WITH DIRECT SHIFMENTS

Under this alternative, food would be shipped directly from the manufacturer to the host area, bypassing the wholesaler. Shipments could be delivered directly to retailers or mass feeding centers. This alternative might be effective for some manufacturers, particularly those located in host areas. For processors located in risk areas, a

EXHIBIT 4.2

ESTIMATED COST OF PROVIDING AND MAINTAINING
CALIFORNIA PRE-CRISIS FOOD STOCKPILES

(Millions of 1975 Dollars)

Commodity	Stockpile Level	Set-Up Cost	Additional Maintenance Cost
Raw Wheat Stockpiles	Minimal (augment existing pipeline supplies to yield 3-month total)	9	1
	Moderate (augment existing pipeline supplies to yield 6-month total)	77	10
	Extensive (3-month supply)	151	17
Prepared Food Stock- piles	Minimal (austere rations of 2000 calories per week per person for two weeks)	78	17
	Moderate (minimal level plus milk powder and dry rations for evacuation use)	253	56
	Extensive (moderate level plus more varied and expensive foods)	495	111

(Source: Based on References 11 and 12 and SYSTAN analysis.)

major advantage of this alternative is the removal of inventories from locations which are vulnerable to attack.

The setup costs needed to bypass wholesalers with direct host-area shipments are negligible. The main disadvantage of this alternative is the heavy strain on the processors' operations, especially transportation. Some processors have their own fleets, while others don't. Many California meat processors have their own fleets and routinely deliver directly to distributors or independent stores. However, major California canners generally have relatively few trucks of their own and rely heavily on common carriers. Heavy reliance on direct shipments under crisis conditions disrupts normal distribution patterns, and can potentially cause supply/demand imbalances and the loss of centralized distribution control. Impossible priority decisions are required of processors with nationwide distribution networks, as local and regional requests for direct shipments are balanced against nationwide demand patterns. The distribution system that can be expected to work best in an emergency is that system which most closely resembles normal operating conditions. In the case of food distribution, normal patterns call for consolidation of shipments in wholesale warehouses. This pattern permits better control over the composition and scheduling of deliveries to individual stores.

Direct or "drop shipments" as a percentage of total retail volume vary considerably by firm as well as product type. During the 1978 truckers' strike in California, major food distributors found they could substantially increase the volume of food shipments directly from the supplier to retail stores. One major distributor indicated that its drop shipments increased from 2% to 14% of total volume. With this type of shipment, the order still originates with the store and is processed by the distributor, who notifies the supplier to ship directly to the store. The supplier bills the distributor and the distributor bills the store. Centralized control is at least partially maintained. Under normal conditions, major chains keep drop shipments to a minimum because it is expensive. Also, it places a strain on the suppliers' transportation facilities.

In summary, drop shipments can only be used effectively to a limited extent under emergency conditions. It may be most appropriate where the supplier (producer or processor) is located in the host area, and can drop-ship to wholesale, retail or mass feeding facilities nearby. The billing could be done through the distributor so that centralized control would be maintained.

4.3 MAINTENANCE OF RISK-AREA WHOLESALE OPERATIONS

One of the simplest distribution system adjustments capable of supporting mass population movement is using wholesale distribution centers in high-risk areas, and increasing the level of supplies shipped to retail stores in outlying host areas. Exhibit 4.3 illustrates this type of distribution adjustment when normal wholesale channels are centered in the risk area itself.

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
EXHIBIT 4.3


PROPOSED DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM ADJUSTMENT

ENTAILING MAINTENANCE OF RISK AREA WHOLESALE OPERATIONS

Retail Outlets Consumers Risk Area Host Area

Food Manufacturers Distribution Centers Truck Route Rail Route 的學






(a) NORMAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM

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(Source: Billheimer and Thomas, Reference 6)



(b) DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM FOR ALTERNATE HOSTING CONCEPT

The system adjustment shown in Exhibit 4.3 has several advantages; this alternative is conceptually simple and builds on existing operating entities. Corporate food chains are maintained as distribution units and most host-area retail stores will be supplied by their preevacuation sources. Strain on the national distribution system is minimized and supplies on the road from national processors to regional and local wholesalers need not be rerouted at the time of evacuation.

The disadvantages of continuing to distribute from existing major chain, risk-area warehouses are: (1) the necessity to supply increased quantities of food to host-area stores results in considerable stress on the local transportation system; (2) this alternative also places a heavy load on retail stores in the outlying host areas; (3) valuable food inventories remain in the high-risk areas; and (4) continued operation of risk-area warehouses subjects critical warehouse workers to additional risks should an attack occur.

The ability of local transportation and distribution systems to accommodate the stress imposed by continued operation of risk-area warehouses has been analyzed in detail in past case studies of crisis relocation undertaken in Detroit, Michigan (Reference 6), Richmond, Virginia (Reference 12), and Colorado Springs, Colorado (Reference 2). In these studies, mathematical models were developed to quantify the amount of stress placed on the local distribution system by an evacuation process of specified distance and magnitude. Critical points of stress were identified and quantified for both the host-area retail stores and local distribution systems supplying these stores under a strategy of crisis evacuation. To supplement the quantititative analysis, food industry personnel were interviewed regarding the ability of local retailers and wholesalers to withstand transportation and distribution system stress. Because of the importance of regional and local transportation and distribution systems to the success of the crisis relocation strategy, additional model development and extensive food industry interviews have been undertaken in the current study.

The quantitative and qualitative insights gleaned from modeling and interviews have been distilled to provide a foundation for developing food distribution guidelines for evacuation planning purposes. These insights and guidelines are discussed in more detail elsewhere in this report, specifically in the transportation analysis of Chapter 6, and the guidelines of Volume II. For the purposes of the present discussion, it should be noted that California's food industry personnel overwhelmingly favor a food distribution strategy that enables them to continue to operate warehouses located in risk areas. It appears that host-area retail outlets are capable of withstanding the stresses imposed by such a strategy. The ability of the local transportation system to withstand the stress imposed by increased vehicle mileage emerges as the most critical element in determining the success of a strategy entailing the continued operation of risk-area warehouses. Food industry leaders estimate that a doubling of vehicle mileage may be tolerated for short periods (one to two weeks) without requiring additional equipment. More detailed discussions regarding the level of transportation stress imposed by a strategy of risk-area warehouse

operations may be found in Chapter 6, along with an analysis of different measures for alleviating this stress.

4.4 ESTABLISHING EMERGENCY WAREHOUSING IN HOST AREAS

Under this alternative, risk-area warehouses would be emptied as quickly as possible into converted, comandeered or hastily-constructed warehouses in the host area. This procedure would have the advantage of decreasing the vulnerability of the food supplies and the key workers. The disadvantages include operating inefficiencies, system disruption, and the occurrence of major delays in reestablishing normal food distribution operations in the event attack does not occur. One problem with establishing emergency host-area warehouses is the difficulty of locating suitable structures. Modern centers for food distribution may devote more than 500,000 square feet to the storage of dry groceries alone. Very few structures of this size, if any, are likely to be in the host area. Furthermore, previous research into the construction of warehouse space under postattack conditions (References 2, 3 and 5) has determined that the emergency construction of suitable warehouse space would require several weeks.

Another important disadvantage of host-area warehouse space lies in the length of time required to empty existing risk-area warehouses. Food industry personnel estimate they would require a minimum of four days to a maximum of two weeks to empty existing warehouses using their own personnel and equipment.

4.5 <u>SUPPLEMENTING RISK-AREA WAREHOUSES WITH SECONDARY HOST-AREA</u> WAREHOUSES

Under this alternative, retail food chains and major wholesalers would establish temporary secondary host-area distribution centers as an adjunct to Alternative 3. Risk-area warehouses would continue to operate and carry the main load of distributing supplies to the host areas, while temporary warehouses in the host areas would also distribute goods to the host-area stores, institutions and mass feeding centers. Discussions with retail chain representatives indicate that certain types of goods (particularly canned goods and the nonperishables) may be efficiently distributed from emergency warehouses constructed or commandeered in the host areas.

This alternative has the advantages of: (1) maintaining the existing structure; (2) moving some goods and personnel out of the risk area; (3) possibly reducing transportation stress; and (4) providing a base for postattack operations. The disadvantages include difficulties such as: (1) establishing and maintaining reliable communications with a temporary host-area warehouse; (2) reestablishing normal flow potterns after the crisis abates; and (3) locating suitable warehouse sence. These advantages and disadvantages are discussed in more detail in the following subsections.

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4.5.1 Maintaining the Existing Structure

Earlier studies have shown that continued distribution of goods to the host areas from risk-area warehouses is conceptually simple and extends existing operations. Corporate food-chains are preserved as distribution units, and most host-area retail stores would be supplied by their preevacuation sources. Strain on the national distribution system is minimized and supplies on the road from national processors to regional and local wholesalers need not be rerouted at the time of evacuation. The importance of building on the existing structure was also emphasized by most retail food distribution executives interviewed. Distribution from secondary host-area warehouses would serve to supplement distribution from existing risk-area warehouses, supplying perhaps 20% to 30% of total requirements under crisis relocation conditions. Each chain or wholesale distributor would operate its own temporary host-area warehouse or warehouses. Supplies shipped to the supplementary host-area warehouse (or distribution center) could come from three possible sources:

- Local California Risk-Area Processors. Substantial quantities
 of canned goods and other processed foods are held in
 processors' warehouses located in major risk areas, either for
 subsequent distribution in California or to other states.
 Shipments of food held in processors' risk-area warehouses
 would reduce the vulnerability of these supplies.
- 2. Local Host-Area Producers or Processors. As shown in Section 3.0, substantial quantities of processed foodstuffs, including canned goods, are processed in host-area counties. Appendix B shows that substantial portions of California's food processing takes place in the San Joaquin, Sacramento, Salinas and Imperial Valleys. The counties of San Joaquin, Sacramento, Stanislaus, Monterey, Fresno, Riverside and Imperial account for 21% of California's food processing. Overall about 85% of California's agricultural production takes place in the host areas. Under crisis relocation conditions, there is no need for local producers and processors to ship all goods to the risk-area warehouses only to have some returned to the local host area through regular channels. Such food products could be delivered directly to the chain or wholesaler's temporary host-area warehouse for subsequent host-area distribution.
- 3. Chain or Wholesaler Risk-Area Warehouses. Previous investigations (Reference 2) have shown that the strategy of draining the warehouses rapidly to supply emergency host-area warehouses should be followed only in the case of the smallest risk-area wholesalers. Chains with risk-area warehouses will be engaged in supplying their own host-area stores and mass feeding centers.
- 4. <u>Diversion of In-Transit Shipments</u>. A portion of in-transit shipments destined for risk-area warehouses can be diverted to host-area warehouses.

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4.5.2 Moving Some Goods and Personnel Out of the Risk Area

If 20% to 30% of the goods are handled by the chain's or wholesaler's temporary host-area warehouses, the supply level of goods in the risk-area warehouses would be reduced by that amount. The number of critical risk-area workers would be reduced proportionately.

4.5.3 Possibly Reducing Transportation Stress

The need to supply increased quantities of food to host-area stores would result in considerable stress on the local transportation system. If a portion of the host-area requirements were met from the temporary host-area warehouses, overall transportation system stress would be reduced, assuming supplies delivered to host-area warehouses were from producers or processors. If a portion of the secondary warehouse stock were shipped from the risk-area warehouse, however, the double-handling involved would increase transportation stress. Transportation stress is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.

4.5.4 Providing a Base for Postattack Operations

A temporary host-area warehouse established by a chain or wholesaler would provide a basic warehouse and personnel nucleus for expansion should an extended crisis situation or actual attack occur.

4.5.5 Establishing Communications with a Temporary Host-Area Harehouse

Establishing host-area warehouses increases the number of distribution points and could add to the problem of maintaining centralized control. Existing studies (References 2, 5, 6 and 12) emphasize the importance of maintaining centralized control in the food distribution system. Without it, there is the danger of diverting food that should be bound for other national markets. Reliable communications are critical for centralized control, and communications with a temporary host-area warehouse could be a potential problem under crisis relocation conditions. From a technical standpoint, however, communications should present no difficulty. In fact, several major food distributors currently maintain completely centralized control of warehouses separated from the control facility. One San Francisco distributor, for example, has its main warehouse and centralized computer-controller-ordering system in Fremont, while its perishable goods distribution warehouse is located in Oakland. At present, orders received from stores go directly into the Fremont computer in Framont where they are processed. Orders for perishable food (including warehouse location and labels for cases) are printed out at the Ockland warehouse. The company is currently studying the possibility of building a new warehouse in a host area that commands approximately 25%

of their business. If such a warehouse were built, order processing would still be done in Fremont and printed out at the new warehouse. A similar procedure could be followed if distribution were made from a temporary host-area warehouse. Company representatives also indicate that the layout of goods in a temporary host-area warehouse could be made according to the same format used in Fremont, and that the computerized-ordering system would not have to be changed. This would allow relocation of a substantial portion of warehouse personnel, but those operating the central computer system would continue to work in the risk area.

4.5.6 Reestablishing Normal Flow Patterns

If an attack is avoided and relocatees return to their homes, temporary host-area warehouses would have to be closed and the remaining goods distributed to host-area stores. Commandeered space could be returned to original use and temporary structures could be either used for other purposes or dismantled. Various types of temporary warehousing are discussed in Section 4.5.8.

4.5.7 Locating Suitable Warehouse Space

Food distribution centers or warehouses are designed to handle large volumes of groceries. This means specific requirements for refrigeration, floor design, ceiling height, number of truck-loading doors, rail and highway access, temperature control, lighting, and suitable handling equipment. The availability of sufficient warehouse space is of primary importance in any evaluation of the secondary host-area warehouse alternative. The three main potential sources of host-area warehouse space are commandeered existing space, emergency construction, and use of railcars at distribution points. The respective advantages and disadvantages of these options are discussed below.

1. Commandeer Existing Space. Commandeered space is a promising source of host-area warehousing capacity in California.

Partly due to California's widespread agricultural production, as well as its seasonal storage and processing, more host-area warehouse space is available than in some other states.

Exhibits 4.4 and 4.5 list actual and potential warehousing space in existing structures in selected cities of Southern, Central, and Northern California, while Exhibit 4.6 maps the location of possible secondary distribution centers. This space generally meets the construction requirements listed above; however, one requirement is deficient. Almost all of these buildings were designed for storage rather than for high-volume throughput, so that the number of loading docks is limited. The existing structure might have 5 or 6 doors, whereas a building of comparable size designed specifically

EXHIBIT 4.4 MAJOR DISTRIBUTION WAREHOUSE LOCATIONS FOR SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA


PRESENT LOCATIONS	WAREHOUSE AREA	POSSIBLE LOCATION FOR SUPPLEMENTARY HOST AREA WAREHOUSES	WAREHOUSE AREA
Los Angeles: Market Basket	370,000	Coachella	250,000
Certified Grocers	000,096	Visalia	300,000
La Habra: Alpha Beta	700,000	Selma	100,000
Buena Park: Lucky Stores	1,400,000	Cutler	100,000
Compton: Ralph's	800,000	Tulare	300,000
San Fernando: Certified Grocers	400,000	Indio	300,000
San Diego: Safeway	319,000	San Luis Obispo	400,000
Fresno: United Grocers	344,000		900 011
Market Wholesale	169,000	brawley	110,000
Santa Fe Springs: Safeway	1,006,000	Fresno*	
	750,000	Bakersfield*	
Others	1,950,000		1,860,000
Restaurants And Institutions	3,701,000		
TOTAL SQUARE FEET OF SPACE:	10,869,000	*Locations of Food Processors With Substantial Warehousing Space On Fringes Of Risk Area.	's With Substantial is Of Risk Area.

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EXHIBIT 4.5 MAJOR DISTRIBUTION WAREHOUSE LOCATIONS FOR NORTHERN AND CENTRAL CALIFORNIA

POSSIBLE LOCATION FOR SUPPLEMENTARY HOST AREA WAREHOUSES	Vacaville 1,300,000	Merced 125,000	Gilroy 500,000	Livingston 200,000	Oakdale 60,000	Tracy 165,000	Madera 200,000	Ukiah 60,000	Modes to *	Oakdale	Stockton*	* Merced	Sacramento	[†] Host Area 2,610,000	*Locations of Food Processors With Substantial		
WAREHOUSE AREA	300,000	121,000	369,000	435,000	1,106,000		127,000	1,300,000	300,000		495,000	125,000	1,585,000	3,701,000		9,964,000	
PRESENT LOCATIONS	Sacramento: United Grocers	Market Wholesale	Safeway	Richmond: United Grocers		+	Redding : Market Wholesale	Vacaville: Lucky Stores	Milpitas: Alpha Beta		Fremont: Fleming Foods	Santa Rosa: Market Wholesale	Others	Restaurants And Institutions		TOTAL SQUARE FEET OF SPACE	

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for food distribution might have 10 or more doors. The number of doors or loading docks is a critical factor in determining throughput capacity. Using pallet loading only, trucks can be loaded in thirty minutes. Thus, the constraint is not in handling within the warehouse but rather at the doors. The overall efficiency factor in terms of throughput per square foot of area for these warehouses will be between 25% and 50%, compared with a warehouse designed and built specifically for food distribution. Under favorable weather conditions, however, secondary warehouse capacity could be increased by use of temporary covering over a portion of the adjacent parking area, although the use of such an outside area could require additional security measures.

Another important factor in considering potential secondary warehouses is the availability of additional nearby warehouse space. This space would be used to handle a larger share of goods through the chain's secondary warehouse if necessary due to increased danger of attack, an extended crisis situation, or an actual attack.

The throughput factor of emergency commandeered warehouses is less than a warehouse designed specifically for food distribution. At a chainstore distribution center, a semi-trailer can be loaded with 40,000 pounds in about thirty minutes. This is equivalent to 648,000 pounds per door, per eight-hour shift, or 333,600 tons per door annually, assuming two shifts per day. At an efficiency of 0.3 for secondary host-area warehouses, this would equal 70,080 tons per door per year. Thus, the throughput capacity of a temporary warehouse with five doors per 100,000 square feet would be 175,200 tons annually; a warehouse with ten doors per 100,000 square feet would have a throughput capacity of 350,400 tons per year (five doors in and five doors out). Major distributors' present risk-area warehouse space is roughly twenty million square feet. Virtually all of this would be destroyed or badly damaged except for the Lucky Stores Vacaville warehouse, which would sustain relatively minor damage. If the Lucky Stores warehouse, which is located on the fringe of the risk area, is included in host-area space, and other host-area space is added, total effective space (using a 2.5 throughput factor for pallet loading, more shifts, and more work days) would be 5.4 million square feet (see Exhibit 4.7), or about half that presently used by the chains in their risk-area distribution warehouse operations.

Of course, loading times would be considerably longer (and efficiency lower) than shown above if part or all hand labor were used. With hand labor, four to six hours would be needed to load 40,000 pounds of food into a semi-trailer. For this reason, forklift trucks or pallet jacks would be essential if trucks were to be loaded quickly. It should be noted, however, that many forklift trucks and pallet jacks used by

existing chain distribution centers are battery-operated. Special facilities for recharging them would not be readily available in most host-area warehouses.

2. Construct Emergency Warehouses. The main advantage of emergency construction is that the warehouse can be placed at the appropriate location and can be constructed to meet the general requirements of an emergency food distribution center. The main disadvantages are the cost, and time required for shipping materials and for actual construction.

Two types of structures are probably most suitable for temporary distribution centers: air-supported and tilt-up buildings. Air-supported structures have been developed only in recent years and are in relatively limited use today, serving as warehouses, greenhouses, and construction site enclosures. The main advantages of this type of structure are its relatively low cost (about \$3 per square foot) and its fast construction time (2 to 4 days). At present, almost all of the large (200 x 500 feet or more) air-supported structures are made to order, and the still small industry cannot produce a large number of such inflatable structures on short notice. If in stock, shipment from the manufacturer would take about one week. Most sizes can be transported on a semi-trailer with blowers and the other equipment on a second truck. Precrisis stockpiling of inflatable structures at host-area sites would be expensive and the material would be subject to deterioration.

Tilt-up emergency structures could also be used for secondary warehousing and distribution in the host area. These would be one-story Butler-type buildings erected on slab floors. If the design and material requisitions were prepared in advance, these buildings might be constructed in a period of four to eight weeks, provided necessary materials were available. Total cost per square foot would probably be about \$9 to \$12, depending on the type of structure and equipment required. Thus, a 400,000 square foot building would cost approximately \$3.6 to \$4.8 million and would require a total construction labor force of 150 to 250 people. Precrisis costs would be limited to the preparation of designs and lists of materials.

Stocking any emergency warehouse would require the average ten-day lead time currently experienced by warehouse operators.

In addition to the cost and time required for construction, there is the problem of choosing sites. To ensure minimum attack damage, it would be preferable to build several moderate-sized warehouses that are widely dispersed railer than one or two very large ones.

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EXHIBIT 4.7

DISTRIBUTION WAREHOUSE SPACE IN THE HOST AREA

Over Pressure				,
Effective Warehouse Space (Square Feet)	250,000 3,250,000 75,000 375,000	150,000 94,000 142,000	225,000 75,000 225,000 300,000	5,393,000
Emergency Thruput Factor with Pallets	2.50 2.50 0.75 0.75	0.75 0.75 0.75	0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75	
Normal Thruput Factor	0.1.0	000	0000	
Square Feet	1,300,000 1,300,000 100,000 500,000	200,000 125,000 190,000	300,000 100,000 300,000 400,000	3,925,000
County	Shasta Solano Stanislaus Santa Clara San Joaquin	* Merced Merced Madera Solano	Tulare Fresno Tulare San Luis Obispo	
City	Redding Vacaville Turlock Gilroy	Livingston* Merced* Madera . Vacaville*	Visalia Selma Tulare San Luis Obispo	כספרווב
<u>Organi zation</u>	Market Wholesale Lucky Stores Warehouse Food Processor Hunt Wesson and Neigh- boring Warehouses	Foster Farms and Neighboring Warehouses Livingston Maracay Mills Armco, Advance, Oberti Madera American Home Foods and Heighboring Warehouses Vacaville	Warehouses Warehouses Warehouses	Mal Gilouvas

Locations of food processors with substantial warehousing space on fringes of risk areas.

Locations of other manufacturers with substantial warehousing or convertible manufacturing space on the fringes of risk areas.

3. Use Railcars as Distribution Points. Discussions with California railroad officials indicate that it will be possible to ship foodstuffs from risk-area processor or wholesaler warehouses to the host areas by rail, and then to use the railcars as emergency distribution points. This option would be used in conjunction with maintaining risk-area warehouses (Alternate 3 above). Adequate track siding space is available to support this option. However, unloading directly from railcars will involve distribution inefficiencies and centralized control may be more difficult.

As the use of trucks for short-haul of fresh and processed foods and other goods has increased, non-mainline railroad track (secondary lines, spurs and sidings) has been used less frequently. This is particularly true in the agricultural areas of California. Such track could be used for intermodal transfer and for siting of individual boxcars or train sections brought from the risk areas. Agricultural products could be unloaded from railcars at these locations without disrupting mainline operations. Some of the locations where operations could be carried out are shown in Exhibit 4.8. Exhibit 4.9 shows all siding on the Southern Pacific lines in California; at least 15% of these sidings would be suitable for such intermodal transfer or siting of boxcars or train sections.

Although some oversized cars are used to carry paper products and lighter goods, railcars used to transport dry groceries (such as canned goods) are typically 60 feet long and have a capacity of 1500-2000 cases; cases are usually on pallets or slipsheets. If this type of car were sited at a railroad terminal platform or warehouse loading dock where forklift or pallet trucks were available, they could be unloaded in two or three hours. If such facilities and equipment were unavailable, railroad representatives estimate that unloading by hand would require ten men and take about six to eight hours per railcar. Where there are no terminal platforms, goods could be loaded into pickups or other single-unit trucks, which are available in the host area. The supplies could then be delivered to host area warehouses, stores or mass feeding centers.


Using railcars as temporary distribution points would effectively reduce the transportation stress for the truck transport system. Each railcar could carry about 1-1/2 times as much dry groceries as a typical semi-trailer, which normally carries 40,000 pounds. The effect of this petential substitution of railcars for trucks is discussed further in Chapter 6.

As an adjunct to maintaining risk-area wholesale operations, the natioar distribution procedure could increase outflow of cannot goods from the large supplies held in processor.


EXHIBIT 4.8
SELECTED POSSIBLE RAILCAR SITING LOCATIONS

Railroad	City	County	Miles of Track	Car Capacity
Western Pacific Southern Pacific	Oroville	Butte	5	100
Southern Pacific	Gerber-Roseville	Tehama-Placer	7	350
Southern Pacific	Orland-Arbuckle	Glenn-Colusa	5	250
Santa Fe Southern Pacific	Oakdale	Stanislaus	2	100
Southern Pacific	Turlock	Stanislaus	-	50
Santa Fe Southern Pacific	Tulare	Tulare	2	100

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(EXHIBIT 4.9, cont'd.)

warehouses in San Francisco and Los Angeles risk areas. The process could begin during relocation if it did not interfere with the evacuation of the risk areas. Canned goods from processor warehouses in the San Francisco Bay Area, for example, are shipped to eastern points outside California almost daily (and almost totally by rail). These shipments could be increased when crisis relocation is implemented. Movement of essential cargo under crisis relocation conditions accounts for 41% of inter-city rail traffic; therefore, some railcars normally used to carry less critical goods could be used for food transport.

Trains loaded with canned food products destined for eastern points pass through major host-area counties. Southern Pacific, carrying canned goods east from the Santa Clara Valley, for example, travels through Sacramento and across the Sierras via Emigrant Gap, and then through to Ogden, Utah. Alternatively, trains destined for southern and southwestern points go through Tracy, Turlock and Tulare in the San Joaquin Valley and then east via Mojave on Union Pacific and Santa Fe or via Colton on Southern Pacific. A predetermined number of loaded cars could be left at selected Central Valley host-area points before the final make-up of the train heading east.

The use of trains to move certain dry grocery foodstuffs in California has the following advantages: (!) decreasing the transportation stress on the intercity truck fleet; (2) reducing foodstocks stored in high-risk areas; (3) decreasing the requirement for host-area warehouse space; and (4) leaving intact the basically sound concept of distributing from major chain risk-area warehouses. The disadvantages include: (1) possibly more difficulty in maintaining centralized control; (2) rail door-to-door time in transit (usually greater than by motor truck); and (3) host-area unloading from railcars directly to trucks requiring a relatively high ratio of labor input and being relatively slow.

4.5.8 Comparison of Warehousing Options

The warehouse options and evaluation criteria discussed above are summarized in Exhibit 4.10. As is the case for other elements of the emergency food distribution system, selecting local storage options entails trade-offs between precrisis preparation and the likelihood of effective performance during the crisis relocation period.

Although generalizations are difficult in light of the wide range of available facilities in California host areas, converted or commandeered space appear to be the most attractive of the secondary distribution warehouse options in the crisis relocation period. The option requires negligible precrisis investment and, as shown in Exhibit 4.6, a sufficient number of suitable host-area buildings exists to

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handle anticipated requirements. Converted host-area space would be used in conjunction with railcars, which provide a means of both transporting and storing vulnerable inventories of canned goods.

4.6 SUMMARY

The main advantages and disadvantages of the five alternatives for assessing and staging food supplies for California crisis relocation have been summarized in Exhibit 4.1.

An analysis of the various alternatives indicates that maintaining risk-area warehouses (Alternative 3) appears to be the single most suitable alternative for California. This alternative has a negligible cost, builds on the existing food distribution system, and results in the least stress on the transportation system and mass feeding centers. (Transportation stress in discussed further in Chapter 6.) Secondary host-area warehouses should also be used to supplement the alternative of maintaining risk-area warehouses. One of the main advantages of secondary host-area warehouses is that they provide flexibility for the distributors.

By-passing the wholesaler with direct shipments to retailers could be used in conjunction with Alternative 3, and has some applicability in California, where a substantial volume of the fresh and processed food originates in the host areas. While direct shipments are not used extensively by major chain stores, about 30% of supplies to independents and smaller chains are delivered by the manufacturer or special wholesalers. A critical limitation on direct shipments to stores, however, is the transport capacity of the processor.

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EXHIBIT 4,10

POTENTIAL SOURCES OF HOST AREA WAREHOUSE SPACE

DISADVANTAGES	- Possible Lack of suitable Host area space,	- MATERIAL SHIPMENT FOR AIR SUPPORTED BUILDINGS IS TIME CONSUMING, - TILT-UP BUILDINGS REQUIRE A MINIMUM OF FOUR WEEKS TO CONSTRUCT,	- OPERATING INEFFICIENCIES. - CENTRALIZED CONTROL PROBLEMS.
ADVANTAGES	- RELATIVELY MORE SPACE AVAILABLE IN CALIFORNIA, PARTICULARLY WHEN CANNING INVENTORIES HAVE BEEN REDUCED,	- RELATIVELY LOW COST OF QUICK CONSTRUCTION FOR AIR-SUPPORTED BUILDINGS, - BUTLER-TYPE TILT-UP BUILD- INGS CAN BE BUILT WITH SUFFICIENT LOADING DOCKS,	- TRACK SPACE AVAILABLE.
ALTERNATIVE	Commandeer Existing Space: - Warehouses - Processors	Construct Emergency Warehouses	Use Railcars as Distribution Points
	i.	2.	3,
	1 21		

5. DELIVERY ALTERNATIVES

This chapter discusses preparing and serving food to the indigenous and evacuee populations once it has been made available to the host area. This section cannot, however, be viewed independently of the staging alternatives. Coordination of staging and delivery is necessary to identify the distribution channels through which the food preparers receive their supplies. An overview of the entire system is shown in Exhibit 5.1.

5.1 STAGING - DELIVERY COORDINATION

Exhibit 5.1 suggests two channels through which food may be supplied to the food preparers: (1) directly from the wholesale level of distribution; and (2) indirectly through the retail level of distribution. Initially, the former seems more efficient since it obviates the unloading and handling of food at the retail level. Under certain circumstances, however, the link through the retail level may prove more efficient despite the additional handling.

Less planning and coordination will be needed if ordinary channels of distribution are followed to the maximum extent possible. This would require that institutional wholesalers continue to supply their normal customers (restaurants, hospitals, schools, convalescent homes), and that grocery wholesalers continue to supply their normal customers (grocery stores). In attempting to decide the extent to which these normal lines of distribution should be altered in the event of a crisis relocation, it is relevant to note that grocery wholesalers ordinarily handle a much larger volume of food shipments than institutional wholesalers.

Since the relative proportion of foods prepared in the home will undoubtedly decrease under conditions of crisis relocation, any modifications in present distribution patterns should be made by the grocery wholesalers. For instance, if normal customers (grocery stores) were bypassed, wholesalers could ship the food directly to the food preparers.


Major institutional wholesalers should continue to operate their normal distribution channels under crisis relocation conditions. Family recommends should continue to receive their supplies through grocery times. In addition, small restaurants and small congregate-feeding to wind also receive their supplies through a grocery store.

The wind don't have enough storage space to handle a communication will be afficient to have a

EXHIBIT 5.1

TYPICAL FOOD DISTRIBUTION PATTERNS UNDER

CRISIS RELOCATION CONDITIONS



(Source: Reference 2)

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large truck make many stops for small deliveries. Depending on the fraction of the evacuee population fed in family residences and small groups (i.e., small restaurants and small mass feeding operations), grocery stores may have excess supplies which will be distributed through large mass feeding outlets. These excess supplies might more efficiently be shipped directly to the food preparer rather than indirectly through a grocery store. Where storage space is available, direct shipments to mass feeding centers will relieve the stress on the host-area grocery stores and eliminate one step in the food distribution process.

In establishing shipping patterns under crisis relocation conditions, the demand for food in private residences, small restaurants, and large institutions should first be identified. Grocery wholesalers would then be directed to deliver a sufficient amount to grocery stores to satisfy the demand of residences and small restaurants, and then deliver any excess to large restaurants, commissaries, and other institutions. Institutional wholesalers would then deliver only to the latter category. If the amount of home feeding cannot be gauged in advance, chain stores without host-area retail outlets should be instructed to supply commissaries and mass feeding centers directly, while chains with host-area outlets supply them. Appropriate adjustments can be made in the delivery system once feeding patterns have been established.

5.2 EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF FOOD PREPARATION AND SERVING

Exhibit 5.1 suggests many methods of food preparation and serving. Of the many that are feasible, the following methods are selected as deserving serious consideration and evaluation:

- 1. Family Residences (preparation and serving);
- 2. Institutions with Kitchens (preparation and serving);
- 3. Restaurants (preparation and serving);
- 4. Existing Commissaries (preparation and delivery to kitchenless institutions); and
- Ad Hoc Commissaries (preparation and delivery to kitchemless institutions).

An overview of the major advantages and disadvantages of these methods is given in Exhibit 5.2. The first four methods require a minimum addition to or modification of existing facilities. The fifth requires a major addition, and consequently, would not be used unless the facilities for the first four methods are inadequate.

The first four methods have differences in the supporting transportation facilities needed. In the "Family Residences" approach.

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the food is prepared and served in the same establishment in which the people reside. However, in the next three methods, it may be necessary to either transport the people to the food preparation/service facility or to transport the food from the preparation facility to the location of the people. The "Institutional Kitchens" and "Restaurants" alternatives require that the people be transported to the food. (In many institutions, such as hospitals, convalescent homes, hotels, military facilities, or penitentiaries, the people may live and eat in the same facility and consequently no transportation would be necessary.) This may be of minor consequence if their residences are close to the serving facility. If not, a major transportation effort may be required two times a day. Under the "Commissaries" alternatives, the food is transported to the people. This may be more efficient if the residences and the food preparation locations are widely separated. Hence, the distance between residences and food preparation areas may be the major factor in choosing between "Institutions" and "Restaurants" on one hand and "Commissaries" on the other.

Other differences exist among the first four methods. The "Family Residences" provide the most home-like setting, the maximum flexibility of menu selection and portion assignment, and the localization of disorders. In addition, the residents themselves transport the food from the point of wholesale dropoff, the grocery store, to the point of preparation--no centralized method of transportation is needed. For these reasons, "Family Residences" should be used to the maximum extent possible for food preparation and serving. One factor which may limit its use would be the willingness of the host-area residents to accept evacuees.

"Institutions with Kitchens", especially those which do not provide residential facilities, and "Restaurants" have many similar characteristics. The institution, however, will usually have more versatile kitchens for preparing a wider variety of meals, and on a larger scale. In addition, institutions usually have a cafeteria mode of service which is more efficient than the sit-down mode of restaurants. Consequently, due to their efficiency of preparation and service, institutions have larger throughput than restaurants. On the other hand, restaurants will usually provide a more pleasant atmosphere for the population. Whether institutions or restaurants are used in a particular situation will depend on the availability of each and their proximity to residential establishments.

Although the number of seats associated with a particular feeding facility can be a useful guide to feeding capacity, it is not essential that people always be seated while eating or that they be served indoors. Outdoor feeding has been used in various exercises and under actual emergency conditions when no indoor facilities were available. The American Red Cross has indicated that, although outdoor feeding is sometimes necessary, it is usually practical for a relatively short period of time since the sites may be largely unprotected. The Red Cross suggests that improvised outdoor feedings should be resorted to only if (1) conventional facilities are lacking or are not usable, or (2) the number of people to be fed exceed the capacity of existing or usable indoor facilities (Reference 18).

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EXHIBIT 5.2: ALTERNATIVE DELIVERY METHODS

	ALTERNATIVE METHOD	CHARACTERISTICS	PRINCIPAL ADVANTAGES	PRINCIPAL DISADVANTAGES
<u>,</u>	(Preparation and Serving)	food prepared and served by the host and evacuee population living in the residence.	No new facilities or additional labor needed. Once food is allocated to household, it can be allocated to individuals on basis of need. Flexibility over menu type. No transportation of people necessary. Home-like environment.	Allocating food to households (minor). Possible friction among residents (minor). Possibe disorder at grocery stores. Failure of kitchen equipment.
~	. Institutions with Adequate Kitchens (Preparation and Serving)	food prepared and served in a congregate feeding facility.	food is transported only once. Use existing kitchen and foud preparation facility (including labor). Use existing serving and dining facilities (probably cafeteria, which is efficient). Easy to allocate food by size of portions. Versatility of kitchen facilities. Speed of food preparation and distribution. Ho transportation of people necessary if they reside in same institution.	Hurried atmosphere.
	. Restaurants (Preparation and Serving)	food prepared and served in an Operating restaurant.	food is transported only once. Use existing kitchen and food preparation facilities (including labor). Use existing serving and Jining facilities. Easy to allocate food by size of portion. Can often be converted to efficient cafeteria service.	Lack of versatility of kitchen. Sit-down meal results in slower distribution and require additio- nal serving resources. Iransportation of people necessary.
**	Central Commissary - Existing (Preparation) to Institutions With- Out Kitchens or With Inadequate Kitchens (serving)	food pre-prepared in a kitchen previously used for take-out meals, and then delivered to other institutions	Efficient production of meals due to largescale production. Efficient serving of food due to preallocated portions and pre-selected types of food.	Transportation hot foodwarming facilities may be needed if insulated containers were not used.
<u> </u>	Ad Hoc (Preparation) to Institutions With- Out Kitchens of With Inadepuate Kitchens (Serving)	fond prepared in a kitthen newly set up to provide take-out meals and then delivered to other institutions.	Efficient production of food due to large- scale production. Efficient serving of food due to pre- allocated purtions and pre-selected types of food.	

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The outdoor feeding mode is generally suitable for California where most areas of the state experience relatively mild weather most of the year. Precipitation is likely during certain periods of the year, but tents and other temporary shelters may be set up and used for preparing and serving food. Appendix D.1-2 of the Planning Guidelines provides further data on outdoor feeding under emergency conditions.

5.3 SPECIFIC CALIFORNIA PROBLEMS

In the event of a national emergency with the implementation of crisis relocation, California would have one of the highest hosting ratios in the country. This high hosting ratio (approximately 7 to 1) would place a considerable strain on host-area food distribution and delivery systems. Exhibit 5.3 shows the increase in number of people served depending on the extent to which the "Family Residences" are used. Exhibit 5.3 shows that in the host area for each 100 people served under "normal" conditions, 700 additional people will have to be served under crisis relocation conditions. It also shows (Column 2) that if no evacuees are served in "Family Residences", 600 out of the 700 evacuees will have to be served in mass feeding centers. It is assumed here that restaurants and institutions increase the number of people served fivefold. Concurrently, this could be increased to sevenfold but with additional strain on the system.

The 600 out of 700 evacuees which would have to be served at mass feeding centers (shown in Column 2 of Exhibit 5.3) illustrates one of the primary reasons why the use of the "Family Residences" to the maximum extent possible is of particular importance in California. The third column of Exhibit 5.3 shows the results of host-area residents accepting relocatees and doubling the number of persons in each "Family Residence". Even so, a large number of people would have to be fed at mass feeding centers.

Another problem aggravated by the high hosting ratio in California is the transporting of relocatees to the food serving centers. Feeding large numbers of people in central locations such as mass feeding centers, as well as institutions with kitchens and restaurants, would result in heavy requirements for local transportation. Even with the use of buses wherever possible, actual transport and parking may be difficult. Thus, the high hosting ratio and its resulting effect on host-area transportation is another reason "Family Residences" should be used to the maximum extent possible in California.

EXHIBIT 5.3: HOST AREA FOOD DISTRIBUTION AND DELIVERY

PRE-RELOCATION
(Population 100)
SALES SERVICE

75	75		
Stores	Home		
25 R & I	25 R & I		

POST-RELOCATION (Population 800) SALES SERVICE

POST-RELO	CATION
(Populati	
SALES	SERVÍCE
371423	

150 Direct To MFC's 125 125 125 126	SALE	.5	3	EKVICE	_	
Stores 600 MFC in Extra Locations 150 Direct To MFC's 125 125 125 126						
Direct To MFC's Direct To MFC 125 125 127	{			MFC in Extra	S	Store
To MFC's MFC						150 Direc
MFC's MFC						To
125 125 12	}		-			MFC '
					-	·
R&I R&I R&		125		125		12
		R&I		R & I		R &

JALES		
	75 Home 75 Home	
525 Stores	525 MFC in Extra Locations	
150 Direct To MFC's		
125 R & I	125 R & I	

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5.4 FEEDING FACILITIES AND OPERATIONS IN CALIFORNIA

A review of several emergency feeding exercises in California (Reference 15) indicates that when choice of dishes is permitted in cafeteria-type serving lines, the rate of flow averaged between 6 and 8 persons per minute, with a maximum of 12 per minute. Where a "one-stop pickup" cafeteria line was used, about 20 people per minute could be served. Also, existing facilities could be used to better advantage by increasing the hours of operation. In recent California emergency mass feeding exercises, for example, it was determined that by increasing the number of hours of operation from 4.5 to 16 per day and using mass feeding methods, a sevenfold increase in the number of meals served could be achieved.

The cafeteria mode of preparation and serving is very efficient. A related disadvantage, the close and hurried atmosphere, is a small price to pay when compared to the advantage of efficiency. Another disadvantage is that transportation would be necessary for evacuees not housed in or near the institution. Food would normally be acquired directly from the wholesale distributor and not through a grocery store, eliminating an extra handling step.

5.5 MERCED COUNTY FACILITIES AND FEEDING RATES

During this study, an overall evaluation of the food distribution and serving system in California was made. At the same time, a closer look was taken at the facilities in one county in California, Merced County. Data for this evaluation of the distribution system and facilities in Merced County were obtained through use of the <u>CPP Hesting</u> <u>Area Survey (1975)</u>, and on-site visits.

The CRP Host Area Survey (1975) indicates that Merced County has a 18,325 seating capacity for serving emergency meals. The serving organizations are shown according to type and supplier category in Exhibit 5.4. It is estimated that approximately 68% of Merced County's emergency seating capacity is comprised of organizations whose food is currently received from institutional suppliers. The organizations representing the other 32% of the seating capacity serve or consume relatively little food and their cooking facilities are not in use most of the time. Under crisis relocation conditions, these organizations will serve as mass feeding centers and will be supplied by major retail chain distributors or institutional suppliers. This feeding copacity will be useful where a substantial portion of the relocatees are staying with host-area families, and they will be critical where no relocatees stay in "Family Residences". Exhibit 5.5 shows the distribution of food by "sales" and "service" in Merced County. About 47% would be sold through stores, 35% per mass feeding centers, and 17% through restaurants and institutions. Based on available seats and ascuring no relocatees are served in residences, about 68% of the relocatees would be served in restaurants and institutions, and 32% in churches, community centers, and fairgrounds.

EXHIBIT 5.4

MERCED COUNTY FOOD PREPARATION SEATING CAPACITY

TYPE ORGANIZATION	From Institutional Suppliers	From Retail Stores	Total
Schools	6314		6314
City,County or State	192	1165	1357
Community Centers		520	520
Churches		1335	1335
County Fairgrounds		1320	1320
Restaurants	5409		5409
Other Public Eating Places	385		385
Hospitals	90		90
Other	** ** **	1595	1595
Totals	12390	5935	18325
Percent	68%	32%	100%

EXHIBIT 5.5: MERCED COUNTY FOOD DISTRIBUTION AND DELIVERY

PRE-RELO	CATION
(Populati	on 100)
SALES	SERVICE

	l
75	75
Stores	Home
25 R & I	25 R & I

POST-REL (Populat SALES		POST-RELO (Populati SALES	
	75 Home		150
376 Stores	232 MFC's in Extra Locations	376 Stores	208 MFC's In Extra Locations
MFC's	493 Restaurants And Institutions	288 Direct To MFC's	442 Restaurants And Institution
136 Restaurants And Institutions		136 Restaurant And Institution	

As shown in Exhibit 5.4, Merced County has a total seating capacity of 18,325. Using the 1975 host-area population figure of 45,000, there would be 0.40 seats per person for the host-area population, assuming a 7 to 1 hosting ratio. After relocation, the number of relocatees in Merced County would be 322,000. If it is assumed that the residents have meals in their homes and relocatees are all residing in congregate-care facilities and are served at dining facilities other than residences, then there would only be 0.057 seats per relocatee. Allowing 30 minutes per meal per person¹, the total time required to feed all relocatees would be 8.77 hours, or 17.54 hours for two meals. This does not take into account the time savings that would be obtained through preparation of food in central kitchens as discussed in Section 5.2. Also this does not take into account the fact that it is not necessary for all persons to be seated while eating as noted in the above discussion of outdoor feeding. Exhibit 5.6 shows the number of hours required to feed relocatees in restaurants, institutions, and mass feeding centers if some relocatees stay in "Family Residences".

5.6 MEASURES FOR RELIEVING STRESS

The level of stress in the distribution system will depend on the relation between the number of food preparation and serving facilities available in the host area and the number of evacuees accepted by the host area. One overall method of relieving stress in the delivery system is not to rely on any single mode of delivery but to design an overall delivery system which makes use of each of the first four delivery alternatives (and the fifth after the first four are exhausted) in a balanced way. Then, if the stress imposed by one delivery alternative were too great, its feeding volume could be reduced, and the volume of another alternative increased as appropriate.

Regardless of these alternative tradeoffs, there are measures which can be used for reducing stress in any particular alternative. These measures are summarized below for each proposed alternative (Reference 2).

1. Family Residences.

- a) Distribute mass feeding menus in advance to host-area family residences accepting evacuees. Selection of mass feeding menus are included in general CRP food guidelines (Reference 2).
- b) Recommend preparation of only two meals a day. Serve one-dish meals when possible. Service one cold meal a day where appropriate.

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¹A somewhat conservative figure suggested by experts who have recently conducted mass feeding exercises in California (Reference 15).

EXHIBIT 5.6

TIME REQUIRED FOR SERVING IN HOST AREA RESTAURANTS,

INSTITUTIONS AND MASS FEEDING CENTERS IN MERCED COUNTY

(With Some Relocatees Residing In Family Residences)
(Population In Thousands)

Multiple Of Increase In "Family Residence" Population	Number Of People In "Family Residence"	Relocatees Served In Restaurants, Institutions And MFC's	Hours Required For Serving In Restaurants, Institutions And MFC's	
1	46	332	17.54	
2	92	276	14.58	
3	138	230	12.15	
4	184	184	9.72	

- c) Make available additional preparation and serving hardware, such as pots and pans, where necessary and where appropriate.
- d) Make available repair services for stoves, refrigerators, etc.

2. Institution and Restaurant Preparation.

- a) Prepare simple and basic meals with minimum of choice.

 Prepare one-dish meals where possible. Prepare only two
 meals a day.
- b) Arrange meal assembly equipment and personnel for efficiency.

3. Cafeteria Service.

- a) Provide sufficient cashiers to accept money or ration tickets or to check identification cards. In most cafeterias, the checkout is the limiting point in line.
- b) Provide few choices of food to speed up progress through the line.
- c) Pre-allocate the portions, when efficient.
- d) Use scramble system self-service, rather than straight-line self-service when possible.
- e) Establish guidelines for eating time at tables. Many Army facilities use 18-minute eating time.
- f) Reduce space between tables and provide additional tables and chairs where possible to provide seating space consistent with greater throughput of cafeteria line.
- g) At completion of meal, diners should deposit dishes and silverware on assigned receiving trays at exit.

4. Sit-Boun Service.

- a) Consider using more efficient cafeteria service wherever possible.
- b) Serve meal on one dish where possible.
- c) Where possible, have a pickup station at which diners can pick up their meal.
- d) Establish guidelines for eating time. 18 minutes is used by many Army facilities.

e) At completion of meal, diner should deposit dishes and silverware on an assigned receiving tray.

5. Commissary Preparation and Serving.

- a) For ease of transportation with minimum cooling, prepare one-dish meals and transport in large vats or pots. When transporting individual meals, package to reduce cooling.
- b) Serve cold meals once a day.
- c) Adapt the most efficient kitchens for use as a commissary.
- d) Use efficient kitchens during off-hours; for example, hospital kitchens when they are not being used to prepare resident meals.

6. General Measures.


- a) Serve only two meals a day. Serve one-dish meals where possible. Serve one cold meal a day where appropriate.
- b) Use methods of mass preparation rather than individual preparation; for example, prepare scrambled eggs rather than fried eggs.
- c) In all cases, the local chapter of the American Red Cross should be contacted to obtain the benefit of their mass feeding experience.

5.7 SUMMARY

The two major channels through which food may be supplied to the food preparers are (1) directly through the wholesale level of distribution and (2) indirectly through the retail level of distribution.

In general, ordinary channels of distribution should be followed as much as possible. Institutional wholesalers would continue to supply their normal customers, and grocery wholesalers should continue to supply grocery stores. Family residences should continue to receive their supplies through grocery stores. In addition, small restaurants and small congregate-care facilities could also receive their supplies through grocery stores.

With the vast majority of the population homeless, the relative proportion of all meals prepared in the home will undoubtedly action at therefore, some of the grocery wholesalers with few or no stoness to host areas would ship food directly to food preparers.



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Of the several methods of food preparation and serving, the most appropriate are family residences, institutions with kitchens, restaurants, existing commissaries, ad hoc commissaries, and outdoor feeding. "Family Residences", because of the particular problems in California, should be used as much as possible. Outdoor feeding is also a suitable feeding mode in California where the climate is relatively mild much of the year.

The high 7 to 1 hosting ratio in California poses special problems for food delivery under crisis relocation conditions. If no evacuees are served in "Family Residences" and restaurants and institutions served from 5 to 7 times as many people as they usually do, 550 to 600 of each 700 relocatees would still have to be served in mass feeding centers.

Several of the delivery alternatives discussed above, including institutions and restaurants, require that people be transported to the serving location. Even though the able-bodied could often walk to feeding centers, transportation would have to be arranged for the aged and infirm. The greater the dependence on institutions, restaurants and other centers for feeding them, the greater the potential stress on the local transportation system. In California, the maximum use of "Family Residences", as well as commissaries, would help to alleviate this problem.

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6. TRANSPORTATION IMPLICATIONS OF ALTERNATIVE PLANS

6.1 INTRODUCTION

Under crisis relocation conditions, the major sources of fcod supply in the United States will remain undisturbed. Thus, the chief consideration is not whether food will be available, but whether it will be accessible to the relocated population. The problems are not to be expected in production and processing, but rather in transportation and distribution. This is especially true in California where both the evacuating population and food supplies will be moving long distances. A preliminary feasibility study (Reference 13) estimates that the average travel distance covered by relocatees will be approximately 200 miles. Evacuation movements over these distances will require transportation support for the food distribution industry to stretch to several times the travel distances normally encountered.

As long as the wholesale distribution centers located in the risk areas are maintained, the local adjustment required to direct large quantities of food to the host area need not interfere with the flow of national supplies. These adjustments will, however, place a heavy strain on the local food transportation system. Supermarkets generally receive a minimum of one delivery of dry groceries each week from local wholesalers, with more frequent deliveries of meat and perishable items. A typical high-volume market may receive an average of four deliveries of dry groceries per week and daily deliveries of meat and perishables. Dry grocery deliveries are made by tractors and trailers owned or leased by the supermarket chain or independent wholesaler, and driven by company employees. Most meat and perishable deliveries are made in a similar fashion. The extent of stress will depend on the increase in distance traveled in order to supply goods to the host-area stores. The measurement of this stress is described in more detail in the following section.

6.2 ESTIMATING TRANSPORTATION STRESS

6.2.1 Findings of Existing Studies

One model used in past SYSTAN studies to estimate transportation stress under crisis relocation conditions is a network model patterned after the traffic assignment models currently used throughout the United States in local and statewide transportation planning. This model uses a node-link representation of the local highway network, descriptions of

the location and market shares of each major wholesaler serving an area, and descriptions of the number and location of retail outlets in the host and risk area served by each wholesaler to compute the number of vehicle-miles and hours associated with a particular demand pattern. This model had been used to estimate the increases in vehicle mileage and time imposed on the food distribution system by crisis relocations in several cities and states. The results of these analyses are summarized in Exhibit 6.1. The transportation stress factor represents the ratio of vehicle mileage required to support crisis relocation to the vehicle mileage incurred under normal operating conditions. Thus, a stress of 1.50 reflects a 50% increase in vehicle mileage under crisis relocation conditions. Exhibit 6.1 shows that the regionwide transportation stress factor exceeds 2.0 (i.e., vehicle mileage requirements double) in the case of only one of the five regions studied. In this single case, which encompassed the State of Colorado, long evacuation distances, coupled with heavy concentration of normal business in the Denver metropolitan area, caused vehicle mileage requirements to triple under crisis relocation conditions.

Exhibit 6.1 also displays the transportation stress factors associated with the individual wholesalers undergoing minimum and maximum stress in each of the study areas. In general, the greatest transportation stress was imposed on wholesalers serving a heavy concentration of risk-area retail outlets, while wholesalers whose normal range of operation encompassed host-area retail outlets experienced minimal stress.

6.2.2 Application of the Transportation Stress Model to California

The model developed to measure transportation stress has been revised to meet the specific requirements of this study of food distribution in California. The revised model was used to predict the transportation stress resulting from the shift in the demand for food under crisis relocation conditions. Census population data gave both normal existing demand and sales capacity. Major distributors reported warehouse supplies, and other supplies were assumed to meet normal demand. Post-relocation demands were predicted on the basis of population shifts and allocated to companies, and finally shipping patterns were assigned to link supply and demand.

A network of 166 links connecting 85 nodes represented the California highway system (Exhibit 6.2). In addition to nodes at major intersections, a node in each county represented the population center for that county. In lightly-populated areas, the same node could represent both a highway junction and the population center, but in large urban areas, such as Los Angeles, separate nodes were used to model distribution costs. Shipping was assumed to occur along minimum-distance routes.

Major food distributors in California supplied most of the food reaching relocatees. The location and capacity of the warehouses of

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EXHIBIT 6.1

COMPARISON OF TRANSPORTATION STRESS FACTORS FOR FIVE AREAS

REGION OR	LOCATION OF	VEHICLE MILEAGE STRESS FACTORS		
METROPOLITAN AREA	MAJOR WHOLESALERS	Total Region	Least Stressed Wholesaler	,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
Detroit	Detroit	1.92	1.20	2.62
San Jose	San Francisco, Oakland	1.18	1.11	1.56
Richmond	Richmond, Washington, D.C.	1.50	1.07	1.92
Colorado Springs	Denver, Pueblo	1.75	1.58	2.92
State of Colorado Denver, Pueblo, Grand Junction		3.04	1.46	7.45

NOTE: Transportation Stress Factor =

Vehicle Mileage Under Crisis Relocation Conditions
Normal Vehicle Mileage

these distributors were represented exactly in the model. Sales through minor distributors and restaurants were assumed to come from additional warehouses in Los Angeles and Oakland.

Demand was based on population census data and a retail delivery rate of 30 pounds per person per week. Predicted normal total sales were based on reported population by county in both risk and host areas. Estimated sales from store counts were then adjusted for variation in store size and location, and sales through miscellaneous suppliers were predicted. Alternative crisis relocation plans were specified by giving the post-relocation population in each county. The capacities of host-area food supplies were increased (700% for stores, 400% for restaurants and institutions) to reflect reasonable performance limitations under conditions of vastly increased demand.

Supply and demand were balanced for each county and company. In counties where sales exceeded demand, company sales were uniformly lowered to match the demand. In counties where demand exceeded sales, the excess demand had to be serviced from shipments direct to mass feeding centers (MFC's). Companies whose supplies exceeded total sales shipped the excess directly to the MFC's, while companies whose sales capacity exceeded supplies had to lower their sales in all counties, the unmet demand again being serviced by shipments to MFC's.

In deciding which warehouses would ship to which stores, the program treated each company as an independent problem. Host areas were ranked by the added cost of shipping from the second nearest warehouse instead of the nearest warehouse, and the stores were supplied in order of increasing marginal cost. Thus, the algorithm was optimal for two-warehouse companies, and near-optimal for multi-warehouse companies.

6.3 EVALUATION OF TRANSPORTATION ALTERNATIVES FOR CALIFORNIA


Food transportation requirements under crisis relocation conditions in California are significantly affected by the state's high hosting ratios and unique geography.

The high hosting ratios mean that large quantities of food must be moved from high-risk urban areas, where 94% of the food distribution volume originates, to the host areas where people will be relocated. Thus, California's high-risk to host-area population ratio imposes stress on the transportation system in the movement of both people and food.

Sixty-four percent of the population resides in Southern California. The ratio of urban to rural (risk to non-risk) population is greater in Southern California than in Northern and Central California. (See Exhibit 2.3.) Much of the rural area of Southern California is quite arid and is sparsely populated. Consequently, proximity hosting in much of Southern California, particularly Riverside and San Bernardino Counties, results in relatively high hosting ratios.

EXHIBIT 6.2

FOR FOOD DISTRIBUTION ANALYSIS



Uniform hosting throughout the state, on the other hand, means that a substantial number of people (approximately 18% of the state's population) would have to move from Southern California to Northern and Central California. If risk-area warehouses are maintained, of course, food supplies must also be shipped to the relocated population in the northern and central parts of the state. This would add substantially to the distance food must be carried and to the strain on equipment and manpower resources.

The effects of four different hosting allocation patterns on transportation resources were evaluated (see Section 2.3). These four hosting allocations were (1) the regional hosting plan of the California Office of Emergency Services, (2) uniform hosting, (3) non-uniform proximity hosting, and (4) proximity hosting/transport capacity allocation (80% evacuation).

Using each of the hosting allocation plans noted above to distribute population by host area county, three different alternative food distribution patterns were analyzed. These are (1) distribution from risk area warehouses, (2) distribution from risk area with limited intercompany diversion, and (3) distribution from risk area and secondary host area warehouses. Each of these alternatives was discussed in Chapter 4 and therefore, the discussion here will be limited primarily to the transportation aspects of these alternatives.

Exhibit 6.3 summarizes the results of using each of these three distribution alternatives in conjunction with the regional hosting plans proposed by the California OES, while Exhibit 6.4 summarizes similar findings for a uniform hosting strategy. Exhibit 6.4 also contains the transportation stress factors associated with alternative proximity hosting strategies.

6.3.1 Regional Hosting Plans of California OES.

When compared with normal distribution patterns, each of the three distribution alternatives considered in conjunction with the regional hosting plan proposed by the California OES required approximately twice the ton-miles needed to supply food to the California population.

1. Distribution from Risk-Area Narehouses. Under this alternative all major grocery wholesalers and institutional suppliers continue to operate risk area warehouses, supply increased quantities to host area stores, restaurants and institutions or mass feeding centers. It is assumed that grocery wholesalers serve only their own host-area stores. Those wholesalers with very few host-area stores will supply mass feeding centers. It can be seen from Exhibit 6.3 that the resulting stress factor is 2.0, that is, that the number of ton-miles needed to meet the revised population allocation doubles. Store throughput drops significantly from 75% of the

the transfer of the second
total volume under normal conditions to 57% under crisis relocation conditions. Approximately 27% of the food would be distributed through mass feeding centers.

2. Distribution from Risk-Area Warehouses with Limited Intercompany Diversion. This alternative is the same as (1) above except that grocery chain warehouses which serve no or very few host-area stores ship to another chain's host-area stores. For the alternatives considered, Ralph's, which has few host-area outlets, would deliver to Safeway's stores as well as mass feeding centers; also, Lucky's Vacaville warehouse would supply United Grocers' Northern California stores as well as mass feeding centers. Exhibit 6.3 shows that transportation stress for this alternative is 1.9, and that total tons shipped to stores are approximately 61% of the total foodstuffs shipped in California. This appears to be the best of the alternatives examined since it has the lowest transportation stress factor and the highest percentage shipment to stores. Only 12% of total food shipments are distributed directly to mass feeding centers. Because of the promise of this alternative, it has been incorporated in the prototype plans presented in Volume II of this report.

Exhibit 6.5 contains a county-by-county summary of the distribution patterns followed by each major food warehouse in California under this alternative. The "Store sales factor" listed in this Exhibit is a planning factor indicating the amount by which the warehouse should increase its shipments to stores in the identified county. The associated transportation stress factor is listed for each supplier and county, and an estimate is provided of the number of additional tractors, trailers, and drivers needed to accommodate this stress.

- 3. <u>Distribution from Risk-Area and Secondary Host Area Warehouses</u>. This alternative allows some diversion of supplier shipments to a secondary host-area warehouse. Secondary warehouses would be operated by some of the workforce transferred from the risk-area warehouses. The transportation stress factor is 2.0 which is the same as under alternative 1 above. Approximately 50% of total foodstuffs shipped would go to stores while 23% would go to mass feeding centers.
- 4. <u>Sensitivity Analysis—Store Capacity Plus and Minus 10%</u>. Changing store capacity by 10% had almost no effect on transportation stress. An increase in the volume shipped to stores, however, reduces the volumes sent to mass feeding centers.

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SUMMARY EXHIBIT 6.3

SUMMARY OF TRANSPORTATION STRESS RESULTS FOR CALIFORNIA

BASED ON REGIONAL HOSTING PLAN OF CALIFORNIA DES

			DISTRIBUTION ALTERNATIVE		
Merchardise Category	Normal Conditions	Distribution From Risk Area Warehouses	Obstribution From Risk Area Warehouses With Limited Inten- company Diversion	Distribution From Pick Area and Secondary Host Area Warehouses	
Thousands of Ton-Miles/Year	1,181,210	2,413,633	2,252,548	2,389,714	
Tons Shipped to Stores	12,346,048	9,414,912	11,360,908	9,432,956	
Tons Shipped to Restaurants and Institutions	4,124,434	2,692,872	2,592,972	2,592,372	
Tans Shipped to MFC1s++	0	4,363,530	2,256,332	4,363,476	
Transportation Stress Factor	1.0	2.0	1.9	2.0	

Note: Total annual food shipments are 16,470,532 tons.

^{*} Mass Feeling Centers

6.3.2 Uniform Hosting Allocation

1.

Under the uniform hosting allocation, transportation stress factors approach 3.0. That is, distribution distances are nearly three times normal distances, and 50 percent higher than the distances required by the regional hosting strategy. This increase in transportation stress reflects the longer evacuation distances required when areas threatened by potential fallout (but not by blast) are treated as risk areas.

- 1. <u>Distribution from Risk-Area Narehouses</u>. Exhibit 6.4 shows that the resulting transportation stress factor under this alternative is 2.9, and that store throughput drops significantly from 75% of the total volume of food distribution to 51%. Approximately 33% of the food would be distributed through mass feeding centers. Appendix C breaks down the individual stress factors by supplier and county, and estimates the number of additional tractors, trailers, and drivers needed to accommodate the additional distribution distance.
- Distribution from Risk-Area with Limited
 Intercompany Diversion. Exhibit 6.4 shows that
 transportation stress for this alternative is 2.730,
 and that total tons shipped to stores are
 approximately 65% of total foodstuffs shipped in
 California. Shipments to mass feeding centers are
 19% of total food shipments.
- 3. <u>Distribution from Risk-Area and Secondary Host Area</u>
 <u>Warehouses</u>. The transportation stress factor under
 this alternative is approximately 2.9.
- 4. <u>Sensitivity Analysis—Store Capacity Plus and Minus</u>
 10%. Changing store capacity had very little effect
 on transportation stress.

6.3.3 Non-Uniform Proximity Hosting

Under this hosting allocation, a larger proportion of evacuees will be hosted in counties near the risk areas. This has the effect of increasing the hosting ratio in San Bernardino and Riverside Counties to approximately 12 to 1. This hosting alternative also decreases the distance food must be transported from risk-area warehouses to the relocation population compared with the Uniform Hosting alternative. Annual ton-miles are decreased 28% and the total volume shipped to mass feeding centers in the state is increased by 11%. The transportation

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EXHIBIT 6.4

TRANSPORTATION STRESS RESULTS FOR CALIFORNIA FOOD DISTRIBUTION BASED ON ALTERNATIVE HOSTING ALLOCATION PATTERNS

			UNIFORM HOSTING ALLOCAT	ION		
Menorandise Category	Normal Conditions	Distribution From Risk Area Warehouses	Distribution From Risk Area Warehouses With Limited Inter- company Diversion	Distribution From Risk Area and Secondary Host Area Warenciess	Hasting'	Proximity * mosting Transport Capacity
Thousands of Ton-Miles/Year	1,181,210	3,452,302	3,225,047	3,413,699	2,482,553	1,988,8211
Tons Shipped to Stores	12,346,048	8,394,372	10,314,908	3,441,108	8,223,175	7,113,920
Tons Snipped to Restaurants and Institutions	4,124,484	2,592,094	2,583,152	2,583,100	2,179,246	1,736,394
Tons Shipped to MAI's**	o	5,483,179	3,072,472	5,445,324	5,263,111	7,500,158
Transportation Stress Factor	1.30	2.912	2.730	2.590	2,290	1.850

Note: Total annual food snigments are 16,470,532 tons.

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^{*} Assumes 30 dencent evacuation of risk areas. ** Mass Feeding Centers

Exhibit 6.5: SUMMARY OF REVISED WHOLESALE-RETAIL DISTRIBUTION PATTERNS

PLAN FOR ALPHA BETA PAR	EHOUSE IN LA HABRA	PLAN FOR FLEMING WAPEHO	USE IN FREMONT
Stress level is 1.631 20 additional dr		Stress level is 1.208	
20 additional dr	ivers needed	Store sales factors:	
Store sales factors:		Sacramento	2.8
San Diego	8.0	Santa Clara	4.8
Riverside	8.0	Contra Costa	5.1
San Bernardino	8.0	Alameda	3.7
Ventura	8.0	Marced	5.1
Tulare	6.7 (1) (2)		
lutare	0.7 (1) (2)	Stanislaus	4.0
ch:		Nopa	3.7
Shipments to mass feeding		Marin	4.3
Orange	4680	Santa Cruz	4.8
San Diego	601	Sorroma	3.1
		San Joaquin	4.4
PLAN FOR ALPHA BETA MARI	EHOUSE IN MILPITAS	Solano	3.7
Stress level is 1.193		PLAN FOR LUCKY'S WAREHO	USE IN VACAVILLE
Store sales factors:		Stress level is 2.455	
Santa Clara	5.2	57 additional tr	
Alameda	4.0	115 additional tr	
Fresno	7.2	302 additional dr	ivers needed
San Benito	5.2		
Santa Cruz	5.2	Store sales factors:	
Sonoma	3.3	Sonta Clara	5.2
Solano	4.0	Alameda	4.0
Tulare	6.7 (2)	Madera	5,2 (2)
		Stanislaus	4.3
Shipments to mass feeding	ag centers (tons/wk)	Monterey	5.2
San Luis Obispo	2095	farin	4.7
0### E013 0013P0	2073	United Grocers stores in	
PLAN FOR CERTIFIED GROCE	THE IMPERATION	Santa Clara	3.8
FEAT TER CERTIFIED GROCE	IN LOS ANGELES	Fresno	
	IN COS ANGELES	, . =	
Charac la al /a 0 00/		Modoc	3.2
Stress level is 2.284	4.25	Kern	5.5
30 additional tra		Madera	3.7
67 additional tra		Mariposa	3.8
195 additional dri	vers needed	Humboldt	2.5
		San Benito	3.7
Store sales factors:		Lake	3.2
San Diego	8.0	Merced	4.0
Alameda	4.0	Monterey	3.8
Fresno	7.2	Tehama	2.8
Kern	7.6	Shasta	2.9
Inyo	6.6	Marin	3.4
Mono	6.6	San Luis Obispo	4.9
Riverside	8.0	Santa Cruz	3.7
Imperial	8.0	Sonoma	2.4 (3)
San Bernardino	8.0		
San Luis Obispo	6.7		
Santa Barbara	6.9		
Ventura	8.0		
Tulare	6.7		
19491 6	5.7		
Shipments to mass feeding	m centore (tone /uk)		
Santa Barbara	506		
Ventura	2577		
ventur 8	C3//		

⁽¹⁾ normally served at least partially by another warehouse

⁽²⁾ served partially by another warehouse of the same company (3) served partially by a warehouse of another company

Exhibit 6.5: SUMMARY OF REVISED MHOLESALE-RETAIL DISTRIBUTION PATTERNS (continued)

PLAN FOR RALPH'S WAREHOUSE	IN COMPTON	PLAN FOR SAFEWAY WAPEHOUSE	SANTA FE SPRINGS
Stress level is 2.067		_	SANTA FE SPRINGS
63 additional drive	ers needed	Stress level is 1.164	
Store sales factors:		Store sales factors:	
Safeway stores in:		Orange	6.3 (2)
Santa Clara	4.1	Los Angeles	6.3
San Diego	6.3 (3)	Riverside	6.3
Fresno	5.6	San Bernardino	6.3 (3)
Kern	6.0	Ventura	6.3
Kings	5.3		
San Bernardino	6.3 (3)	PLAN FOR SAFEWAY WAREHOUSE	IN SAN DIEGO
Monterey	4.1		
Santa Ba rbara	5.4	Stress level is 1.614	
Santa Cruz	4.1	4 additional drive	ers needed
Tulare	5.2		
		Store sales factors:	
PLAN FOR SAFEWAY WAREHOUSE	IN SACRAMENTO	San Diego	6.3 (3)
		Imperial	6.3
Stress level is 1.027			
		PLAN FOR UNITED GROCERS WA	REHOUSE IN FRESNO
Store sales factors:			
Inyo	5.2 (1)	Stress level is 0.298	
Mono	5.2 (1)		
Amador	3.5	Store sales factors:	
Merced	4.3	Fresno	5.1 (3)
Stanislaus	3.4	Kings	4.9
Butte	2.3		
El Dorado	3.4	PLAN FOR UNITED GROCERS WA	
Plumas	3.4		IN RICHMOND
Tehama	3.0		
Shasta	3.2 (2)	Stress level is 1.932	
	•	25 additional drive	rs needed
PLAN FOR SAFEWAY WAREHOUSE	IN RICHMOND		
		Store sales factors:	
Stress level is 2.855		Sacramento	2.1 (1)
95 additional tract		Alameda	2.9
190 additional trail		Calaveras	3.7
321 additional drive	rs needed	Placer	3.1
		Mono	4.8 (1)
Store_sales factors:		Colusa	1.7
Oranse	6.3 (1) (2)	Nevada	3.1 3.2 (1)
Alameda	3.2	Amador	
Calaver as Placer	4.1 (1) 3.4 (1)	Yuba Napa	1.7 (1) 2.9
Del Norte	2.1	napa Butte	2.9
Humboldt	2.7	El Dorado	3.1 (1)
	3.4 (1)	Plumas	3.1 (1)
Nevada Lake	3.5	Sierra	3.2 (1)
	3.1	Sonoma	2.4 (1) (3)
Napa Shas ta	3.2 (1) (2)	Tuolumne	3.8 (1)
Sonoma	2.6	San Joaquin	3.5 (1)
Tuolumne	4.1 (1)	Mendocino	3.2 (1)
San Joaquin	3.8 (1)	Solano	2.9 (1)
San Joaquin Lassen	3.5 (1)	Tulare	4.8 (1) (2)
Lassen Mend ocino	3.5	Trinity	2.9 (1)
Solano	3.2 (1)	Glenn	2.6 (1)
Glenn	2.8 (1)	Yolo	2.9 (1)
Siskiyou	3.2 (1)	Siskiyou	2.9 (1)
Sutter	1.2 (1)	Sutter	1.1 (1)
Jul (E)	1.5 (1)	Julien	

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⁽¹⁾ normally served at least partially by another warehouse
(2) served partially by another warehouse of the same company
(3) served partially by a warehouse of another company

Exhibit 6.5: SUMMARY OF REVISED WHOLESALE-RETAIL DISTRIBUTION PATTERNS (continued)

PLAN FOR LUCKY'S WAREHOL	<u>ISE IN BUENA PARK</u>	PLAN FOR MARKET WHOLES	IN SACRAMENTO
Stress level is 5.991			IN SACRAHENTO
851 additional tra	ctors needed	Stress level is 2.155	
1703 additional tra		7 additional dr	rivers needed
1819 additional dri	vers needed		
		Store sales factors:	
Store sales factors:		Fresno	2.3 (1) (2)
Sacramento	3.0	Calaveras	1.6
Fresno	7.2 (1)	Placer	1.4
Madera	5.2 (1) (2)	Colusa	0.7 (1)
Riverside	8.0	Nevada Amador	1.4
San Bernardino	8.0 3.3 (1)	Amador Yuba	0.8
Sonoma	3.3 (1) 4.8 (1)	Stanislaus	1.4 (1)
San Joaquin Solano	4.0 (1)	Butte	0.9 (1)
Ventura	8.0	El Dorado	1.4
Vertcara	0.0	Plumas	1.4 (1)
Shipments to mass feeding	og centers (tons/wk)	Sierra	1.4
San Diego	5512	Tuolumne	1.6 (1)
Riverside	6013	San Joaquin	1.5 (1)
Imperial	1222	Tulare	2.1 (2)
San Bernardino	1381		
		PLAN FOR MARKET WHOLESA	
PLAN FOR MARKET BASKET &	IAREHOUSE		IN SANTA ROSA
	IN LOS ANGELES		
		Stress level is 2.631	
Stress level is 4.977		4 additional tr	
54 additional tra		4 additional tr	
134 additional tra		11 additional dr	ivers needed
149 additional dri	vers needed	Store sales factors:	
Chiamante ta mase facilis	m montant (tone (uk)	• •	13 (1)
Shipments to mass feedin		Alameda	1.3 (1)
Kern	2015	Alameda Mariposa	1.7 (1)
Kern Inyo	2015 167	Alameda Mariposa Lake	1.7 (1) 1.4 (1)
Kern Inyo San Bernardino	2015 167 1772	Alameda Mariposa Lake Merced	1.7 (1) 1.4 (1) 1.7 (1)
Kern Inyo San Bernardino San Luis Chispo	2015 167 1772 451	Alameda Mariposa Lake	1.7 (1) 1.4 (1)
Kern Inyo San Bernardino	2015 167 1772	Alameda Mariposa Lake Merced Napa	1.7 (1) 1.4 (1) 1.7 (1) 1.3
Kern Inyo San Bernardino San Luis Chispo Santa Barbara	2015 167 1772 451 997	Alameda Mariposa Lake Merced Napa Marin	1.7 (1) 1.4 (1) 1.7 (1) 1.3 1.5
Kern Inyo San Bernardino San Luis Chispo	2015 167 1772 451 997	Alameda Mariposa Lake Merced Napa Marin Sonoma	1.7 (1) 1.4 (1) 1.7 (1) 1.3 1.5
Kern Inyo San Bernardino San Luis Chispo Santa Barbara	2015 167 1772 451 997 .EPS WAREHOUSE	Alameda Mariposa Lake Merced Napa Marin Sonoma Mendocino	1.7 (1) 1.4 (1) 1.7 (1) 1.3 1.5 1.0 (1) 1.4 (1) 1.3 (1) 2.1 (1) (2)
Kern Inyo San Bernardino San Luis Chispo Santa Barbara	2015 167 1772 451 997 .EPS WAREHOUSE	Alameda Mariposa Lake Merced Napa Marin Sonoma Mendocino Solano Tulare Trinity	1.7 (1) 1.4 (1) 1.7 (1) 1.3 1.5 1.0 (1) 1.4 (1) 1.3 (1) 2.1 (1) (2) 1.3 (2)
Kern Inyo San Bernardino San Luis Chispo Santa Barbara PLAN FOR MARKET WHOLFSAL Stress level is 1.411	2015 167 1772 451 997 .EPS WAREHOUSE	Alameda Mariposa Lake Merced Napa Marin Sonoma Mendocino Solano Tulare	1.7 (1) 1.4 (1) 1.7 (1) 1.3 1.5 1.0 (1) 1.4 (1) 1.3 (1) 2.1 (1) (2)
Kern Inyo San Bernardino San Luis Chispo Santa Barbara PLAN FOR MARKET WHOLFSAL Stress level is 1.411 Store sales factors:	2015 167 1772 451 997 <u>EPS WAREHOUSE</u> <u>IN FRESNO</u>	Alameda Mariposa Lake Merced Napa Marin Sonoma Mendocino Solano Tulare Trinity Yolo	1.7 (1) 1.4 (1) 1.7 (1) 1.3 1.5 1.0 (1) 1.4 (1) 1.3 (1) 2.1 (1) (2) 1.3 (2) 1.3 (1)
Kern Inyo San Bernardino San Luis Obispo Santa Barbara PLAN FOR MARKET WHOLFSAL Stress level is 1.411 Store sales factors: Fresno	2015 167 1772 451 997 EPS WAREHOUSE IN FRESNO 2.3 (2)	Alameda Mariposa Lake Merced Napa Marin Sonoma Mendocino Solano Tulare Trinity	1.7 (1) 1.4 (1) 1.7 (1) 1.3 1.5 1.0 (1) 1.4 (1) 1.3 (1) 2.1 (1) (2) 1.3 (2) 1.3 (1) LEERS WAREHOUSE
Kern Inyo San Bernardino San Luis Chispo Santa Barbara PLAN FOR MARKET WHOLFSAL Stress level is 1.411 Store sales factors: Fresno Kern	2015 167 1772 451 997 .EPS WAREHOUSE IN FRESNO 2.3 (2) 2.4	Alameda Mariposa Lake Merced Napa Marin Sonoma Mendocino Solano Tulare Trinity Yolo	1.7 (1) 1.4 (1) 1.7 (1) 1.3 1.5 1.0 (1) 1.4 (1) 1.3 (1) 2.1 (1) (2) 1.3 (2) 1.3 (1)
Kern Inyo San Bernardino San Luis Cbispo Santa Barbara PLAN FOR MARKET WHOLFSAL Stress level is 1.411 Store sales factors: Fresno Kern Kings	2015 167 1772 451 997 .EPS WAREHOUSE IN FRESNO 2.3 (2) 2.4 2.1	Alameda Mariposa Lake Merced Napa Marin Sonoma Mendocino Solano Tulare Trinity Yolo PLAN FOR MARKET WHOLESA	1.7 (1) 1.4 (1) 1.7 (1) 1.3 1.5 1.0 (1) 1.4 (1) 1.3 (1) 2.1 (1) (2) 1.3 (2) 1.3 (1) LEERS WAREHOUSE
Kern Inyo San Bernardino San Luis Chispo Santa Barbara PLAN FOR MARKET WHOLFSAL Stress level is 1.411 Store sales factors: Fresno Kern	2015 167 1772 451 997 .EPS WAREHOUSE IN FRESNO 2.3 (2) 2.4	Alameda Mariposa Lake Merced Napa Marin Sonoma Mendocino Solano Tulare Trinity Yolo	1.7 (1) 1.4 (1) 1.7 (1) 1.3 1.5 1.0 (1) 1.4 (1) 1.3 (1) 2.1 (1) (2) 1.3 (2) 1.3 (1) LEERS WAREHOUSE
Kern Inyo San Bernardino San Luis Cbispo Santa Barbara PLAN FOR MARKET WHOLFSAL Stress level is 1.411 Store sales factors: Fresno Kern Kings	2015 167 1772 451 997 .EPS WAREHOUSE IN FRESNO 2.3 (2) 2.4 2.1	Alameda Mariposa Lake Merced Napa Marin Sonoma Mendocino Solano Tulare Trinity Yolo PLAN FOR MAPKET WHOLESA Stress level is 0.823	1.7 (1) 1.4 (1) 1.7 (1) 1.3 1.5 1.0 (1) 1.4 (1) 1.3 (1) 2.1 (1) (2) 1.3 (2) 1.3 (1) LEERS WAREHOUSE
Kern Inyo San Bernardino San Luis Cbispo Santa Barbara PLAN FOR MARKET WHOLFSAL Stress level is 1.411 Store sales factors: Fresno Kern Kings	2015 167 1772 451 997 .EPS WAREHOUSE IN FRESNO 2.3 (2) 2.4 2.1	Alameda Mariposa Lake Merced Napa Marin Sonoma Mendocino Solano Tulare Trinity Yolo PLAN FOR MARKET WHOLESA	1.7 (1) 1.4 (1) 1.7 (1) 1.3 1.5 1.0 (1) 1.4 (1) 1.3 (1) 2.1 (1) (2) 1.3 (2) 1.3 (1) LEERS WAREHOUSE
Kern Inyo San Bernardino San Luis Cbispo Santa Barbara PLAN FOR MARKET WHOLFSAL Stress level is 1.411 Store sales factors: Fresno Kern Kings	2015 167 1772 451 997 .EPS WAREHOUSE IN FRESNO 2.3 (2) 2.4 2.1	Alameda Mariposa Lake Merced Napa Marin Sonoma Mendocino Solano Tulare Trinity Yolo PLAN FOR MARKET WHOLESA Stress level is 0.823	1.7 (1) 1.4 (1) 1.7 (1) 1.3 1.5 1.0 (1) 1.4 (1) 1.3 (1) 2.1 (1) (2) 1.3 (2) 1.3 (1) **LERS WAREHOUSE IN PEDDING**
Kern Inyo San Bernardino San Luis Cbispo Santa Barbara PLAN FOR MARKET WHOLFSAL Stress level is 1.411 Store sales factors: Fresno Kern Kings	2015 167 1772 451 997 .EPS WAREHOUSE IN FRESNO 2.3 (2) 2.4 2.1	Alameda Mariposa Lake Merced Napa Marin Sonoma Mendocino Solano Tulare Trinity Yolo PLAN FOR MAPKET WHOLESA Store sales factors: Modoc Del Norte Humboldt	1.7 (1) 1.4 (1) 1.7 (1) 1.3 1.5 1.0 (1) 1.4 (1) 1.3 (1) 2.1 (1) (2) 1.3 (2) 1.3 (1) **LERS WAREHOUSE IN PEDDING** 1.4 (1) 0.8 1.1 (1)
Kern Inyo San Bernardino San Luis Cbispo Santa Barbara PLAN FOR MARKET WHOLFSAL Stress level is 1.411 Store sales factors: Fresno Kern Kings	2015 167 1772 451 997 .EPS WAREHOUSE IN FRESNO 2.3 (2) 2.4 2.1	Alameda Mariposa Lake Merced Napa Marin Sonoma Mendocino Solano Tulare Trinity Yolo PLAN FOR MAPKET WHOLESA Store sales factors: Modoc Del Norte Humboldt Tehama	1.7 (1) 1.4 (1) 1.7 (1) 1.3 1.5 1.0 (1) 1.4 (1) 1.3 (1) 2.1 (1) (2) 1.3 (2) 1.3 (1) **LERS WAREHOUSE IN PEDDING** 1.4 (1) 0.8 1.1 (1) 1.2 (1)
Kern Inyo San Bernardino San Luis Cbispo Santa Barbara PLAN FOR MARKET WHOLFSAL Stress level is 1.411 Store sales factors: Fresno Kern Kings	2015 167 1772 451 997 .EPS WAREHOUSE IN FRESNO 2.3 (2) 2.4 2.1	Alameda Mariposa Lake Merced Napa Marin Sonoma Mendocino Solano Tulare Trinity Yolo PLAN FOR MARKET WHOLESA Store sales factors: Modoc Del Norte Humboldt Tehama Shasta	1.7 (1) 1.4 (1) 1.7 (1) 1.3 1.5 1.0 (1) 1.4 (1) 1.3 (1) 2.1 (1) (2) 1.3 (2) 1.3 (1) **LERS WAREHOUSE IN PEDDING** 1.4 (1) 0.8 1.1 (1) 1.2 (1) 1.3 (1)
Kern Inyo San Bernardino San Luis Cbispo Santa Barbara PLAN FOR MARKET WHOLFSAL Stress level is 1.411 Store sales factors: Fresno Kern Kings	2015 167 1772 451 997 .EPS WAREHOUSE IN FRESNO 2.3 (2) 2.4 2.1	Alameda Mariposa Lake Merced Napa Marin Sonoma Mendocino Solano Tulare Trinity Yolo PLAN FOR MAPKET WHOLESA Stress level is 0.823 Store sales factors: Modoc Del Norte Humboldt Tehama Shasta Lassen	1.7 (1) 1.4 (1) 1.7 (1) 1.3 (1) 1.4 (1) 1.3 (1) 2.1 (1) (2) 1.3 (2) 1.3 (1) 2.1 (1) (2) 1.3 (1) 2.1 (1) (2) 1.3 (1) 1.4 (1) 0.8 1.1 (1) 1.2 (1) 1.3 (1) 1.4 (1)
Kern Inyo San Bernardino San Luis Cbispo Santa Barbara PLAN FOR MARKET WHOLFSAL Stress level is 1.411 Store sales factors: Fresno Kern Kings	2015 167 1772 451 997 .EPS WAREHOUSE IN FRESNO 2.3 (2) 2.4 2.1	Alameda Mariposa Lake Merced Napa Marin Sonoma Mendocino Solano Tulare Trinity Yolo PLAN FOR MAPKET WHOLESA Stress level is 0.823 Store sales factors: Modoc Del Norte Humboldt Tehama Shasta Lassen Trinity	1.7 (1) 1.4 (1) 1.7 (1) 1.3 (1) 1.5 1.0 (1) 1.4 (1) 1.3 (1) 2.1 (1) (2) 1.3 (2) 1.3 (1) LERS WAREHOUSE IN PEDDING 1.4 (1) 0.8 1.1 (1) 1.2 (1) 1.3 (1) 1.4 (1) 1.3 (2)
Kern Inyo San Bernardino San Luis Cbispo Santa Barbara PLAN FOR MARKET WHOLFSAL Stress level is 1.411 Store sales factors: Fresno Kern Kings	2015 167 1772 451 997 .EPS WAREHOUSE IN FRESNO 2.3 (2) 2.4 2.1	Alameda Mariposa Lake Merced Napa Marin Sonoma Mendocino Solano Tulare Trinity Yolo PLAN FOR MAPKET WHOLESA Stress level is 0.823 Store sales factors: Modoc Del Norte Humboldt Tehama Shasta Lassen Trinity Glenn	1.7 (1) 1.4 (1) 1.7 (1) 1.5 1.0 (1) 1.4 (1) 1.3 (1) 2.1 (1) (2) 1.3 (2) 1.3 (1) 2.1 (1) (2) 1.3 (2) 1.3 (1) 2.1 (1) (2) 1.3 (1) 1.4 (1) 0.8 1.1 (1) 0.8 1.1 (1) 1.2 (1) 1.3 (1) 1.4 (1) 1.3 (1) 1.4 (1) 1.3 (2) 1.1 (1)
Kern Inyo San Bernardino San Luis Cbispo Santa Barbara PLAN FOR MARKET WHOLFSAL Stress level is 1.411 Store sales factors: Fresno Kern Kings	2015 167 1772 451 997 .EPS WAREHOUSE IN FRESNO 2.3 (2) 2.4 2.1	Alameda Mariposa Lake Merced Napa Marin Sonoma Mendocino Solano Tulare Trinity Yolo PLAN FOR MARKET WHOLESA Store sales factors: Modoc Del Norte Humboldt Tehama Shasta Lassen Trinity Glenn Siskiyou	1.7 (1) 1.4 (1) 1.7 (1) 1.5 1.0 (1) 1.4 (1) 1.3 (1) 2.1 (1) (2) 1.3 (2) 1.3 (1) 2.1 (1) (2) 1.3 (2) 1.3 (1) 1.4 (1) 0.8 1.1 (1) 1.2 (1) 1.3 (1) 1.4 (1) 1.3 (1) 1.4 (1) 1.3 (2) 1.1 (1) 1.3 (2) 1.1 (1) 1.3 (2) 1.1 (1) 1.3 (2) 1.1 (1) 1.3 (2) 1.1 (1) 1.3 (2) 1.1 (1) 1.3 (2) 1.1 (1) 1.3 (2)
Kern Inyo San Bernardino San Luis Cbispo Santa Barbara PLAN FOR MARKET WHOLFSAL Stress level is 1.411 Store sales factors: Fresno Kern Kings	2015 167 1772 451 997 .EPS WAREHOUSE IN FRESNO 2.3 (2) 2.4 2.1	Alameda Mariposa Lake Merced Napa Marin Sonoma Mendocino Solano Tulare Trinity Yolo PLAN FOR MAPKET WHOLESA Stress level is 0.823 Store sales factors: Modoc Del Norte Humboldt Tehama Shasta Lassen Trinity Glenn	1.7 (1) 1.4 (1) 1.7 (1) 1.5 1.0 (1) 1.4 (1) 1.3 (1) 2.1 (1) (2) 1.3 (2) 1.3 (1) 2.1 (1) (2) 1.3 (2) 1.3 (1) 2.1 (1) (2) 1.3 (1) 1.4 (1) 0.8 1.1 (1) 1.2 (1) 1.3 (1) 1.4 (1) 1.3 (1) 1.4 (1) 1.3 (2) 1.1 (1)

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normally served at least partially by another warehouse
 served partially by another warehouse of the same company
 served partially by a warehouse of another company

Exhibit 6.5: SUMMARY OF REVISED WHOLESALE-RETAIL DISTRIBUTION PATTERNS (continued)

PLAN FOR UNITED GROCEP	S WADEHOUSE IN SACRAMENTO	PLAN FOR RESTAURANT WAREHOUSES	AND INSTITUTIONAL IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
Stress level is 2.533 12 additional to 19 additional to 41 additional do	ractors needed railers needed	554 additional	518 tractors needed trailers needed
Store sales factors:	Tree a freedad		eding centers (tons/wk)
Stanislaus	3.1 (1)	Santa Clara	247
Lassen	3.2	Los Angeles	1674
Tulare	4.8 (1) (2)	Placer	309
101816	4.0 (1) (2)	San Benito	101
PLAN FOR VONS WAREHOUSE	E IN EL MONTE	Monterey	405
		Butte	1127
Stress level is 1.781		El Dorado	731
30 additional d	riv ers ne eded	Plumas'	239
		Tehama	467
Store sales factors:		Shasta	1230
San Diego	7.6	Santa Cruz	1221
Riverside	7.6	Tuolumne	361
San Bernardino	7.6	San Joaquin	921
Santa Barbara	6.6	Lassen	253 540
DIAN EOD DECTAIDANT AND	THETTITTONAL	Solano Ventura	735
PLAN FOR RESTAURANT AND	NORTHERN CALIFORNIA	Tulare	2628
KARCHOOSES IN	NOR THERN CALL ORITH	Trinity	169
Stress level is 1.133		Glenn	290
511 cas 164e1 13 11133		Yolo	920
Shipments to mass feed	ing centers (tons/wk)	Siskiyou	462
Sacramento	26	Sutter	239
Contra Costa	97	PLAN FOR OTHERS WARE	HOUSES
Alameda	450		IN NORTHERN CALIFORNIA
Fresno	2608		
Calaveras	220	Stress level is 1.0	58
Modec	141		
Placer	439	PLAN FOR OTHERS WARE	
Mono	76		IN SOUTHERN CALFORNIA
Madera	366	Stress level is 2.2	7.0
Colusa Mariposa	127 142		tractors needed
Del Norte	129		trailers needed
Humboldt	1125		drivers needed
Nevada	391	220 222, 3131,22	2
Kings	1143		
Amador	189		
Lake	332		
Yuba	255		
Marced	934		
Stanislaus	530		
Alpine	5		
Napa	204	•	
San Mateo	13		
Marin Siamma	16		
Sierra Sonoma	45 1260		
tiendoci no	852		
HENGOGINO			

⁽¹⁾ normally served at least partially by another warehouse
(2) served partially by another warehouse of the same company
(3) served partially by a warehouse of another company

stress factor is reduced to approximately 2.1 but the additional strain on congregate care facilities and mass feeding centers in San Bernardino and Riverside Counties would be considerable.

6.3.4 Proximity Hosting/Transport Capacity (assumes 80% relocation)

Under this hosting allocation, ton-miles are 42% less than for the Uniform Hosting allocation. Shipments to mass feeding centers increase by 39% statewide. Transportation stress is reduced to 1.85. One of the major problems with this hosting allocation is it results in hosting ratios of 17 to 1 in San Bernardino and Riverside Counties with a consequent heavy strain on congregate care facilities and mass feeding centers.

6.4 METHODS OF RELIEVING TRANSPORTATION STRESS

As part of earlier studies (References 2, 6 and 12), distribution managers for major food wholesalers serving five different metropolitan areas of the United States were interviewed at some length regarding potential measures that might be employed to ease the transportation stress imposed on the food distribution system by a crisis relocation. Similar interviews were carried out with major food wholesalers in California. Most of the distribution managers interviewed felt that the vehicle mileage covered by the truck fleets in making local deliveries could be doubled under emergency conditions; additional increases would require additional equipment. The larger food distributors interviewed indicated a willingness to lease additional equipment in time of emergency. This is their current practice when demand surges or emergencies render their truck fleets inadequate. Additional strategies for increasing truck and driver productivity include:

- 1. Relaxing Regulatory Constraints.
 - a) Relaxing union and DOT driver restrictions
 - b) Ignoring over-the-road weight limitations
- 2. Improving Utilization of Existing Equipment.
 - a) Relaxing maintenance requirements
 - b) Minimizing downtime
 - c) Shipping only full-pallet commodity loads
 - d) Eliminating light loads
 - e) Shipping only necessary commodities

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- 3. Obtaining Additional Equipment and Drivers
 - a) Leasing equipment
 - b) Using incoming equipment from manufacturers
 - c) Commandeering additional drivers and equipment from less critical sectors of the economy

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Each of these strategies, discussed in detail in <u>Impacts of the Crisis</u>
<u>Relocation Strategy on Transportation Systems</u> (Reference 17), is briefly reviewed in the following paragraphs.

- 1. Relaxing Regulatory Constraints. Relaxing union and DOT restrictions on the length of time a driver may spend at the wheel during a tour of duty (consistent with safety precautions) would increase driver availability, while waiving truck weight limitations would improve vehicle utilization.
- 2. Improving Utilization of Existing Equipment. Existing equipment is not fully utilized, and additional vehicle-hours may be realized over short periods by cutting back on maintenance procedures. By ignoring brand differences and loading only full-pallet loads of specified items, additional savings of from one to three hours per trip may be attained at the warehouse loading dock.

Another means of improving vehicle utilization under emergency conditions is to ship only essential items. Every retail grocery store and grocery wholesaler carries many items which would not be required for survival under crisis relocation or postattack conditions. The identification of non-essential items is not simply a matter of separating food and non-food items and shipping only food items to host-area outlets. While some non-food items carried by grocers are clearly not essential to survival (e.g., toys, hairspray, and tobacco products), many other items in this classification will contribute significantly to the well-being of the evacuated population (e.g., aspirin, toilet tissue, and detergents). Food distribution and transportation guidelines prepared by SYSTAN contain a suggested listing of essential and non-essential commodities, classified according to wholesaler inventory categories (Reference 17).

Trucks and drivers making deliveries from food manufacturers to wholesale distribution warehouses might be induced to make local shipments from the warehouse to the host area as part of their return journey to the manufacturer. Many manufacturers currently arrange to have their trucks backhaul other commodities on the return journey as a matter of course, so the use of these trucks in local food shipments would require an assessment of relative shipment priorities.

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Equipment utilization may also be increased by dropping trailers at host-area locations, especially mass feeding centers where unloading may be slow, and returning for a second load.

3. Obtaining Additional Drivers and Equipment. One obvious means of coping with the transportation stress imposed on the food distribution system by a crisis relocation is to secure the use of drivers and equipment from other, less critical sectors of the distribution community. This approach is currently practiced on a small scale by most food distributors, who typically lease additional equipment when demand surges or emergencies render their truck fleets inadequate. During the recent truckers' strike in California, several of the grocery chains interviewed indicated they obtained the services of outside carriers. Under emergency conditions, additional vehicles and drivers might also be obtained on a somewhat larger scale from the household moving industry and from manufacturing firms shutting down for the duration of the crisis.

6.5 INTERPRETING TRANSPORTATION STRESS MEASUREMENTS

Since existing equipment is not used to capacity, it is necessary to estimate the additional usage that may be obtained from this equipment before additional drivers and equipment are necessary. Estimates for the requirements for additional drivers and equipment have been made in existing studies (References 2 and 17). Exhibit 6.5 lists the estimated range of increase of driver and vehicle productivity associated with each of the labor- and equipment-saving measures proposed above. Some of the proposed measures would have the effect of increasing vehicle productivity without increasing driver productivity (i.e., relaxing maintenance requirements), while other measures (i.e., relaxing union and DOT restrictions) would primarily increase driver productivity, and still others (i.e., relaxing weight restrictions) would improve both driver and vehicle productivity. Exhibit 6.5 shows that the average potential increase in driver productivity is 51%, while the average increase in productivity possible for existing food transportation vehicles is 112.5%. This figure could range from 76% to 149%, depending on existing vehicle down time.

Exhibit 6.6 charts the rough results of Exhibit 6.5 as a function of different transportation stress factors. On the average, a transportation stress factor of 2.5 (i.e., a 150% increase in vehicle mileage) would require an influx of 18% more vehicles and 71% more drivers from other sectors of the economy. These estimates allow for no attrition in the existing driver force in the face of emergencies, and assume that the length of the crisis relocation period will be relatively short (one to two weeks). Although Exhibit 6.6 was prepared from rough estimates of the likely impact of different measures for improving distribution system productivity, it confirms two of the major

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EXHIBIT 6.6

SUMMARY OF POTENTIAL PRODUCTIVITY INCREASES

	ESTIMA	TED PERC	CENT INC	REASE IN	EFFICI	ENCY
EMERGENCY MEASURE	Ve	hicle Ti	me	Dri	ver Tim	e
	Lower	Mid- Range	Upper	Lower	Mid- Range	Upper.
REGULATORY CONSTRAINTS						
Relaxing Driver Restrictions				18%	20%.	22%
Relaxing Weight Limitations	4%	6%	8%	4%	6%	8%
EQUIPMENT USE						į
Minimizing Down Time	37%	54%	71%			
Relaxing Maintenance Requirements	15%	17.5%	20%			
Eliminating Light Loads	5%	10%	15%	5%	10%	15%
Shipping Only Full-Pallet Loads	5%	10%	15%			
Shipping Only Necessary						j
Commodities	10%	15%	20%	10%	15%	20%
TOTAL	76%	112.5%	149%	37%	51%	65%

(Source: Reference 2)

intuitive observations of distribution managers regarding emergency operations under crisis relocation conditions:

- Driver availability is likely to be more critical than vehicle availability. That is, more additional drivers than vehicles are required to meet a specified increase in vehicle mileage.
- 2. The existing distribution system can support a doubling of vehicle-miles for short periods of time without requiring additional transportation equipment.

The relationships of Exhibit 6.6 have been used to compute the additional number of food trucks and drivers needed to accomplish a relocation in California. Exhibit 6.4 has summarized these numbers on a warehouse-by-warehouse basis for major food distributors under a uniform hosting allocation. This exhibit shows that a total of 3820 tractors, 7422 trailers, and 9143 drivers would have to be diverted from less critical sectors of the economy to distribute food under crisis relocation conditions.


6.6 MEETING ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT NEEDS

Of a total of nearly 1,000,000 trucks currently registered in California, 600,000 are dedicated to specific purposes such as construction, forestry, mining and manufacturing, leaving 400,000 primarily used to haul general cargo. Of these 400,000 trucks, approximately 225,000 are already used by California agriculture. In addition, approximately 95,000 of the 400,000 are small pickups and parcel trucks that are unsuited for intercity cargo transport. This leaves a total of 80,000 general cargo trucks large enough to be employed efficiently in making intercity food shipments (1978 Census of Transportation and Reference 13). Many of these trucks are already carrying what would be considered essential cargo under crisis relocation conditions. A past SYSTAN survey (Reference 12) estimated that 62% of all intercity truck ton-miles and 51% of all intracity ton-miles were consumed in delivering essential cargo.

Conservatively assuming that 62% of the 80,000 larger cargo trucks in California are currently engaged in delivering essential goods, 35% or 30,000 vehicles could be diverted from less critical sectors of the economy in an emergency. Exhibit 6.5 estimates that 1,491 tractors and 2,815 trailers (20,000 to 40,000 pound capacity) will have to be added to the existing wholesale food distribution fleets to deliver food from risk-area warehouses to host-area evacuees. Thus, there appears to be more than enough vehicles in less critical sectors of the economy to meet food distribution needs under crisis relocation conditions. The problem under these conditions is not likely to be lack of vehicles, but rather the identification, organization, and coordination of surplus vehicles so that they are in the right place at the right time. In a separate study (Reference 20), SYSTAN has prepared a videotape and workshop guidance materials designed to encourage the transportation

EXHIBIT 6.7

RANGE OF ADDITIONAL DRIVERS AND EQUIPMENT ASSOCIATED WITH TRANSPORTATION STRESS FACTORS



(Source: Reference 2)

industry to work with civil defense officials in planning for the emergency use of transportation equipment.

In addition to planning for the emergency use of trucks and trailers, it appears that some railcars can also be diverted from less critical uses in time of emergency.

In an earlier study (Reference 17), it was determined that 41% of all intercity rail ton-miles were accounted for by essential cargo. Each rail boxcar can carry about 1-1/2 times the volume carried by truck semi-trailers with a 40,000 pounds capacity. Southern Pacific has about 40,000 boxcars in its system, some of which could be secured to relieve transportation stress on the food distribution system.

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APPENDIX A: POPULATION

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APPENDIX TABLE A-1

POPULATION DATA FOR LOS ANGELES HOSTING REGIONS UNDER NON-UNIFORM HOSTING PLAN (Population in Thousands)

County	1975 Population	Population in High Risk Areas	Resident Population In Lower Fallout Risk Areas	Relocatees Assuming Non-Uniform Hosting Ratio	Resident & Relocatee Population
Hosting Region-LA 1					
Los Angeles	4659	4659	0	0	0
Ventura	438	374	64	538	209
Fresno	447	337	110	924	1034
Kings	89	18	20	420	470
Kern	343	242	101	848	949
Santa Barbara	281	258	23	193	216
Inyo	17	0	17	143	166
Tulare	208	0	208	1747	1955
San Luis Obispo	128	0	128	1075	1203
	}	}		and an artist and a second	
Totals	6889	5888	701	5888	6283
Hosting Region-LA 2					
Los Angeles	2311	2311			
Orange	1695	1695	0	0	0
Riverside	527	342	185	2237	2422
San Bernadino	869	631	29	810	877
San Diego	1572	1347	225	2722	2947
[mperia]	84	35	49	592	641
		1		-	
Totals	6887	636}	526	6361	6887

APPENDIX TABLE A-1 (Continued)

POPULATION DATA FOR NORTHERN AND CENTRAL CALIFORNIA UNDER NON-UNIFORM HOSTING PLAN

		(Population in Thousands)	Thousands)		
	1975	Population in	Resident Population In Lower Fallout		Resident & Relocatee
County	Population	High Risk Areas	Risk Areas	Hosting Ratio	Population
Hosting Region-Northern					
Modoc	8	0	8	0	80
Siskiyou	35	0	35	0	35
Del Norte	16	0	16	0	16
Humboldt	104	0	104	0	104
Trinity	10	0	10	0	10
Shasta	88	0	88	0	88
Plumas	14	0	14	0	14
Tehama	32	0	32	0	32
Lassen	19	4	15	4	19
		1	}	-	1
Totals	526	4	222	4	226
Hosting Region-Central					
Alpine	_	0		0	_
Mono	7	0	7	0	7
Tuolumne	56	0	26	0	26
Mariposa	8	0	80	0	ω
Madera	46	0	46	0	46
San Benito	20	0	20	0	20
Merced	1117	11	46	7.1	117
Monterey	566	208	58	208	566
Totals	491	279	212	279	491

APPENDIX TABLE A-1 (Continued)

POPULATION DATA FOR SAN FRANCISCO HOSTING REGION UNDER NON-UNIFORM HOSTING PLAN

(Population in Thousands)

County	1975 Population	Population in High Risk Areas	Resident Population In Lower Fallout Risk Areas	Relocatees Assuming Non-Uniform Hosting Ratio	Resident & Relocatee Population
Hosting Region-S.F.					
San Francisco	899	899	0	0	0
San Mateo	571	571	C	0	0
Santa Clara	1190	1159	31.	208	239
Alameda	1087	1087	; c	0	
Contra Costa	582	585	o 0	0	0
San Joaquin	302	222	80	537	617
Sacramento	289	989	_	1	8
Placer	06	47	43	289	332
Yolo	102	102	0	0	0
Solano	184	184	0	0	0
Napa	88	88	0	0	0
Sonoma	243	154	88	598	289
Marin	214	214	0	0	0
Yuba	45	34	11	74	85
Stanislaus	212	137	75	504	579
Mendocino	58	0	58	390	448
Lake	56	0	26	175	201
Glenn	19	0	19	128	147
Colusa	13	0	13	87	100
Butte	117	0	117	786	903
Sierra	က	0	m	20	23
Nevada	34	0	34	228	292
Sutter	46	0	46	309	355
El Dorado	29	0	59	396	455
Amador	15	0	15	101	116
Calaveras	91	0	16	107	123
Santa Cruz	148	0	148	366	1143
	{		}		}
Totals	6823	5939	884	5939	6823

POPULATION DATA FOR NON-UNIFORM-TRANSPORT CAPACITY HOSTING PLAN APPENDIX A-2

(80% evacuation)

RESIDENT & RELOCATEE POPULATION 134 1114 481 167 117 1135 203 123 34 34 332 38 339 3,553 1,458 161 (1000)1,700 84 20 17 212 456 102 680 3,652 RESIDENT POPULATION IN LOWER FALLOUT RISK AREAS 185 67 64 225 49 030030 (1000)HIGH RISK AREAS POPULATION IN 6,970 1,695 342 631 374 34 137 208 71 71 337 242 ,159 ,087 ,087 ,585 ,222 ,222 ,686 ,47 ,102 ,184 ,89 ,154 1,347 18,471 (1000)POPULATION N 1,190 1,087 302 302 687 90 102 184 89 243 1,572 19 45 212 266 266 117 447 68 343 281 6,970 1,695 527 698 438 19,794 (1000)SAN FRANCISCO CONGLOMERATE: LOS ANGELES CONGLOMERATE: SAN DIEGO CONGLOMERATE: San Bernardino INDIVIDUAL AREAS: Santa Barbara San Francisco Contra Costa San Joaquin Los Angeles Santa Clara Sacramento Stanislaus San Mateo Riverside San Diego Monterey Imperial Alameda Ventura Placer Orange Lassen Solano Merced resno Sonoma Kings Marin Yolo Napa Yuba Kern

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APPENDIX A-2 (Continued) POPULATION DATA FOR NON-UNIFORM-TRANSPORT CAPACITY HOSTING PLAN

(Population in Thousands)

COUNTY	1975 POPULATION	RELOCATEES ASSUMING NON- UNIFORM HOSTING	RESIDENT & RELOCATEE POPULATION
		ONLI ONE HOUSE INC	TOTOLATION
NORTHERN CALIFORNIA:			•
Modoc Siskiyou Del Norte Humboldt Trinity Shast ^{,2} Plumas Tehama	8 35 16 104 10 88 14	0 0 0 0 0 49 0	8 35 16 104 10 88 63 32
SAN FRANCISCO PROXIMITY:			
Mendocino Lake Glenn Colusa Butte Sierra Nevada Sutter El Dorado Amador Calaveras Santa Cruz	58 26 19 13 117 3 34 46 59 15 16	0 306 207 154 103 9 119 260 141 240 256	58 332 226 167 220 12 153 306 200 255 272 1,191
CENTRAL CALIFORNIA:			
Alpine Mono Tuolumne Mariposa Madera San Benito	1 7 26 8 46 20	0 0 44 8 394 15	1 7 70 16 440 35
LOS ANGELES PROXIMITY:			
Inyo Tulare San Luis Obispo	17 208 128	65 1,973 	82 2,181 884
TOTAL:	1,322	6,142	7,464

APPENDIX B: FOOD PRODUCTION, PROCESSING AND DISTRIBUTION

APPENDIX TABLE B-1

ESTIMATED PRODUCTION, DISTRIBUTION AND CONSUMPTION OF MEAT IN CALIFORNIA

Consumption and Sources of Supply Volume in Short Tons	Imports	From <u>Out-of-State</u>	California Production	Total California <u>Consumption</u>
Liveweight	275,000	2,936,000	1.364.000	4.575.000
Dressed Weight	165,000 ^C	1,762,000 ^e	818,000	2,745,000 ^b
Retail Weight	132,000	1,410,000	654,000	.2,196,000 ^f
Percentage Share	6%	64%	30%	100%
Meat Alternates	16,000	176,000	83,000	275,000
	148,000	1,586,000	737,000	2,471,000
	California Consumption	Exports	To Other States	Total California Production
Production and Distributi	on			
Volume in Short Tons				
Liveweight	1,364,000 ^d	16,000ª	-0- e	1,380,000ª
Dressed Weight	818,000	10,000		828,000
Retail Weight	654,000	8,000		662,000
Percentage Share	99%	1%	-0-	100%
Meat Alternates	83,000	4,000	38,000	125,000
	737,000	12,000	38,000	78,000

Liveweight basis, 1976. Data from Exports of Agricultural Commodities Grown or Produced in California. Fiscal Year 1976 and 1977, California Crop and Livestock Reporting Service, USDA and California Department of Food and Agriculture, Sacramento, California, April, 1978, Page 14.

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Dressed weight varies with each type of livestock and from year to year, but here a weighted average of 60% of liveweight is used. Retail weight is calculated at 80% of dressed weight. This data is based on information from the American Meat Institute, Washington, D.C.

Based on National Food Situation, NFS-161 Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, September, 1977, Page 25. Imports based on 65 of available supplies (consumption).

d Balance

This figure is net. Out-of-state shipments to California includes shipment of live animals into and out of the state. In 1977, for example, 1,722,000 head of cattle and calves were shipped into California and 343,000 were shipped out to other states. A substantial number of hogs and sheep and lambs are also shipped into California from other states. These shipments of live animals to California from other states account for about one-fifth of all California's meat consumption. In addition, a substantial quantity of dressed or halves and quarters of beef, as well as poultry, come into California from other states.

f Based on four pounds per capita per week. Meat alternates based on 0.5 pounds per capita per week. Source: USDA, National Food Review WFR-3, Economics, Statistics, and Cooperatives Service, USDA, Masnington, D.C., June 1978, Page 54.

APPENDIA TABLE B-1 (Continued) ESTIMATED PRODUCTION, DISTRIBUTION AND CONSUMPTION

OF EGGS IN CALIFORNIA

	Imports	From Out-of-State	California Production	
Consumption and Sources of Supply				
Volume in Short Tons	-0-	-0-	379,000	379,000 ^b
Percentage Share	0%	0%	100%	100%
	California Consumptio	•	To Other States	Total California Production
Production and Distribution	1_			
Volume in Short Tons	379,000 ^b	5,000 ^a	176,000 ^C	560,000 ^a
Percentage Share	68%	1%	31%	100%

^a Data from Exports of Agricultural Commodities Grown or Produced in California, Fiscal Year 1976 and 1977, California Crop and Livestock Reporting Service, USDA and California Department of Agriculture, Sacramento, California, April 1978.

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Based on 0.69 pounds per week or 35.88 pounds per year, and the 1975 California population. See National Food Review, Economics, Statistics and Cooperatives Service, USDA, June 1978, page 54.

C Balance.

APPENDIX TABLE B-1 (Continued)

ESTIMATED PRODUCTION, DISTRIBUTION AND CONSUMPTION

OF MILK IN CALIFORNIA

	Imports	From Out-of-State	Californ Producti	
Consumption and Sources of Supply				
Volume in Short Tons	-0-	29,000 ^b	2,890,0	00 2,919,000 ^a
Percentage Share	0%	. 1%	99%	100%
	California Consumptio		To Other States	Total California Production
Production and Distribution	<u>!</u>			
Valume in Short Tons	2,890,000	-0-	29,000	2,919,000 ^a
Percentage Share	99%	0%	1%	100%

a Class I products only (primarily fluid milk and cream). Class I products generally account for roughly half of the total milk produced in California. There is very little shipment of Class I products into or out of California, although there is some shipment of Class 4 products; milk for drying as well as some butter is shipped out of state and some hard cheeses are shipped in. Per capita consumption of Class I dairy products in California in 1975 was 128.6 quarts (@ 2.15 pounds per quart) or 276.49 pounds per capita. Source: McEwen, J.H., California Dairy Industry Statistics, 1976, California Crop and Livestock Reporting Service, California Department of Food and Agriculture, and USDA, Sacramento, California, 1977, page 72.

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Product Classes 1, 2 and 3; actual 1975 California commercial milk production was approximately 5,354,000 short tons. The 1975 per capita consumption of Class 1 products was 276.49 pounds (5.32 pounds per week). Class 1, 2 and 3 milk and milk products consumption in California was 340.2 pounds. (California Dairy Industry Statistics, 1976, California Crop and Livestock Reporting Service, USDA, and California Department of Food and Agriculture, Sacramento, 1977, pages 13 and 72.) The national average per capita consumption is 329.3 pounds. (National Food Review, NFR-3, Economics, Statistics and Cooperatives Service, USDA, June 1978, pages 54.) In addition to the products in Class 1, 2 and 3, a substantial amount of milk goes into Class 4 products, which include hard cneeses and powdered milk. Class 1, which is primarily fluid milk, is only about 50% of total commercial milk production.

California imports some cheeses (not Class I) from abroad and brings in some from other states, while shipping some butter and powdered milk. Overall, however, there is an approximate balance between California's production and consumption of milk and other dairy products. The shipment into and out of state of Class I products are estimated at one percent of production on a product weight basis. Precise figures on into and out-of-state shipment are not available from California Crop and Livestock Reporting Service.

APPENDIX TABLE B-1 (Continued)

ESTIMATED PRODUCTION, DISTRIBUTION AND CONSUMPTION

OF CEREALS IN CALIFORNIA

Consumption and Sources of Supply	Imports 0	From ut-of-State ^C	California Production	Total California Consumption
Whole Grain Volume in Short Tons				
Rice	-0-	-0-	94,000	94,000
Wheat	-0-	1,173,000	368,000	1,541,000
Total	-0-	1,173,000	462,000	1,635,000
Flour Volume in Short Tons				
Rice	-0-	-0-	84,000	84,000
Wheat	<u>-0-</u>	868,000	272,000	1,140,000
Total	-0-	868,000	356,000	1,224,000
Percentage Share				
Rice	0%	0%	100%	100%
Wheat	0%	76%	24%	100%
Total	0%	71%	29%	100%
	California Consumption	<u>Exports</u> ^a	To Other States	Total California <u>Production</u> a
Production and Distribution	<u>on</u>			
Whole Grain Volume in Short Tons				
Rice	94,000	481,000	934,000	1,509,000
Wheat	368,000	1,469,000	-0-	1,837,000
Total	462,000	1,950,000	934,000	3,346,000
Flour Volume in Short Tons				
Rice	84,000	432,000	842,000	1,358,000
Whea t	272,000	1,087,000	0	1,359,000
Total	356,000	1,519,000	842,000	2,717,000
Percentage Share				
Rice	6%	32%	62%	100%
Wheat	20%	80%	0%	100%
Total	13%	56%	31%	100%

From Exports of Agricultural Commodities Grown or Produced in California, Fiscal Year 1976 and 1977, California Crop and Livestock Reporting Service, USDA, and California Department of Food and Agriculture, Sacramento, 1978, page 12.

b Consumption is based on 8 pounds of rice and 108 pounds of wheat per capita per year (National Food Review, NFR-3, Economics, Statistics, and Cooperatives Service, USDA, June 1978, page 54). Ratio of wheat retail weight (flour) to whole grain is 0.74, and for rice without husks, the ratio is estimated at 0.90.

C Balance.

APPENDIX B-1 (Continued)

ESTIMATED PRODUCTION, DISTRIBUTION AND CONSUMPTION

OF FRUITS AND VEGETABLES IN CALIFORNIA

	Imports	From Out-of-State	California Production	Total California Consumption		
Consumption and Sources of Supply						
Volume in Short Tons	378,000 ^c	221,000 ^d	2,549,000 ^e	3,148,000 ^a		
Percentage Share	12%	7%	81%	100%		
	California Consumptio		To Other States	Total California Production		
Production and Distribution	<u>n</u>					
Volume in Short Tons	2,549,000	a 2,144,000 ^b	12,900,000 ^e	17,593,000 ^b		
Percentage Share	15%	12%	73%	100%		

^a Based on 298.2 pounds per capita per year (5.7 pounds per week) from <u>National Food Review</u>, NFR-3, Economics, Statistics and Cooperatives Service, USDA, Washington, D.C., July 1978. California per capita consumption could be above the national average, but data are unavailable.

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b From Exports of Agricultural Commodities Grown or Produced in California, Fiscal Year 1976 and 1977, California Crop and Livestock Reporting Service, USDA, California Department of Food and Agriculture, pages 12 and 14. (Production data for 1976; export data for 1976-77,)

Based on National Food Situation, NSF-161, Economic Research Service, USDA, September 1977, page 25.

d Estimated based on interviews with chain store distribution managers and USDA Crop and Livestock Reporting Service personnel in Sacramento.

e Determined by difference.

APPENDIX B-1 (Continued)

ESTIMATED PRODUCTIONS, DISTRIBUTION AND CONSUMPTION OF FOOD FATS AND OILS IN CALIFORNIA

	Imports	From Out-of-State	California Production	Total California Consumption
Consumption and Sources of Supply				
Volume in Short Tons				
Cottonseed Oil	-0-	-0-	55,000	55,000
Other Vegetable Oils	45,000 ^C	274,000 ^d	5,000 ^c	324,000
Butter	-0-	-0-	51,000	51,000
Other Fats and Oils	10,000 ^C	59,000 ^d	50,000 ^C	119,000
•	55,000ª	333,000	161,000	549,000 ^b
Percentage Share	10%	61%	29%	100%
	California Consumption	<u>Exports</u>	To Other States	Total California Production
Production and Distribution	<u>.</u>			
Volume in Short Tons				
Cottonseed 0il	55,000	78,000 ^e	43,000 ^d	176,000 ^e
Other Vegetable Oils	5,000	-0-	-0-	5,000 ^c
Butter	51,000	-0-	23,000 ^d	74,000 ^f
Other Fats and Oils	50,000	-0-	-0-	50,000 ^C
	161,000	78,000	66,000	305,000
Percentage Share	53%	26%	22%	100%

Based on data shown in National Food Situation, NFS-161, USDA, Washington, D.C., 1977, Page 25.

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Based on per capita consumption of one pound per capita, per week in California, as shown in National Food Review, NFR-3 Economics, Statistics, and Co-Operatives Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, June 1978, Page 54. Individual shares of food fats and oils components are based on data on Page 25 and on Fats and Oils Situation FOS-282, USDA, Economic Research Service, Washington, O.C., April 1976, Page 13.

 $^{^{\}mathtt{C}}$ Estimated

d Balance

Based on Exports of Agriculture Commodities Grown or Produced in California, Fiscal Year 1976 and 1977, California Crop and Livestock Reporting Service. USDA and California Department of Food and Agriculture, 1978, Page 92.

From California Dairy Industry Statistics, 1976, California Grop and Live-stock Reporting Service, California Department of Food and Agriculture, Sacramento and USDA, Sacramento, California, Page 58.

APPENDIX B-1 (Continued) ESTIMATED PRODUCTION, DISTRIBUTION AND CONSUMPTION

OF POTATOES IN CALIFORNIA

	Imports	From Out-of-State	California Production			
Consumption and Sources of Supply						
Volume in Short Tons	-0-	694,000 ^C	634,000	1,328,000 ^b		
Percentage Share	0%	52%	48%	100%		
	California Consumptio		To Other States	Total California Production		
Production and Distribution	<u>l</u>					
Volume in Short Tons	634,000	46,000 ^a	522,000 ^C	1,202,000 ^a		
Percentage Share	53%	4%	43%	100%		

^a Based on <u>Exports of Agricultural Commodities Grown or Produced in California</u>, Fiscal Year 1976 and 1977, California Crop and Livestock Reporting Service, USDA and California Department of Food and Agriculture, Sacramento, 1978, page 14.

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Consumption based on 1975 U.S. per capita annual consumption of 125.8 pounds, from National Food Review, NFR-3, Economics, Statistics and Cooperatives Service, USDA, Washington, D.C., June 1978, page 54.

 $^{^{\}mbox{\scriptsize c}}$ The into and out-of-state figures are estimated.

APPENDIX TABLE B-2

CALIFORNIA FOOD PROCESSING ESTABLISHMENTS, RANKED BY VALUE OF SHIPMENTS, BY COUNTY

Counties	Number of Establishments	Sales (\$mil)	Cumulative Sales Share (\$mil)	Sales Share (%)	Cumulative Sales Share (x)
Los Angeles	773	3,697.9	3,697.9	31.4	31.4
Alameda	186	959.6	4,627.5	7.9	39.3
San Joaquin	89	647.7	5,275.2	5.5	44.8
San Francisco	166	635.8	5,911.0	5.4	50.2
Santa Clara	136	619.2	6,530.2	5.2	55.4
Stanislaus	27	608.2	7,138.4	5.2	9.09
Orange	104	536.8	7,675.2	4.6	65.2
Fresno	113	511.5	8,186.7	4.3	69.5
Sacramento	61	356.8	8,543.5	3.0	72.5
San Diego	94	352.7	8,896.2	3.0	75.5
Merced	29	328.0	9,224.2	2.8	78.3
San Mateo	54	264.3	9,488.5	2.2	80.5
Monterey	41	218.9	9,707.4	1.9	82.4
Yolo	21	202.1	9,909.5	1.7	84.1
San Bernardino	90	171.2	10,080.7	1.5	85.6
Solano	18	151.0	10,231.7	1.3	86.9
Tulare	42	117.7	10,349.4	1.0	87.9
Madera	18	111.6	10,461.0	6.0	88.8
Kings	18	101.1	10,562.1	0.9	89.7
Sonoma	67	93.9	10,656.0	0.8	90.5
Kern	40	91.6	10,747.6	0.8	91.3
Santa Barbara	23	80.8	10,828.4	0.7	92.0
Ventura	28	75.3	10,903.7	9.0	95.6
Butte	24	69.3	10,973.0	9.0	93.2
Riverside	44	61.1	11,034.1	0.5	93.7
lmperial	22	51.8	11,085.9	0.4	94.1
Napa	56	47.9	11,133.8	0.4	94.5
Sutter	-	31.5	11,165.3	0.3	94.8
Humbo ldt	17	29.9	11,195.2	0.2	95.0
San Benito	7	23.3	11,218.5	0.2	95.2
Contra Costa	39	*	ı	•	1
All Other Counties	170	576.1	11,794.6	4.8	0.001
intal Statewide	2.594	11.794.6	11,794.6	100.0	100.0
		•			

*Withheld to avoid disclosing figures of individual firms. (Source: Bureau of the Census, 1972 Census of Manufacturers: Volume III, Area Statistics, Tables 5 and 6, Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C.)

CALIFORNIA FOOD PROCESSING ESTABLISHMENTS
BY STANDARD METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREAS, 1972

SMSA's	Number of Establishments	Sales (\$mil)	Cumulative Sales Share (\$mil)	Sales Share (%)	Cumulative Sales Share (%)
Los Angeles - Long Beach	773	3,697.9	3,697.9	31.4	31.4
San Francisco - Oakland	449	2,134.7	5,832.6	18.1	49.5
Stockton	89	647.7	6,480.3	5.5	55.0
San Jose	136	619.2	7,099.5	5.2	60.2
Modesto	27	608.2	7,707.7	5.2	65.4
Sacramento	83	559.1	8,266.8	4.7	70.1
Anaheim - Santa Ana - Garden Grove	104	536.8	8,803.6	4.6	74.7
Fresno	113	511.5	9,315.1	4.3	79.0
San Diego	94	352.7	9,667.8	3.0	82.0
Riverside - San Bernardino	134	232.2	0,000,6	2.0	84.0
Salinas - Seaside - Monteray	41	218.9	10,118.9	1.9	85.9
Vallejo - Fairfield - Napa	44	198.9	10,317.8	1.7	97.6
Santa Cruz	33	157.8	10,475.6	1.3	88.9
Santa Rosa	67	93.9	10,569.5	0.8	89.7
Bakersfield	40	91.6	10,661.1	0.8	90.5
Santa Barbara - Santa Maria - Lompoc	23	80.8	10,741.9	0.7	91.2
Oxnard - Simi Valley - Ventura	28	75.3	10,817.2	9.0	91.8
Outside SMSA's	316	977.4	11,794.6	8.2	100.0
Total Statewide	2,594	11,794.6	11,794.6	100.0	100.0

Bureau of the Census, 1972 Census of Manufacturers: Volume III, Area Statistics, Tables 5 and 6, Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C.) (Source:

APPENDIX TABLE B-4: CALIFORNIA FOOD PROCESSING ESTABLISHMENTS, BY COUNTY, 1972 (Showing Estimated Share of Value of Shipments in Risk and Host Areas)

		Value of	Per	-	of			•
	Number of	Shipments	Value	Shi	pments		Value of Ship	of Shipments (\$mil)
Sounties	Establishments	(\$mil)	Risk	Host	Total	Risk	Host	Total
Alameda	186		100	0	100	929.6	O	929.6
Butte	24	69.3	0	100	100	0	69.3	69.3
Contra Costa	35	*	1	ì	. '	,		*
Fresno	113	511.5	70	30	100	358.1	153.4	511.5
Humboldt	17	29.9	0	90	100	0	29.9	29.9
Imperial	22	51.8	20	20	100	25.9	25.9	51.8
Kern	40	9.16	20	ဓ	100	64.1	27.5	91.6
Kings	18	101.1	15	82	100	15.2	85.9	101.1
Los Angeles	773	3,697.9	100	0	100	3,697.9	0	3,697.9
Madera	18	111.6	0	100	100	0	111.6	111,6
Merced	29	328.0	18	85	100	59.0	269.0	328.0
Monterey	41	218.9	20	30	100	153.2	65.7	218.9
Napa	56	47.9	100	0	100	47.9	0	47.9
Orange	104	536.8	100	0	100	536.8	0	536.8
Riverside	44	61.1	70	9	100	42.8	18.3	61.1
Sacramento	61	356.8	90	10	100	321.1	35.7	356.8
San Benito	7	23.3	0	100	100	Q	23.3	23.3
San Bernardino	06	171.2	70	30	100	119.8	51.4	171.2
San Diego	94	352.7	80	20	100	70.5	282.2	352.7
San Francisco	991	635.8	901	0	100	635.8	0	635.8
San Joaquin	88	647.7	70	30	100	453.4	194.3	647.7
San Mateo	54	264.3	100	0	100	264.3	0	264.3
Santa Barbara	23	80.8	20	20	100	40.4	40.4	80.8
Santa Clara	136	619.2	90	10	001	557.3	61.9	619.2
Solano	18	151.0	100	0	100	151.0	0	151.0
Sunoma	29	93.9	75	52	001	70.4		93.9
Stanislaus	27	608.2	70	30	100	425.7	182.5	608.2
Sutter	11	31.5	0	90	100	0		33.5
Tulare	42	117.7	0	90	100	0	117.7	117.7
Venture	28	75.3	40	09	100	30.1	45.2	75.3
Yolo	21	202.1	100	0	100	202.1	0	202.1
All Other Counties	170	576.1	2	95	100	28.8	547.3	576.1
Total Statewide	2,594	11,794.6	79	21	100	9,301.2	2,493.4	11,794.6
* Withheld to avoid disclosin	g figures	of individual	firms.					

* Withheld to avoid disclosing figures of individual firms. (Source: Bureau of the Census, 1972 Census of Manufacturers: Volume III, Area Statistics, Tables 5 and 6, Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C., and SYSTAN analysis.)

APPENDIX TABLE 8-5

RANKED BY SALES ACCORDING TO STANDARD METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREAS, 1972 CALIFORNIA GROCERY AND RELATED PRODUCTS WHOLESALE ESTABLISHMENTS

SMSA 's	Number of Establishments	Sales (\$1000)	Cumulative Sales Share (\$1000)	Sales Share (%)	Cumulative Sales Share (%)
Los Angeles - Long Beach	1,332	4,984,248	4,984,248	37.7	37.7
San Francisco - Oakland	779	3,821,898	8,806,146	28.9	9.99
Anaheim - Santa Ana - Garden Grove	165	616,029	9,422,175	4.6	71.2
San Jose	150	511,015	9,933,190	3.9	75.1
Riverside - San Bernardino	204	471,396	10,404,586	3.6	7.87
San Diego	183	443,478	10,848,064	3.4	82.1
Fresno	159	432,598	11,280,662	3.3	85.4
Sacramento	139	317,001	11,597,663	2.4	87.8
Oxnard - Simi Valley - Ventura	62	213,532	11,811,195	1.6	89.4
Salinas - Seaside - Monterey	66	180,110	11,991,305	1.4	8.06
Stockton	95	173,433	12,164,738	1.3	92.1
Modesto	47	110,669	12,275,407	0.8	92.9
Santa Rosa	53	109,009	12,384,416	8.0	93.7
Bakersfield	79	106,246	12,490,662	8.0	94.5
Santa Barbara - Santa Maria - Lompoc	52	91,066	12,581,728	0.7	95.2
Santa Cruz	48	47,706	12,629,434	0.4	92.6
Vallejo - Fairfield - Napa	22	20,362	12,649,796	0.2	95.8
Outside SMSA's	361	553,560	13,203,356	4.2	100.0
Total Statewide	4,029	13,203,356	13,203,356	100.0	100.0

(Source: Bureau of the Census, 1972 Census of Wholesale Trade: Volume II, Area Statistics, Tables 2 and 3, Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C.)

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APPENDIX TABLE B-6
GROCERY AND RELATED PRODUCTS WHOLESALE ESTABLISHMENTS

(Percentage Share According to Sales Volume by County)

FOR SOUTHERN, NORTHERN AND CENTRAL CALIFORNIA, 1972

Counties	Sales Share (%)	Population (000)	Population Percentage
Southern			
Los Angeles Orange San Diego Fresno Riverside Tulare Ventura San Bernardino Kern Santa Barbara Others**	37.7 4.7 3.4 3.3 2.6 2.3 1.6 1.0 0.8 0.7 1.2	6970 1695 1572 444 527 208 438 698 343 281	33.0 8.0 7.4 2.1 2.5 1.0 2.1 3.3 1.6 1.3
Subtota1	59.3	13473	63.7
Northern & Central			
San Francisco Alameda San Mateo Santa Clara Sacramento Contra Costa Monterey San Joaquin Stanislaus Sonoma Marin Placer-Yolo Napa-Solano Other Subtotal	13.5 7.5 5.3 3.9 2.2 1.9 1.4 1.3 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.2 0.2 1.0	668 1087 571 1190 687 585 266 302 212 243 214 192 273 1153 7643	3.2 5.1 2.7 5.6 3.3 2.8 1.3 1.4 1.0 0.9 1.3 5.5
TOTAL	100.0	21,116	100.0

^{*}Inyo 17; San Luis Obispo 128; Kings 68; Imperial 84.

Source: Bureau of the Census, 1972 Census of Wholesale Trade; Volume II, Area Statistics, Table 2, U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C.

CALIFORNIA GROCERY AND RELATED PRODUCTS WHOLESALE ESTABLISHMENTS, BY COUNTY, RANKED BY SALES APPENDIX TABLE 8-7

00	County	Number	Sales (\$1000)	Cum. Sales Share (\$1000)	Sales Share (%)	Cum. Sales Share (%)
- i	Los Angeles	1332	4,984,248	4,984,248	37.7	37.7
2.	San Francisco	349	1,781,779	6,766,027	13.5	51.2
<u>ښ</u>	Alameda	500	991,159	7,757,186	7.5	58.7
4.	San Mateo	142	704,595	8,461,781	5.3	64.0
5.	Orange	165	616,029	9,077,810	4.7	68.7
9	Santa Clara	150	511,015	9,588,825	3.9	72.6
7.	San Diego	183	443,478	10,032,303	3.4	76.0
8	Fresno	159	432,598	10,464,901	3.3	79.3
9.	Riverside	85	336,030	10,800,931	2.6	81.9
10.	Tulare	94	305,865	11,106,796	2.3	84.2
11.	Sacramento	115	291,167	11,397,963	2.2	86.4
12.	Contra Costa	49	248,881	11,646,844	1.9	88.3
13.	Ventura	62	213,532	11,860,376	1.6	6.68
14.	Monterey	66	180,110	12,040,486	1.4	91.3
15.	San Joaquin	95	173.433	12,213,919	1.3	96.2
16.	San Bernardino	119	135,366	12,349,285	1.0	93.6
17.	Stanislaus	47	110,669	12,459,954	0.8	94.4
18.	Sonoma	53	109,009	12,568,963	0.8	95.2
19.	Kern	79	106,246	12,575,209	0.8	0.96
20.	Marin	30	95,484	12.770,693	0.7	7.96
21.	Santa Barbara	25	91,066	12,861,759	0.7	97.4
22.	Placer-Yolo	24	25,834	12,887,593	0.2	97.6
23.	Napa-Solano	22	20,362	12,907,955	0.2	97.8
A11	All Other Counties	315	295,401	13,203,356	2.2	100.0
101	TOTAL STATEWIDE	4029	13,203,356	13.203,356	100.0	100.0

APPENDIX TABLE B-8

CALIFORNIA GROCERY AND RELATED PRODUCTS WHOLESALE ESTABLISHMENTS, BY COUNTY, 1972 (Showing Estimated Share of Sales Volume in Risk and Host Areas)

000) Total	991 159	248.881	432,598	106,246	4.984.248	95,484	180,110	616,029	336,030	291,167	135,366	443,478	1,781,779	173,433	704,595	990,16	511,015	109,009	110,669	305,865	213,532	25,834	20,362	295,401
s Volume (\$1000) Host	c	· C	64.890	15,937	0	0	36,022	0	50,404	29,117	20,305	66,522	0	34,687	0	13,660	0	16,351	22,134	0	128,119	3,875	0	280,631
Sales Risk	991,159	248,881	367,708	90,309	4,984,248	95,484	144,088	616,029	285,626	262,050	115,061	376,956	1,781,779	138,746	704,595	77,406	511,015	92,658	88,535	305,865	85,413	21,959	20,362	14,770
age of /olume Risk	0	0	15	15	0	0	20	0	15	10	15	15	0	20	0	15	0	<u>.</u>	20	100	09	15	O	95
Percentage of Sales Volume Host Ris	100	100	82	82	100	100	80	100	82	90	82	85	100	80	100	82	100	82	80	0	40	82	100	ည
Number of Establishments	209	49	159	79	1332	30	66	165	85	115	119	183	349	95	142	52	150	53	47	94	62	24	22	315
Counties	Alameda	Contra Costa	Fresno	Kern	Los Angeles	Marin	Monterey	Orange	Riverside	Sacramento	San Bernardino	San Diego	San Francisco	San Joaquin	San Mateo	Santa Barbara	Santa Clara	Sonoma	Stanislaus	Tulare	Venture	Placer-Yolo	Napa-Solano	All Other Counties

Bureau of the Census, 1972 Census of Wholesale Trade: Volume II, Area Statistics, Tables 2 and 3, Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C. and SYSTAN analysis.) (Source:

13,203,356

782,654

12,420,702

5.93%

94.07%

4029

Total Statewide

Appendix Table B-9

CALIFORNIA COUNTIES WITH 500 RETAIL ESTABLISIMENTS OR MORE - 1972

		FOOD STORES	53	RESI	RESTAURANTS	Total Restaurant	Dectaurant Sales
County	Number	Sales (\$000)	Sales Per Store (\$000)	Number	Sales (\$000)	and Food Store Sales (\$000)	as % of Food Store
Alameda	186	553,014	564	1,348	178,813	731,827	24.4
Butte	140	58,762	450	157	14,899	73.661	25.4
Contra Costa	465	315,664	629	195	76,379	392,043	19.5
El Dorado	89	32,150	473	717	12,280	44,430	27.6
Fresno	515	208,876	90	009	64,465	2/3,341	23.6
Humboldt	145	55,120	380	991	14,837	756, 69	21.2
Imperial	122	53,047	435	220	12,075	65,122	18.5
Kern	345	156,655	454	510	57,402	214,057	26.8
Kings	29	27,156	405	16	7,149	34,305	20.8
Los Angeles	5,703	3,643,167	639	9,514	1,451,589	5,094,756	28.5
Marín	208	138,281	999	260	37,982	176,263	21.5
Mendocino	85	32,964	405	102	9,360	42,324	22.1
Merced		41,511	374	146	14,984	56,495	26.5
Monterey	528	123,130	/*	356	50,934	1/4,064	5.67
Napa	98.	44,8/0	275	66.	250,11	1 140 022	30.0
Orange	3;	926,38/	-	718.1	306,366	60 60	26.3
Placer	461	40,087	6.4	658	90,903	348,735	26.0
KI VETS TOE	919	358.245	283	1.160	127.209	485.634	26.2
San Bernardian	649	333,527	514	853	102,657	436,184	23.5
San Diego	1,153	645,245	260	1,520	248,929	894,174	27.8
San Francisco	1,270	401,279	316	1,605	271,369	672,648	40.3
San Joaquin	335	138,576	414	412	44,331	182,907	24.2
San Luis Obispo	145	53,311	368	195	22,207	75,518	29.4
San Mateo	546	330,369	909	615	109,194	439,563	24.8
Santa Barbara	263	134,180	510	417	62,112	196,292	3.6
Santa Clara	896	613,662	634	1,138	178,127	803,789	22.0
Santa Cruz	: 83	82,942	453	500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500	29,030	111,972	25.9
Shasta	<u> </u>	50,845	422	134	9,8,5	64.724	4.12
Solano	141	/96,18	185	661	36,795	118,762	0.5
Sonoma	687	136,850	4/4	339	186,28	169,831	. S. S.
Stanislaus	700	112,403	400	600	704,67	137,810	9.77
Tulare	007	729.76	140	067	861,62	126,733	23.7
Ventura	- 67	190,620	993	711	30,233	63 781	22.3
4010	-	010101	6/6	-	0634	20,150	6.33
Areas Outside SMSA	1,988	758,170		2,417	216,037	974,207	22.2
State	19,238	10,652,042	554	27,289	3,920,109	14,572,151	26.9

(Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Rureau of the Census, 1972 Census of Retail Trade, Area Statistics (RC72-A-5), Washington, D.C.)

APPENDIX C: SUMMARY OF WHOLESALE/RETAIL DISTRIBUTION PATTERNS

UNIFORM HOSTING ALLOCATION: SHIPMENTS FROM RISK AREA WAREHOUSES

APPENDIX C: SUMMARY OF WHOLESALE/RETAIL DISTRIBUTION PATTERNS

UNIFORM HOSTING ALLOCATION: SHIPMENTS FROM RISK AREA WAREHOUSES

	RELOCATION SHIPMENTS							
DISTRIBUTION	•	O STORES		FEEDING CENTERS	d Latransportation	ESTIMATED ADDITIONAL RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS		
CENTER	SHIPPING LEVEL	COUNTY	TONS PER WEEK	COUNTY	STRESS FACTORS	TRACTORS TRAILERS		
	FACTOR		-			TRACTURS	TRAILERS	DRIVER
United Grocers, Fresno	2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7	Fresno Madera Mariposa Merced San Luis Obispo°	-		1.193	-	-	-
United Grocers, Richmond	2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7	Calaveras* Humboldt* Kern* Kings* Nevada* Placer* Plumas** Sierra* Sutter* Tulare* Amador Lake Mendocino Monterey San Benito San Joaquin San Luis Obispo* Santa Clara Santa Clara Santa Cruz Sonoma Tuolumne Yuba	-		2.733	23	25	74
United Grocers, Sacramento	2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7	Butte Colusa El Borado Glenn Lassen Modoc Mono Plumas' Shasta Siskiyou Stanislaus Tehama Trinity		-	1.626	-	-	5
Market Whole- salers. Sacramento	1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7	Amador Butte Calaveras Colusa El Dorado Nevada Placer Plumas San Joaquin Sierra Stanislaus Sutter' Tulare' Tuolumne Yuba	-	-	1.740	- :	- 1	٠.
Market Whole- salers, Fresno	1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7	Fresno Kern Kings San Luis Obispo Tulare?	:	-	1.162	, t	-	-

^{*} indicates a county which is normally served by a different warehouse of the same firm.

 $^{^{\}circ}$ indicates a county which is partially served by a different varenouse of the same firm.

		RELOCATIO	N SHIPMENTS		TRANSPORTATION STRESS FACTORS	ESTIMATED ADDITIONAL RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS		
DISTRIBUTION		TO STORES	TO MASS	FEEDING CENTERS				
CENTER	SHIPPING LEVEL FACTOR	COUNTY	TONS PER WEEK	COUNTY		TRACTORS	TRAILERS	DRIVER
Market Whole- salers, Santa Rosa	1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7	Lake Mariposa Mendocino Merced Shasta° Siskiyou Sonoma Trinity	-	-	3.434	9	9	19
Market Whole- salers, Redding	1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7	Del Norte Glenn Humboldt Lassen Modoc Shasta° Sutter° Tehama	-	•	1.106	•	-	•
Safeway, Sacramento	5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4	Amador Butte El Dorado° Fresno Merced Stanislaus Inyo* Mono*	-	-	0.919	-	-	-
Safeway. Richmond	5.44 5.44 5.44 5.44 5.44 5.44 5.44 5.44	Calaveras** El Dorado** Kings* Plumas* Shasta* Tehama* Del Norte Humboldt Lake Mendocino Monterey Santa Clara Santa Cruz Sonoma	-	-	2.092	-	-	142
Safeway, Santa Fe	5.444444 5.5555555555555555555555555555	Calaveras*° Glenn* Lassen* Nevada* Placer* San Diego*° San Joaquin* Siskiyou* Sutter* Tulare* Tuolumne* Kern Riverside San Bernardino Santa Barbara Ventura	-	-	3.758	194	389	530
Safeway. San Diego	5.4 5.4	Imperial San Diegos		•	1,449	- ,	-	-

^{*} indicates a county which is normally served by a different warehouse of the same firm.

 $^{^{\}circ}$ indicates a county which is partially served by a different warehouse of the same firm.

DISTRIBUTION	<u> </u>	RELOCATIO	TRANSPORTATION	ESTIMATED ADDITIONAL				
	TO STORES			TO MASS FEEDING CENTERS		RESCUR	RCE REQUIRE	
CENTER	SHIPPING LEVEL FACTOR	COUNTY	TONS PER WEEK	COUNTY	STRESS FACTORS	TRACTORS	TRAILERS	DRIVER
Vons, Los Angeles	8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0	Riverside San Bernarding San Diego Santa Barbara	3000	Kern	1.727	-	-	26
Alpha Beta, La Habra	8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0	Tulare *° Riverside San Bernardino San Diego Ventura	3900 4200	Riverside San Diego	1.989	-	-	80
Alpha Beta, Milpitas	8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0	Tulare° San Benito San Joaquin Santa Clara Santa Cruz	3200	San Luis Obispo	1.242	-	•	16
Market Basket, Los Angeles			500 1300 3600	Inyo Kern San Luis Obispo	7.390	95	239	255
Fleming Foods, Fremont	6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6	Merced San Joaquin Santa Cruz Sonoma Stanislaus	-	-	1.348	-	-	-
Ralph's, Compton			6000 2900 800 800 400 2700 1700	Butte El Dorado Lassen Plumas San Joaquin Shasta Tehama	5.738	196	579	480
Certified Foods Los Angeles	8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0	Fresno Imperial Inyo Kern Mono Riverside San Bernardino San Diego San Luis Obispo Santa Barbara Tulare Ventura	600 500 3400 1700	San Luis Obispo Santa Barbara Tulare Yentura	2.547	67	151	265
Lucky's. Buena Park	8.0 8.0 8.2 8.0 8.0	Riverside San Bernardino Ventura Fresno** San Joaquin* Sonoma*	1100 1000 1800 100 500 1700 900 5400 1800 2500 600	Glenn Imperial Monterey Riverside San Benito Santa Clara Santa Cruz Shasta Siskiyou Sutter Trinity	12.326	2203	4566	±629

^{*} indicates a county which is normally served by a different warehouse of the same firm.

 $^{^{2}}$ indicates a county which is partially served by a different warehouse of the same firm.

APPENDIX C (continued)

		RELOCAT	ION SHIPMENTS	TRANSPORTATION				
DISTRIBUTION	TO STORES		TO MASS					FEEDING CENTERS
CENTER	SHIPPING LEVEL FACTOR	COUNTY	TONS PER WEEK	COUNTY	STRESS FACTORS		TRAILERS	ORIVERS
Lucky's, Vacaville	8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0	Fresno° Madera Monterey Santa Clara Stanislaus	800 700 4600 1300 2900 500 200 200 30 3300 700	Calaveras Del Norte Humboldt Lake Hendocino Modoc Mono Nevada Sacramento Sonoma Yuba	2.624	75	150	362
Others, Oakland	8.0	Various	19019	! Various	1.380		-	-
Others. Los Angeles	8.0	Various	24216	Various	3.724	258	385	700
Restaurant & Institutional Suppliers, Oakland	5.0	Various	4800 2700 500 2300 2800	Fresno Kings Mariposa Merced Stanislaus	1.350	•	-	-
Restaurant & Institutional Suppliers, Los Angeles	5.0	Various	30 700 800 900 1900 1400 2100 2400 200 4800 1300	Alpine Amador Colusa Fresno Madera Nevada Placer San Joaquin Sierra Tulare	4.236	620	929	1560
TOTAL	! .		į	: :	2.912	3820	7422	9143

^{*} indicates a county which is normally served by a different warehouse of the same firm.

NOTE: In the shipments shown above, it was assumed that grocery chains shipped only to their own stores. However, limited inter-company transfer results in higher store throughput as follows: (1) Ralph's ships to Safeway stores, increasing the Safeway shipping level factor to 7.5; and (2) Lucky warenouses at Vallejo and Buena Park ship to United Grocers, increasing the United Grocers shipping level factor to 3.0.

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indicates a county which is partially served by a different warehouse of the same firm.

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The report traces the existing patterns of food distribution in California, develops and analyzes alternative strategies for redirecting the existing food distribution system to support the imposed population; investigates the transportation requirements imposed by distribution changes; drafts prototype plans for redirecting the state food distribution network in an emergency; and develops appropriate guidelines for the use of Nuclear Civil Protection planners and local officials.

Although roughly 85% of California's extensive agricultural lands are removed from direct threat of nuclear attack, only 21% of the state's food processing capacity is located in unthreatened areas. Food wholesalers, which carry between two and three weeks of food stocks, are the most vulnerable element of the distribuation chain with only 6% of these stocks likely to survive a nuclear attack undamaged. Retail grocers, with one to three weeks of inventory, are distributed in proportion to the population itself, with roughly 10% in areas free from blast effects.

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